Something energetic and spirited  :: Massachusetts Federalists, rational politics, and political economy in the age of Jefferson, 1805-1815/ by Mayo-Bobee, Dinah,
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-2007
"Something energetic and spirited" :: Massachusetts
Federalists, rational politics, and political economy
in the age of Jefferson, 1805-1815/
Dinah, Mayo-Bobee
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mayo-Bobee, Dinah,, ""Something energetic and spirited" :: Massachusetts Federalists, rational politics, and political economy in the
age of Jefferson, 1805-1815/" (2007). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 870.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/870

University of
Massachusetts
Amherst
Library




This is an authorized facsimile, made from the microfilm
master copy of the original dissertation or master thesis
published by UMI.
The bibliographic information for this thesis is contained
in UMI's Dissertation Abstracts database, the only
central source for accessing almost every doctoral
dissertation accepted in North America since 1861.
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106-1346 USA
800.521.0600 734.761.4700
web www.il.proquest.com
UMI DissertationServices
From:Pro£xuest
COMPANY
Printed in 2007 by digital xerographic process
on acid-free paper
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014
https://archive.org/details/somethingenergetOOmayo
"SOMETHING ENERGETIC AND SPIRITED:'' MASSACHUSETTS FEDERALISTS,
RATIONAL POLITICS, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON, 1805-1815
A Dissertation Presented
by
Dinah Mayo-Bobee
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
Of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2007
Five College Graduate Program in History
UMI Number: 3275797
Copyright 2007 by
Mayo-Bo bee, Dinah
All rights reserved.
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
UMI Microform 3275797
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
©Copyright by Dinah Mayo-Bobee 2007
All rights Reserved
-SOMETHING ENERGETIC AND SPIRITED:" MASSACHUSETTS FEDERALISTS.
RATIONAL POLITICS, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON, 1805-1815
A Dissertation Presented
by
DINAH MAYO-BOBEE
Approved as to style and content by:
Barry Levy, Chair
Bruce Laurie, Member
Leonard Richards, Member
Robert Paul Wolff, Member
Audrey L. Altstadt, Department Head
Department of History
'SOMETHING ENERGETIC AND SPIRITED': MASSACHUSETTS FEDERALISTS,
RATIONAL POLITICS, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON, 1805-1815
A Dissertation Presented
by
DINAH MAYO-BOBEE
Approved as to style and content by:
Barry Levy, Chair
ruce Laurie, Member
Leonard Richards, Member
Robert Paul Wolff, Memb
Audrey L. Altstpdt, Department Head
Department of^History

DEDICATION
To Michael.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is impossible to complete a project of this size without the generosity of those
willing to lend their expertise, time, patience, and support in innumerable ways. The
printed and manuscript collections located at the W.E.B. Dubois Library proved
invaluable to my research, as did the assistance and guidance of Melinda C. Mcintosh,
Microforms Reference librarian, Barbara Morgan. Law Collections librarian, and
Elizabeth Campbell of the Microforms and Periodicals department. My sincerest thanks
to the American Antiquarian Society and Boston Athenaeum, as well as the
Massachusetts Historical Society, Neilson Library at Smith College, Mount Holyoke
College Library, and most notably, the Boston Public Library for its treasure trove of
collections.
Deepest gratitude must go to my dissertation committee, Barry Levy whose
seminar in Early American culture yielded so much, including my dissertation topic. To
Leonard Richards, who has worked with me since I entered the Master's program and
keeps me on my toes, and Robert Wolff of Afro-American Studies, for helping me
understand how to make my work informative and appealing to a broader audience. My
heartfelt thanks must go to Bruce Laurie, who cultivated and improved my writing with
patience and a keen interest in my success. Because of his critiques, I learned how to
convey my ideas more effectively, while I enjoyed the writing process.
My sincerest thanks to the History department, especially, Gerald McFarland who
is never been too busy to share his time and expertise, and Patty Ryan and Joyce Grabon
for caring for the details and making sure that everything runs smoothly. I must also
acknowledge the advice, interest, and friendship of Carlin Barton, Joye Bowman, David
v
Glassberg, Stephen Higginson, Laura Lovett, Alice Nash, and Brian Ogilvie. To this list
I add student colleagues whose camaraderie proved invaluable: Brian Bixby, Heather
Murray, Jordan Reed, and Jill Ogline. I must also thank long-time friend Meredith Feltus
of Commonwealth College, who provided inspiration and intellectual stimulation. My
deepest expressions of appreciation and gratitude go to my dear friend Dr. Carolyn
Powell, a consummate professional and elegant scholar who continues to provide support
and advice. And a special thanks to Dr. Christoph Strobel, who as an unofficial mentor
and confidant helped me traverse the pitfalls of academia to reach all of my goals.
Most important is the inspiration that comes from my family. Deserving the utmost
appreciation are my parents Olivia and James Mayo, who indulged my interest in the past
from an early age. For buying me swing era music, print memorabilia, and biographies at
elementary school book fairs, and especially, for their unconditional love and support, a
simple thank you will never be enough. Nonetheless, I thank them with all of my heart.
My blessings have also been immeasurable because of the love and encouragement I
receive daily from Anita and Joseph Bobee, my mother and father in law. For the past
ten years, their unmatched generosity, thoughtfulness, and encouragement have helped
me weather the rough spots and find deeper enjoyment in every success. They have
supported me every step of the way, and for this reason, my affection, and gratitude are
boundless.
Finally, for everything that he is and that has given me, my husband Michael
receives my highest expressions of admiration, praise, and appreciation. It is only
through his consistent support, persistent encouragement, and affection that I have been
able to walk "placidly amid the noise and haste." Michael's hard work and devotion have
vi
sharpened my focus and allowed me to achieve my academic goals and enjoy life in the
process. Thanks for being my sounding board, my rock, and for completely capturing my
heart.
vii
ABSTRACT
' SOMETHING ENERGETIC AND SPIRITED:'' MASSACHUSETTS FEDERALISTS,
RATIONAL POLITICS, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON, 1805-1815
MAY 2007
DINAH MAYO-BOBEE, B.A., NORWICH UNIVERSITY
M.A.. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Barry J. Levy
This dissertation examines the resurgence of Massachusetts Federalists in national
politics from 1805 through 1815. During this ten-year period. Federalists were relegated
to the periphery of national politics as the Democratic-Republican majority in Congress
passed a string of controversial commercial policies directed at French and British
violations of America's neutral trade. However, the rejection of bipartisan solutions,
along with the anti-commercialism and sectional bias in Jeffersonian political economy,
precipitated a resurgence of the Federalist Party after 1805. In Congress, Federalists, led
by Massachusetts' representatives, compensated for their dwindling numbers and
influence in the national arena by adopting a populist stance and opposition platform that
attracted New England voters. In fact, this study suggests that national expansion, the
spread of slavery, and Jefferson's agrarian ethos, played a more significant role in the
Democratic-Republican Party's rise to national prominence after 1800, than a widespread
rejection of Federalist elitism. By testing the validity of Federalist claims that New
England's ability to safeguard its interests in national government diminished in direct
proportion to the nation's growth, we gain a better understanding of the emergence of
viii
New England nationalism and the deepening sectional hostilities that threatened the
survival of the Union. Finally, through its reassessment of the Federalists' opposition to
commercial restrictions and their calls for constitutional reform to abolish slave quotas,
this dissertation departs from the focus of previous studies, expands the discourse
surrounding early national politics, and places Federalists in their appropriate historical
context.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1805, a Federalist from Salem traveled to Boston for what he
believed would be the "last induction of federal men to office." Already. Democratic-
Republicans had made enormous progress, and Thomas Jefferson had just won his
second presidential victory, with Massachusetts* help. So, many Federalists were bracing
themselves for the Federalist Party's demise. Indeed, the same idea no doubt occurred to
Jefferson, who took time in his second inaugural address to condemn the '"demoralizing
licentiousness" of the partisan press and his Federalist opposition. But the overall tone of
his speech was optimistic and buoyant. Jefferson accepted his reelection as evidence that
there was a "union of sentiment" in the nation, which augured "harmony and happiness to
our future course." He ended the speech positively, predicting that the federal
government, having divine guidance, would act wisely and secure the "friendship, and
approbation of all nations." 1
It would only be a short period of time before Jefferson and distraught Federalists
realized that the sun was not ready to set on Federalism. Events would conspire to give
the Federalist Party newfound popularity, and turn Jefferson's optimism into despair, as
he watched his foreign and domestic policies undermine his administration's success.
The following study investigates the resurgence of Massachusetts Federalists, and
chronicles the party's transition from leading defenders of the Constitution and
republican government to advocates of constitutional reform and disunion.
1
Robert E. Moody. The SaltonstaU Papers. 1607-1815 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society. 1974).
2:185, 242; State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States (Boston: T.B. Wait & Sons, 1814),
1: 253-259.
1
Few historians have looked closely at the external factors that figured prominently
in the Federalists' transformation during the Age of Jefferson. Yet, it is vital to do so
when we investigate the circumstances that led to the Federalists' revival, and the
emergence of radical Federalism as a dominating force in the party. With a concentration
on the Federalists' role and treatment as the opposition party in national politics, this
work departs from the conventional studies, which focus on developments within the
party to explain significant changes in the Federalists' political culture. By emphasizing
the partisan climate in and outside of the national legislature, it is possible to challenge
several assumptions about the Federalists, and reassess the party's role and contribution
to early national politics.
When investigating the Federalists in the Age of Jefferson, the Massachusetts
wing of the party figures most prominently in the party's development and history. As a
party ideology Federalism found its fullest expression in Massachusetts, where cultural
and political institutions produced the intellectual and philosophical basis for the
American Revolution and the institutions needed to establish and maintain republican
government.
2
Massachusetts Federalists led their state's ratification of the U.S.
Constitution in 1788, but were soon battling inequities in the government they had helped
to create. As a result, interrelated themes, both commercial and political emerge in this
study to explain the Federalists' violent reaction to Jefferson's restrictive policy. Thus,
this dissertation focuses primarily on national politics, and argues that the Federalists'
experiences in the Halls of Congress, especially during debates over the protection and
: James Banner, To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins ofParty Politics in
Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), ix, x, 3-11.
2
future of commerce, challenged Federalists' nationalism, altered their relationship to the
federal government, and informed their response to national policy.
The Federalist Party dominated national politics in the 1790s: but between 1800
and 1805. they were reduced to minority status in the federal government. One reason
this occurred was President Jefferson's removal of Federalists from any federal offices at
the national and state level that involved decision-making or enforcement of public
policy.
3
Thus, President Jefferson's famous conciliatory proclamation. ''We are all
republicans: we are all federalists." in his first inaugural address, did not translate into
bipartisan patronage.
4
Moreover, the Democratic-Republican majority in Congress
followed Jefferson's lead, and when it came to commercial policy, attempted to exclude
Federalists from debate and prevent them from passing legislation.
As this study will show, the Federalists' role as the minority party took on greater
importance after 1805 because as Jefferson's political economy began to operate as a
direct threat to Massachusetts' economic stability and growth, the proposals sponsored by
the state's Federalists, who called for the protection of commerce, were marginalized and
disregarded in Congress. Moreover, Jefferson reversed many of the Federalists'
economic and military policies to reduce the size of government, and these policies left
foreign trade vulnerable to attack when the European wars resumed in 1803. Unwilling
to use the military as an option, Jeffersonians placed prohibitions on commerce in
' See for example. Carl E. Prince, 'The Passing of the Aristocracy: Jefferson's Removal of the Federalists,
1801-1805" Journal ofAmerican Histon 57 (Dec. 1970): 563-575; and Mark A. Graber. "Establishing
Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall Court" Political Research Quarterlx 51 (Mar..
1998): 221-239.
4
State Papers and Publick Documents of the United States: From the Accession of Thomas Jefferson to the
Presidency, Exhibiting a complete View of Our Foreign Relations Since That Time, 3 vols. (Boston: T.B.
Wait & Sons, 1814), 1: 10.
3
response to French and British depredations on American ships in the Caribbean and
Atlantic.
When reports of seizures and impressments reached the Jefferson administration,
their responses set off a firestorm of protests led by Massachusetts Federalists. One of
the primary reasons for the intensity in the Federalists' tone was the majority's disregard
of the solutions they posed in Congress. By belittling the Federalists' proposals to
protect commerce and fortify the nation's coasts and harbors, Jeffersonians eventually
alienated New Englanders. Moreover, the sectionalism in Jeffersonian policy became
apparent as southern Democratic-Republicans questioned the importance of commerce
and blocked any measures that threatened southern agriculture.
The frequent rejection or defeat of Federalist bills and resolutions, coupled with the
sectional rancor that surfaced in debates over commercial policy, sparked Federalists'
protests, which escalated into calls for nullification, disunion, and constitutional reform.
Nothing could prepare the President for the criticism and resistance he encountered when
he implemented commercial coercion and used the nation's commerce as a weapon to
force France and Britain to end their violation of the national neutrality. Jeffersonians
expanded the Executive's authority and imposed harsh measures to enforce trade
restrictions to deal with the growing crisis. These policies sparked mob action and calls
for nullification or disunion in Massachusetts. Bay State voters sent a Federalist majority
to Congress and replaced Jeffersonians in state and congressional elections.
Much of Massachusetts repudiated the national government and petitioned the
General Court to nullify the Force Act. Several towns formed paramilitary groups to
thwart enforcement of the law, and the General Court attempted to form a Confederacy of
4
New England States. The Embargo was repealed and tensions died down; but once New
England nationalism surfaced, it remained a part of the public discourse. The War of
1812 produced the Federalists' last significant statement of protest. By this time, the
radicals, who helped to restore the party, were relegated to the sidelines. Moderates
softened the Federalists' tone hoping to restore the party to national status, or curry favor
with Democratic-Republicans in Washington. However, the wartime disunionism and
New England nationalism that emerged after 1808 overshadowed the moderates' efforts.
Instead of reestablishing a national coalition, the Federalist Party decomposed after the
War of 1812 and disbanded permanently in the 1820s.
Through a detailed analysis of the issues and rationale for the Federalist Party's
response to Jeffersonian political economy, this study makes crucial distinctions between
political thought and action. One of the important issues addressed herein is the meaning
of Thomas Jefferson's victory in 1800. The argument that Jefferson's election signaled a
general rejection of Federalist elitism after 1800 does not explain why Federalists, after
becoming the spokesmen of the people, did not fare better in national elections. Nor does
it clarify, satisfactorily, the reason that Jeffersonians, who abandoned their
decentralization platform to adopt the Federalists' taxation, military, banking,
manufacturing policies, continue to win the presidency. This is especially perplexing
after the nation suffered through ten years of disastrous policies that ended in sectional
strife, turmoil, and war. Most of all, the elitism argument does not account for why the
Jeffersonian leadership, itself composed of a gentry class, was not rejected on that basis.
This gives rise to another important theme that emerges in the dissertation,
namely the effects of westward expansion and the extension of slavery on national
5
elections after 1800. Federalists reached the conclusion that the three-fifths clause would
give the slave states an unfair advantage and minimize New England's voice in the
central government. Indeed, the dissertation tests the Federalists' assertions and explores
the connection between the commercial restrictions that began in 1805-1806, and the
spread of the South 's slave economies.
Historiographically, this dissertation relies to some extent on the republican
synthesis interpretation. In the 1960s and 70s, Gordon Wood, Bernard Bailyn, and J.G.A.
Pocock refined the argument that classical republicanism, civic humanism, and post-
Restoration English opposition writers laid the intellectual foundation for the ideologies
that fueled the American Revolution. From these sources, historians argue, the founders
arrived at an understanding that republican government required the support of
independent, virtuous citizens who elected disinterested men to serve under a balanced,
mixed constitution with checks on the abuse of power. 5
Lance Banning, Stanley Elkins, Eric McKitrick, and Drew McCoy applied the
republican synthesis to the formation of political parties in the 1790s, and in addition to
the basic elements of classical republicanism and civic humanism, applied the court-
country divisions of seventeenth century England to the ideological divisions to early
national politics. Succinctly put, the country segment of English society, which
represented the landed gentry, was suspicious of unchecked power in the hands of a few
3
Robert E. Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography'' William and Mary Quarterly,
39. (Apr.. 1982): 335; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge:
Belknap Press. Harvard University Press. 1967). 22-54. 230-317: J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1975): Lance Banning. The Jejfersonian Persuasion: Evolution ofa Party Ideology
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1978); Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The
Early American republic, 1788-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993): Doron S. Ben-Atar,
The Origins ofJejfersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 4,
5.
6
rapacious men. These suspicions grew from the fact that the men of the court operated
within the confines of a government far removed from local authority and were therefore
less accountable. The court was made up of powerful men stationed near the seat of
government. They received power through royal patronage and influenced public
finances through their association with commercial centers in London.
In the United States, Antifederalists and then Democratic-Republicans assumed
the characteristics of the country; and Federalists, the court. By the 1790s, debates in
Congress over plans to fund the government and disputes over the size and strength of the
federal government polarized politicians. Divisions emerged between Democratic-
Republicans who endorsed Madisonian protective tariffs and discriminating duties as a
source of funding and small government, and Federalists who supported the Hamiltonian
finance options, which included the assumption of state debts, a national bank, and
encouragement of manufacturing. From this dispute emerged warring political parties,
both attempting to avoid corruption and collapse of the American republic, and both
attempting to impose its interpretation of virtue and republicanism on the operation of the
national government. By 1800, country politicians, with their fear of centralized
government and conspiratorial aristocrats, permanently unseated the court party.
Historians examining the Federalist Party were influenced by the republican
synthesis. From the 1960s through the 1980s David Fischer, James Banner, Linda
Kerber, and Ronald Formisano explained that Federalists were attached to republican
notions of a virtuous society governed by the most successful, accomplished, yet
h
Banning, Jeffersonian Persuasion. 130-134.139. 200-207: Elkins and McKitrick. Age of Federalism, 13-
15, 18-25, Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America. (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 68-75,136-165.
7
disinterested men of society. As they saw it, Republicanism governed every aspect of
Federalism from their support of strong central government, social programs, educations,
and cultural development. 7
The most influential look at Massachusetts Federalism was James Banner's To the
Hartford Convention (1970). Banner's detailed analysis established the context in which
Massachusetts Federalists emerged and organized their base to rally around what became
an opposition to the "southern hue" in national politics, culminating at the Hartford
Convention in 1815. Banner also maintained that Massachusetts Federalists "'because of
their historical and provincial situation...remained more rigidly confined to the original
categories of revolutionary thought." 8 Yet, the effect of grounding Federalists so firmly
in classical republicanism is that they were consigned by historians to an old and obsolete
order and, that compared to the liberal Jeffersonians, was obsolete by the nineteenth
century. Scholars, most notably Joyce Appleby, in her book Capitalism and a New
Social Order (1984) argued that the Jeffersonians' forward-looking vision freed the
nation from the restraints of republicanism. Unlike Federalists, she claims, Jeffersonians
allowed Americans to focus on individual pursuits and escape the confines of
republicanism and embrace the capitalism of the Atlantic world. '"Republicans created a
movement that was national in scope and universal in its ideological appeal."9 Thus, by
1800, it was inevitable that Jeffersonians capture the national government.
7
David Hackett Fisher, The Revolution ofAmerican Consen'atism: The Federalist Party in the Era of
Jeffersonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), Banner. Hartford Convention. 22-24; Linda
K. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian America (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 1970). 201. 202, 206: and Ronald P. Formisano, Transformation of Political Culture:
Massachusetts Parties. 1790s-1840s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). 57.
8
Banner, Hartford Convention, 86.
9
Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican vision of the 1790s (New York:
8
The drift away from the republican synthesis prompted Banner to question the
rigidity of republicanism in Federalist thought, and to suggest that the court-country
concept as applied to the Federalist Party is obsolete. Banner acknowledges that
Federalism experienced significant transformations closely resembling the "country"
model after 1800, and other historians have already begun to abandon strict adherence to
the republican synthesis and discuss the liberalism in Federalist politics. 10
My work agrees with the assessment that classical republicanism was an
important aspect of Federalist politics, and argues that Federalists began to reflect
Lockean concepts of liberal government. For Federalists, at least initially, the U.S.
Constitution would foster republican virtue and civic-minded citizens under a balanced
government with checks and balances to thwart corruption and anarchy. When
Federalists resurfaced after 1805, they fully embraced the Lockean notions of freedom
from arbitrary power, which undergirded their rejection of Jeffersonian commercial
restrictions the General Court deemed by 1 809 to be ''oppressive on the community,"
subversive of civil liberties, and therefore, a threat to the Union."
Both Federalists and Democratic-Republicans grappled with the constraints of
classical republicanism and the commercial implications of Lockean liberalism, but in
New York University Press, 1984), 17. 49,78, 86, 96; Also see "Thomas Jefferson and the Psychology of
Democracy" in James Horn, Jan Ellen Lewis, and Peter S. Onuf, The Revolution of 1800: Democracy,
Race, and the New Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002), 159, 160, 166-171:
Peter Onuf, "A Different Kind ol'Independence: The Postwar Restructuring of the Historical Study of
Early America" William and Mary Quarterly 50 (Apr.. 1993): 262-264; and "The Scholars' Jefferson"
William and Man Quarterly 50 (Oct., 1993): 676-684. 696,
10 James Banner. "The Federalists - Still in Need of Reconsideration" in Doron Ben-Atar and Barbara B.
Oberg, eds. Federalist Reconsidered (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia. 1998). 246-253.
" For example compare John Locke. Second Treatise of Government ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company. Inc., 1980), 17-30 to U.S. 10th Congress. Senate, Memorial and
Remonstrance From the Legislature of the State ofMassachusetts Against Certain Acts. ..February 27'
h
,
1809, (Washington: R.C. Weightman, 1809). 3-9.
9
fundamentally different ways. 12 As Steven Watts and Donald Hickey have shown,
Federalists while social and cultural conservatives critical of unfettered democracy
advocated "commercial growth, entrepreneurial achievement, and individual
independence." While in power, they encouraged neutrality with both France and
England, and promoted the economic development that brought national prosperity in the
1790s. Jeffersonians, on the other hand, promoted democracy and national expansion,
and hinted at laissez-faire economics. But the rhetorical subtext and consequences of
their restrictive system exposed a growing aversion to capitalism and commerce when
independent of agrarian surplus. Furthermore, the Democratic-Republicans' pro-French
policies strained diplomatic relations with Great Britain, while their anti-commercial
rhetoric deepened sectional discord. Ultimately, the Jeffersonians' inability to purge
themselves of Physiocratic economic theories, Revolution era biases, and slavery,
wrecked the nation's economy, impaired foreign diplomacy, and eventually resulted in an
extemporized war with Great Britain. 13
In reality, the heady notions of republicanism and Lockean liberalism resonated
with voters at election time, but had little practical value to political practitioners fighting
to be taken seriously in Congress. These theories even lost their value with voters when
crucial developments, such as the cessation of all trade under the Embargo of 1807 or the
War of 1812, disrupted their daily lives. Yet, in Congress both parties expressed political
1
Banner, Hartford Convention, 22-24: Linda Kerber, Federalists in Dissent, 201. 202; Formisano,
Transformation of Political Culture, 57.
1
See Donald Hickey. "Federalist Defense Policy in the Age of Jefferson. 1801-1812" Military Affairs,
45:2 (Apr.. 1981): 63-70; Steven Watts, "Ministers. Misanthropes, and Mandarins: The Federalists and
the Culture of Capitalism. 1790-1820" and Paul Finkelman. "The Problem of Slavery in the Age of
Federalism." in Ben-Atar and Oberg, Federalists Reconsidered (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1998), 135-175.
10
concerns and policy recommendations using these ideological terms. The importance of
such concepts must be contemplated and understood as part of the political dialogue that
helped Americans choose their political leaders. But actions ultimately decided the
course of political history, and this study focuses on how these actions made an impact on
New England voters and their return to the Federalist Party.
Like historians Paul Finkelman, Tim Matthewson, and Leonard Richards, my
work also recognizes the Federalists* progressive approach to slavery and race, as seen in
their promotion of Negro suffrage and their resistance to the expansion of slavery. 14
Even as the political aspects of slavery expansion come into focus, my work sees
Federalists also drawn into the abolition debate. More important is my dissertation's
discussion of how African-Americans in New England came to view the Federalist Party.
Thus, the degree to which sectionalism affected Federalist thought is an important theme
in this study.
This study challenges traditional interpretations that see Federalists as retrograde
conservatives, too attached to outmoded ideologies and elitism to deal with the
socioeconomic or international challenges that faced Americans in the nineteenth
century. However, in the end, as my work demonstrates, radical Federalists earned Bay
Staters' gratitude and their critique of Jeffersonianism evolved into a denunciation of
slavery expansion that established the tone for the free labor debates and antislavery
politics of the antebellum period.
u
Paul Finkelman, "The Problem of Slavery." 158, 159. 161, 146: Tim Matthewson. A Proslavery Foreign
Policy: Haitian-American Relations During the Early Republic (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 63-
64; Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 42-45, 109.
11
Jeffersonian Republicans, on the other hand, were unable to purge themselves of
Revolution-era biases and slavery, which impaired foreign diplomacy, wrecked New
England's economy, and precipitated an ill-conceived war with Great Britain. Like
Leonard W. Levy, Burton Spivak, and Doron Ben-Atar, this study questions Jeffersonian
commercial policies and diplomacy. 13 My thesis ultimately challenges the uncritical
celebration of Jeffersonianism and subsequent condemnation of Federalists seen in most
works.
16 And by placing Federalists in the context that informed their antagonistic
approach to Jeffersonian policies, this dissertation establishes the Federalists' important
contributions to early national politics, and hopefully, as James Banner suggests, will
"rescue Federalists from the dustbin of historiography."
17
Chapter one looks at Massachusetts* tradition of economic independence from the
colonial period through the American Revolution and chronicles the emergence of
political parties in the 1790s.The chapter argues that Federalism was an organic product
of Massachusetts' sociopolitical institutions and as such, struggled with conflicting
regional interests in Congress that by 1806, had become protests over the slave ratio in
1?
Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A Biography, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1970), 916-918.
Leonard W. Levy, Jefferson and Civil Liberties: The Darker Side (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1989).
passim: Burton Spivak, Jefferson 's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1979), xi-xii, 103, 210: 220-225; Ben-Atar, Origins of
Jeffersonian Commercial Policy and Diplomacy, 165-172; Robert W. Tucker and David C Hendrickson,
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the Constitution and the Jeffersonians inability or unwillingness to defend New
England's commercial interests. Chapter two looks closely at the rhetoric and
implications surrounding the Saint Domingue or Haitian embargo of 1806. Not only did
Federalists recognize the harmful nature of Jeffersonian commercial policies; but also as I
suggest, the restrictive system exposed the limits of Jeffersonian thinking and facilitated
the deepening of sectional hostilities and the resurgence of Federalism.
Chapters three and four deal with the problems in Jeffersonian diplomacy with
France and Britain between 1806 and 1807, and explore the perception that the federal
government was unwilling to care for the interests of Massachusetts' merchants or
seamen without trade restrictions. Chapter three focuses on the escalation of ship
seizures and impressments and argues that this development was closely tied to the pro-
French bias in Jeffersonian diplomacy. Most disturbing were the congressional debates
over nonimportation in which southerners accused corrupt merchants and seamen of
causing the crisis. As chapter four demonstrates, after failed diplomacy, Jeffersonians
placed an embargo on all shipping. In certain areas, Bay State residents were jolted by
the law's prejudicial enforcement and the government's willingness to use military force
against its own citizens. Here, I argue that the congressional majority's dismissal of Bay
State petitions and memorials, along with northern Democratic-Republicans' support for
Jefferson's Embargo, enabled Federalists to construct a compelling critique of
Jeffersonian policies that helped them in the election of 1808, when Massachusetts'
voters elected a Federalist majority to represent them in the national legislature.
The final two chapters deal with the emergence of New England nationalism.
Chapter five examines the consequences of extending Jefferson's Embargo and imposing
13
the Draconian Force Act (1809). Bay Staters rejected federal authority, as this chapter
demonstrates, and were ready to act on threats of nullification and disunion. Because of
their unrelenting fight against commercial restrictions, Federalists gained even more
power in Massachusetts. Chapter six looks at Madison's anti-Federalist intrigues before
the War of 1812, the basis for the Federalists' antiwar protests, and the issues that
contributed to the demise of the Federalist Party, including the enervating effect of
moderates. But the final chapter also looks at the Federalists' fight against slavery
expansion and sees it as the forerunner of controversies over the spread of slavery in
antebellum politics.
This dissertation reassesses Federalism while recognizing the problems that
plagued the party throughout its existence. In the meantime, certain Federalists figure
more prominently and more favorably than others. Massachusetts' representatives
Timothy Pickering and Josiah Quincy took the lead in Congress and therefore play an
important part in this narrative. Unlike conventional studies, because this work questions
the validity of radical Federalists' charges against Democratic-Republicans, it casts them
in a very different light. When measured by the reception that radical Federalists
received in Massachusetts, we get a very different impression of their successes and
failures in Congress.
This study challenges the traditional criticisms of the Federalist Party and
examines their opposition to Jeffersonianism from a different perspective. Understanding
the external factors that contributed to the party's demise reveals much about the future
of the republic. The Democratic-Republican attempt to stifle Federalist voices in
Congress proscribed the party, but could not destroy its ideals. The study will not
14
compensate for every deficiency in Federalist historiography, but it will bring new
arguments into the debate over the place of liberal capitalism and the stirrings in the
Federalist Party that shaped the contours of antebellum politics and directed the course
American political history. 18
18
Ibid., 246-253.
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CHAPTER 1
THE "GLOOMY NIGHT OF DEMOCRACY:'" THE ELECTION OF 1 800
In 1689, Sir Josiah Child, president of the East India Company, assessed the
British colonies and praised New Englanders for their "frugality, industry, and
temperance." Although he admired their laws, which promoted longevity and fecundity,
Child was not at all pleased with certain aspects of New England's development. Unlike
"those more southerly," New England's colonists were more economically independent
than was desirable. Their advanced socioeconomic systems, shipbuilding, and "natural
industry," while commendable, encouraged resistance to royal authority and, far too
often, violation of navigation acts and other laws governing commerce. "New England is
the most prejudicial plantation to this Kingdom," he surmised. Child recognized, nearly a
century before the American Revolution, that New England's commercial culture was
leading to the "diminution" of British influence in America. 19
Child's observations were penetrating and prophetic. Seventeenth century New
Englanders were more attentive to their own interests than to those of Great Britain,
which proved to be a first and significant step toward self-government. By the second
half of the eighteenth century, Britain's attempts to rein in its precocious colonists,
especially those in Massachusetts, ended in outright rebellion and the permanent rejection
of British rule. Trade restrictions, taxation, along with a steady diet of classical
republicanism, Enlightenment philosophy, and the covenant ideology undergirding New
19
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England's social and political development, nourished an apocalyptic angst among the
colonists. Revolution, war, and independence soon followed.
20
As New England's largest, oldest, and most petulant colony. Massachusetts
prided itself on its revolutionary credentials. Not only was it the birthplace of luminaries,
such as Samuel Adams. John Adams, John Hancock, and Paul Revere, Massachusetts
saw itself as a beacon of liberty and the exemplar of republican virtue. Both before and
after the American Revolution, no other colony in British North America, and no other
state in the newly formed United States was as sensitive to commercial restrictions or
threats to its economy - real or perceived - than Massachusetts. These sentiments were
fully absorbed by the Federalist Party, and for this reason, Massachusetts Federalists
played a unique and important role in early national politics. Their emergence and
maturation is the focus of this study.
When comparing the economic cultures that emerged in New England with those
of the southern colonies, Child's observations also anticipate divisions amongst the
colonists that were directly related to economic independence. While New England built
ships and bred seamen, the southern colonies produced agricultural staples through
2
1
slavery, which generated "employment for four men in England."' After independence
from Great Britain Americans from all quarters were elected to care for the needs of these
diverse economic systems, but also indulged their sectional prejudices. As this study will
show, because of their efforts to combat threats to New England's economy, Federalists
2(1
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formulated and articulated an antislavery, anti-southern philosophy that contributed to
their diminished role in national government. Federalists would redefine New England's
identity and role in nineteenth century politics by sparking a campaign that questioned
slave representation and demanded the national government's commitment to New
England's economic freedom.
Before discussing how these sentiments were articulated in national politics, it is
important to first consider the evolution of the interface between government and
economic development that became embedded in Massachusetts' politics. Colonial
government fostered economic development in Massachusetts through land grants and
protective tariffs that sparked the growth of industries such as glass and brick
manufacturers, saltworks, and textile milling during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Special acts and laws directed towns to prepare young and poor men and
women to enter the work force through apprenticeships, schools in industrial arts, and
indentures. Public lotteries also contributed to the construction and even the rebuilding
of manufacturers. For example, the Massachusetts legislature held a lottery to raise
£1,250 to restore the Germantown Glass Works after it burned down in 1756. Industrial
towns were common by the 1760s; but even before the erection of flour and textile mills,
sawmills and sundry manufacturers, coastal communities such as Boston, Salem, and
Newburyport developed fisheries and thrived because of offshore whaling, shipbuilding,
and maritime commerce. 22
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Governments were created to encourage and regulate, but never hamper, the
diverse economic interests of the Commonwealth. The state constitution of 1 780 and the
Articles of Confederation had been drafted to meet these expectations. 23 By the late
1780s. however, wealth and power were centered in the coastal areas of the state, and
taxation to pay the state's debts clashed with the post-war recovery and financial security
of farmers in western Massachusetts. Meeting federal tax quotas under the Articles
sparked conflicts that exposed the need for a new federal constitution. From 1782
through 1785, fanners in Hampshire. Berkshire, Worcester, Bristol, Plymouth, York,
Cumberland, and Lincoln counties repulsed tax collectors - often violently. When over
600 farmers led by Samuel Ely, marched into Northampton to burn it in 1782, Governor
Hancock and the General Court eased tensions by relaxing efforts to collect overdue
taxes. After his election in 1785, however, Governor James Bowdoin increased pressure
on delinquent taxpayers and with the state legislature passed laws to force collectors into
seizing property for back taxes, or else have their own property confiscated and sold at
auction. Farmers petitioned the state for leniency but the legislature was unrelenting. In
response, indebted farmers closed county courts across central Massachusetts, and in
January 1787, Captain Daniel Shays led armed units to the Springfield armory where they
clashed with militia. Three men were killed and Shays' forces retreated, but the General
court repealed its harsh tax codes and postponed payment of federal taxes. 24
2<
Handlin and Handlin, Commonwealth, 20, 28. 32-33.
2i
Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists. Taxation, and the Origins of the Constitution
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 108-121; Patrick T. Conley and John P. Kaminski,
eds., The Constitution and the States: The Role of the Original Thirteen in the Framing and Adoption of
the Federal Constitution (Madison: Madison House Publishers, Inc.. 1988), 115, 1 16.
19
By 1788 a new constitution had been drafted and returned to the states for
ratification, and at this point, the philosophies that once united revolutionary Americans
splintered them into two opposing camps. The Constitution's drafters restructured the
federal government and strengthened it with powers previously denied under the Articles.
These included the creation of executive and judiciary branches, the power to raise a
military, and the authority to impose taxes. Federalists, alarmed by the disorder of
Shays' Rebellion, encouraged strong central government as a way to foster stability and
perpetuate the Union. But Antifederalists, frightened that relinquishing states'
prerogatives would engender absolutism, were hostile toward the Constitution, and
contested ratification on the grounds that it threatened liberties the Revolution was fought
to obtain.
Elbridge Gerry of Marblehead, a delegate at the Constitutional Convention and
future Democratic-Republican governor of Massachusetts, opposed ratification because
he disliked centralization and the new government's ability to organize a treasury
department and create a peacetime army. Gerry had refused to sign the Constitution and
actively opposed ratification. 25 This is not to argue that a direct connection exists
between the Antifederalists and Democratic-Republicans. In fact, one of the leading
Federalists of the Constitution era, James Madison, who spearheaded the call for a new
constitution and worked closely with Alexander Hamilton, the most controversial
25
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Federalist, on the persuasive Federalists (1788), became a leading Democratic-
Republican shortly after ratification/
Nevertheless, objections to the Constitution give us an indication of the
philosophical conflict that set Federalists and Democratic-Republicans apart. Leading
Antifederalists who dreaded any attempts to establish an aristocracy or monarchy through
centralization, did not automatically relinquish their trepidation after ratification, nor did
the people of several Massachusetts towns that rejected the Constitution. Many also
disapproved of clauses that safeguarded slavery and gave Southerners representation for
their slaves. During the debates, Federalists Rufus King, George Cabot, and Francis
Dana supported the three-fifths clause; but others, including Gerry. James Warren, and
Jeremy Belknap, objected to every concession made to slaveholders, including
continuation of the Atlantic slave trade for twenty years.
27
Proponents of the Constitution
prevailed, but only narrowly, in a 187 to 168 vote. Yet, once Massachusetts ratified the
Constitution, albeit by just nineteen votes, resistance to its implementation and authority
became a political liability. 28
Government's conspicuous hand in economic development continued under the
new Constitution. Massachusetts' emissaries in Congress were expected to be guardians
of their state's rights and privileges. In this respect, they were no different from the
representatives of other states. Provincial attitudes and prejudices often dictated whether
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congressmen and senators cooperated or opposed matters debated in the U.S. Congress.
Even though many of Massachusetts' representatives aspired to a nationalist outlook,
most kept a close eye on legislation that affected the state and its influence in the new
government.
Federalists in the national government reflected breeding that inculcated citizens
with Massachusetts' history, lore, and tradition; but they also responded to a confluence
of ideological currents convinced them that sociocultural stability was necessary for
success. Most of all, they were accustomed to government support and encouragement of
public works, agriculture, manufacturing and commerce, and expected nothing less under
the Constitution." For Federalists then, support of a strong central government was
commensurate with protecting Massachusetts' interests. In Congress, they supported
fiscal policies that harmonized with the Commonwealth's interests. Particularism came
to dominate their discourse and policy.
The U.S. Constitution gave Congress control over commerce, and the majority of
those elected to national office were personally invested in upholding the Constitution
and promoting their state's economic interests. The General Court elected Northampton
lawyer and future governor Caleb Strong, along with George Cabot of Beverly, to serve
as senators in the First Congress. Both were engaged in the state's maritime and
manufacturing industries. Strong was a lawyer who began a mercantile business before
the Revolution; and Cabot, who was also a merchant, had opened maritime trade with
Russia and helped found the Beverly Cotton Manufactory. 30 Salem merchant Benjamin
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Goodhue and the wealthy attorney, speculator, and farmer Theodore Sedgwick of
Berkshire County were elected by popular vote to the U.S. House of Representatives
along with lawyers George Thacher (sometimes spelled Thatcher) of Yarmouth and
Fisher Ames of Dedham. By and large, the state's first congressional delegations
reflected its diverse economic interests and had been advocates for the Constitution
during the ratification debates. By the 1790s, these men were identified as Federalists or
Federalist-Republicans, and shared Sedgwick's sentiment that Massachusetts was the
"prop of the union.
"
31
Since most Federalists came from the middling or well-to-do families of
Massachusetts, it should surprise no one that they advocated governance by the well bred
and educated of society. David H. Fischer's prosopographical study of Federalists
describes the old and new school progression in Federalist Party politics. The '"old
school" generation of Federalists included Revolutionary leaders such as John Adams,
signer of the Declaration of Independence and member of the Constitutional Convention.
Mostly born between 1720 and 1760, as younger men the elder Federalists, according to
Fischer, "had been capable of extraordinarily effective political leadership." Old school
Federalists were conservative in their views and suspicious of unbridled democracy; but
by 1800, the aging generation had passed the torch to "new school" Federalists. Born
between 1760 and 1789, new school Federalists came of age during the Revolution and
entered political life as political parties and the democratic process were beginning to
take shape. One example of a new school Federalist is Josiah Quincy, who chose politics
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as a career, and with others of his generation, looked to party organization, campaigns,
and public caucuses to combat the Democratic-Republicans' surge to power in
Massachusetts.
3 '
Whether old or new school, however, as James Banner assures us, Federalists
"were confident of their state's commanding stature and certain that they represented not
one interest group, not one class, but the interests of all the people of the state."
33
Following the depressions and uncertainties of the 1780s, Massachusetts' economy
stabilized and began to flourish in an economic culture that balanced commerce,
agriculture, and manufacturing. Three years after the Constitution was drafted, the
backlog of unpaid taxes that provoked Shays' Rebellion had been reduced from £497,474
to £33,847. Furthermore, they were collected with no further violence toward the courts
or collectors.
34
Custodianship of Massachusetts' interests informed the deportment of old
and new school Federalists in Congress, who supported legislation as long as it promoted
commerce, encouraged fiscal stability, and safeguarded the rights of property holders. 35
In Congress, the Mid-Atlantic, southern, and western states brought ideas,
perspectives, and objectives to the national legislature that sometimes conflicted with
New Englanders' ambitions. However, each region vied for influence or control in
Congress, so stability in the new nation required a level of compromise not easily
obtained. Most contentious was the relationship between southern agriculturalists and
New England commercialists. Separated by miles of geography and centuries of
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distinctively different cultural and intellectual development, the strife that escalated in
early national politics would involve these sharply conflicting regional perspectives,
socioeconomic imperatives, and political philosophies. 36
Fundamental differences of opinion and priority surfaced as soon as the national
legislature assembled in 1789. In April, when James Madison of Virginia proposed
raising revenue for the federal government through a system of temporary tariffs on
European imports and tonnage duties on ships built in America, Massachusetts'
congressmen Fisher Ames, Benjamin Goodhue, and George Thacher opposed his bill. 37
They rejected an eight cents impost on mm and molasses because it would unfairly
impact Massachusetts' economy. Madison's tariff would not only damage the West
Indian trade, it would also harm the state's fisheries, and manufacturing, "Nay it would
carry devastation through all the New England states," Ames demurred. Madison asked
if northerners are "the chosen few?" Other southern proponents of the impost cited the
harmful affects of New England rum. James Jackson of Georgia caviled, "New England
mm [is] five hundred times as bad in its effect" as spirits distilled elsewhere, before he
urged the House to "discourage the use of bad spirits." Thacher fired back, "If the
pernicious effect of New England mm have been justly lamented, what can be urged for
Negro slavery?" Massachusetts' delegates were able to reduce the duty on molasses to
five cents, but the tariff initiated one of many sectional conflicts that emerged in the First
Congress.
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Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton's financial system proved more
controversial than Madison's. In a series of reports, Hamilton advocated funding the
national debt, federal assumption of state debts, creating a national bank to establish the
nation's credit, and encouraging domestic manufacturers. To former Antifederalist and
southerners, Hamilton's policies, Lance Banning writes, "brought to mind the entire
system of eighteenth-century English governmental finance" and evoked fears that the
government was adopting the "'whole extent and reach of the social and governmental
corruption that crept into English life."39 Hamilton's policies, especially his program for
the assumption of state debts, smacked of the autocratic corruption that the Constitution
might permit.
Not only did Hamilton's reports deepen sectional divisions, they also generated
polarization along ideological lines and gave birth to the oppositional Democratic-
Republican Party. Democratic-Republicans saw glimpses of the British finance system in
Hamilton's proposals, and a consolidation of power in the federal government that
infringed on state rights. Nor were they pleased with the preference given to the nation's
financial and mercantile interests or the federal government's control over internal
taxation.
40
But Federalists endorsed Hamilton's plans because, for one thing, they would
create a federal cash reserve from which merchants and investors could borrow to
develop the nation's industries. The promotion of industry was a fundamental principle
of Federalism.
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Essentially, at the bottom of James Madison's plans calling for tariffs and tonnage
duties was commercial coercion. Madison wanted to force foreign nations to change
their policies toward American commerce. Discriminating duties would give nations that
entered into treaty arrangements with the United states an advantage over countries such
as Great Britain, which placed restrictions on American shipping. 42 In the 1790s,
Madison, as Drew McCoy explains, promoted small-scale manufacturing but was more
eager to preserve and expand "the predominately agricultural character of American
society." The Democratic-Republican Party ethos, as conceptualized by Madison, was to
foster individual autonomy, but within economic constraints. Home manufacturing and
trade in agricultural surplus, Madison believed, would preserve republican virtue, and
protect the Union. But his was a sectionally driven political economy cultivated by an
aversion to commercial ethics and the creation of a landless working class through large-
scale manufacturing. It was inevitable for the agrarian ideal to clash with New England
commercialism. 43
As they would in the future. New England Federalists objected to any system that
curtailed their region's sources of revenue or altered its economic structure. Conversely,
Hamilton promoted national growth, domestic manufacturing, fiscal solvency through
internal taxation, liberal trade, and technological progress through the importation of
artisans and machinery. Federalists preferred Hamilton's system because of its benefits
to commerce, manufacturing, and banking. The Hamiltonian system would not unfairly
42
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hinder the most important branch of Massachusetts' economy; and despite Republicans'
accusations, Hamilton promoted independence from British manufacturing.
44
Congress passed many of Hamilton's measures between 1 790 and 91 , but to pass
assumption, Hamilton was forced to barter for support. In a behind-the-scenes deal,
Hamilton used the location of the national capitol as a bargaining chip. After failing with
Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers, Hamilton was able to broker a deal with James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson that would locate the seat of government on the Potomac
in return for their support. The entire Massachusetts delegation rejected the southern site
for the capitol, and Jefferson later regretted making the deal; nevertheless, plans to situate
the seat of government in the South passed by a 32 to 29 vote in the House.45 Before the
issue was finally settled, however, antislavery memorials from the Pennsylvania
Antislavery Society and Quakers were presented in Congress in February 1790. The
petitions asked Congress "to loosen the bands of slavery" by ending the slave trade and
taking steps to abolish slavery altogether. Southerners attempted to table the petitions
and lashed out at Quakers, the Pennsylvania Society headed by Benjamin Franklin, and
the northern states.
46
New Englanders insisted that the petitions be considered and reviewed in
committee. Fisher Ames was vexed because the petitions distracted congressmen from
the assumption debates, but he was also disturbed by the contentious climate they
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produced and the southerners' response. He lamented the fact that "The Quakers have
been abused, the eastern States inveighed against... [and] Language low. indecent, and
profane has been used" by southern congressmen. Theodore Sedgwick, on the other
hand, praised the Quakers for conforming "their moral code to their religious tenets. "
Since they were asking the government to "restrain a practice productive of great evil,"
he defended their right to be heard.
47
After protracted debates, the matter was referred to
a special committee, which released a report on 25 March 1790. Representatives James
Jackson of Georgia, William L. Smith, and Aedanus Burke of South Carolina, along with
Theodorick Bland of Virginia, even objected to reading the report. However, they need
not have worried. The select committee and the Committee of the Whole concluded that
Congress could not end the slave trade or emancipate the slaves. And after more heated
10
debate, the House entered the report into its Journal by a close 29 to 25 vote.
Contests between Massachusetts' Federalists and southern Democratic-
Republicans in Congress constitute some of the most important debates in early national
politics. In fact, the Civil War can rightly be considered the culmination of a regional
struggle in the making since the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Just as the economic
and social cultures in Massachusetts gave birth to Federalism and sectionalism in
government, events on the national stage guided the nation's ideological development,
refined its tenets, and amplified the antagonisms that eventually threatened New
England's allegiance to the Union.
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Yet it was not until 1800 that Federalists found themselves at a disadvantage of
their own making. When they rallied support for a Constitution with safeguards for
slavery, especially the three-fifths clause, Federalists gave southern states and the
Democratic-Republican Party an advantage in the House of Representatives and the
Electoral College that detrimentally affected the course of Federalism. By the time New
England Federalists, such as Rufus King, realized that they had sacrificed their political
futures through their support of the three-fifths clause, it was too late. The stage was set
for the growth of sectional hostilities that might destroy everything the Revolution and
the Convention of 1787 were intended to prevent. 49
Through 1790s, however, Federalism remained a powerful force in national
politics. Federalists, such as the venerable George Washington, Revolutionary hero and
first President of the United States and John Marshall, chief Justice of the Supreme Court
for nearly thirty-five years, could be found in Virginia. Among southern states, North
Carolina probably had the strongest Federalist base, with support spread across the state.
And even though their longevity and numbers were not as impressive, Federalists were
formidable in the Deep South. Party adherents could be found in Georgia after the War
of 1812; and South Carolina planter Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, in addition to his
attendance at the Constitutional Convention, received the Federalist nomination for the
Presidency in 1800, 1804, and 1808. 50
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The influence of Massachusetts Federalists in national politics was evident in the
election of John Adams to two terms as vice president, and his election to the presidency
in 1796. Moreover, Washington appointed Bostonian Henry Knox secretary of war, and
Timothy Pickering became postmaster general and secretary of war in the Washington
administration, and secretary of state under both Washington and Adams.^ But this was
about to change. Many scholars argue that the Federalist Party became detached
ideologically and culturally from the socioeconomic and political forces swirling around
them by 1800. Yet, in Massachusetts the party attracted persons from all economic
backgrounds.'
2
Federalists had significant support in the western farmlands of the
Connecticut River Valley, and were deeply entrenched in eastern coastal towns and cities.
Even if some retained power through family ties and professional networks, the party
provided stability and devotion to state institutions, which was crucial through decades of
revolution, war, and government restructuring. 33
It is true, however, that post-revolution migration and boundless economic
opportunities created new interests and demands that contrasted with the aims of
Federalists. While in control of the national government. Federalists hesitated to develop
the Northwest Territory for American settlement. Federalists also restricted the suffrage
to those who met property requirements and promoted a protracted naturalization process.
The Federalist Party, therefore, did not attract the arriviste, those with recently acquired
wealth who lacked familial or business connections for entry into circles of power and
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prestige. Nor were they attractive to newly arriving immigrants, financially unstable
Americans seeking opportunities through migration, those suffering from financial
instability, or those generally disgruntled voters in Massachusetts who lacked the
finances to qualify for the suffrage. These groups found a home in the Democratic-
Republican Party. 34
It took time for Massachusetts' Antifederalists, such as the revolutionary
firebrand Samuel Adams, to recover from their hostility to the Constitution; but he
survived and went on to become lieutenant governor and then governor in 1794 with John
Hancock's help. 33 Within a few short years, those who aligned themselves with Adams
and Gerry established a core philosophy of Massachusetts' Democratic-Republican Party,
namely, an aversion to aristocratic tendencies in government. Republicans began their
ascension in the state by depicting Federalists as a common enemy, who, as described by
one Maine editorialist, was constantly reaching for "that dignity of aristocratic
importance which by education they were designed for."
The post-ratification careers of Gerry and Samuel Adams, to some extent, refute
the notion that men were predominately elected to offices, not because of their party
affiliation, but because of their ties to the Revolution or "revolutionary center" as argued
by historian Ronald Formisano. Until the 1820s, according to Formisano, the extremism
of both Federalists and Democratic-Republicans was neutralized by the antiparty centrists
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of the revolutionary generation.' Yet, while it is true that politicians who participated in
the Revolution were revered, once political parties appeared that association had its
limits.
Samuel Adams was defeated in his bid for a seat in the First Congress by the
relative newcomer Fisher Ames, a much younger man who supported the Constitution,
and whose views echoed those of the emerging Federalist Party. Campaign literature
insisted that men, who understood and supported the new federal government, were the
only rational choices for election to Congress; and Adams protested the Constitution too
much to be trusted. Only by allying himself with John Hancock, a master of patronage
and public relations who avoided alienating his constituents by dodging controversial
issues, did Adams' political career survive. 58
At first, Adams was scorned by Democratic-Republicans such as William Bentley
who criticized him for using Hancock as a steppingstone to success. But three years
later, when party lines were more clearly drawn, Bentley commended Adams for being
"too much of a republican" for Federalist President John Adams. More significant were
Federalist attempts to remove Adams from the governorship. Federalist newspapers
blacklisted Adams during the gubernatorial campaign of 1796. One of Adams'
supporters challenged the Federalists' tactics and the use of Adams' age and mental
faculties as excuses to oppose his reelection. Instead of resorting to slander, an Eastern
Herald writer challenged Federalists to just admit that they opposed Adams because "He
Formisano. Transforation of Political Culture, 10-12. 72-74.
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is not only in heart but in practice a republican." Adams' revolutionary reputation did
not protect him from partisan politics.
Unlike Adams, Eldridge Gerry made conciliatory gestures that have been offered
as proof that the post-Revolutionary generation had an aversion to factionalism that
hindered the development of political parties in early national politics. In some studies
Gerry is depicted as the epitome of ''moderation" and "antipartyism." He is also
described as the quintessential '"centrist" who refused to indulge in partisan politics until
1811, when Federalists drove him to it. 60 Yet, once Gerry's invective flowed, it
contained the same Antifederalist rhetoric he used when opposing ratification in 1788.
He accused Federalists of participating in "deep laid plots" and "secret intrigues" to adopt
a form of government and usher in monarchy or '"an immediate aristocratic tyranny." In
1812 he called them "American royalists" and retrieved earlier arguments, suggesting
that Federalists had been so "violently in favor of the Constitution without amendments"
because it was "a step-stone to monarchy." 61
Gerry backed away from his opposition and was elected to represent Middlesex
County in the First Congress.62 Clearly, Gerry learned to work within the system
tolerating a Constitution he distrusted, but never abandoned his suspicion of Federalists
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or what, in his mind, they stood for. When he and others in the early national period
condemned the "spirit of party," their complaints were the equivalent of present day calls
for bipartisan cooperation during heated political battles; not evidence of a pervasive,
overarching ''antiparty ethos."63 For Gerry and other Democratic-Republicans,
eliminating party spirit meant that Federalists should acquiesce to their wishes, stop
resisting their policies, and simply stop acting like Federalists, and there would be no
problems. Partisanship helped Gerry become vice president in 1812.
The apprehension surrounding centralized government is but one characteristic of
Democratic-Republicanism. A more extensive foundation for both Federalist and
Democratic-Republican thought appears in the republican synthesis interpretation, which
focuses on the philosophical basis for the American Revolution and the first party system.
In the late eighteenth century, Americans influenced by theorists from antiquity, the
Renaissance, and the European Enlightenment developed ideologies that bifurcated after
1787. Centuries of theorizing infused revolutionary Americans with the belief that the
most durable form of government needed to balance the three conventional forms of
authority - monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy - to avoid the excesses endemic to all.
Succinctly put, before the Constitution, Federalists and Republicans shared the conviction
that a system of checks and balances in government was necessary to prevent
degeneration into anarchy or despotism. Only a virtuous citizenry could sustain the
republic and avoid the extremes that would lead to the collapse of order and the
destruction of civil society and the republic.64
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Yet, distinct interpretations on the meaning of republicanism emerged.
Federalists maintained that virtue entailed disinterested self-sacrifice for the general
welfare. They also believed that government, on all levels, had to discourage
unrestrained democracy, which could easily deteriorate into chaos. A mixed constitution,
economic freedom, and the election of gifted men by a prosperous electorate would avert
social and political corruption. On the other side of the coin were the Democratic-
Republicans. As defined by Thomas Jefferson in his ''Anas" and Notes on Virginia
(1784), Democratic-Republicans also believed in a virtuous citizenry, but were afraid that
centralized power would usurp republican institutions and demolish democratic freedoms
through the establishment of corrupt aristocratic or monocratic governments. Once this
was accomplished, Americans would again find themselves under an oppressive
fie
tyranny.
Jefferson explained that competing forces representing "royalism &
republicanism" participated in drafting the Constitution in Philadelphia. Since then, the
threats to republican government had become unrelenting; and while Secretary of State in
the Washington administration, Jefferson believed himself to be "the only advocate on
the republican side of the question." Jefferson and those who shared his viewpoint set
out to combat the insidious threats to republican government and democratic freedoms.
Standing armies were seen as the tool for a probable monarchial or aristocratic coup, so
Democratic-Republicans preferred citizen soldiers or militias. Many, especially in the
South, agreed with Jefferson's assessment in his Notes that "'those who labour in the earth
^ Merrill D. Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson, Writings (New York: Library of America, Penguin Putnam
Inc., 1984), 661-665.
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are the chosen people of God." They therefore favored small government and preferred
agricultural over manufacturing or commercial economies. 66
Massachusetts Federalists drew from this reservoir of philosophical perceptions
and apprehensions about society and government, and maintained that the original
thirteen states should concentrate on attaining maturity through the guidance of those
whose independence and disinterest in financial gain would maintain virtue in
government. Federalists indulged the provincial precepts that had guided and
safeguarded Massachusetts since its founding.
67
In practice, they backed restricted voting
rights and mistrusted rapid expansion. But Federalists also promoted economic
development, military preparedness, and founded historical and philanthropic
organizations. The party also recruited the votes of free African-Americans, and many,
including Theodore Sedgwick, Josiah Quincy, and Timothy Pickering, promoted the
abolition of slavery.
By the 1790s, events abroad forced Americans to redefine themselves through
discrete lenses cleaved by these assumptions. The French Revolution and its aftermath
evoked responses that drew sharp divisions to the surface in American society and
politics. Initially accepted as a sign that the American Revolution had initiated the spread
of republican government, by 1793, when the Reign of Terror began, most Americans
recoiled from the revolution in France. Party divisions deepened when President
Washington declared American neutrality and signed the Jay Treaty with Great Britain.
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Dissenters, led by Jefferson, argued that the administration's policies spurned a
republican ally to reestablish ties with monarchial Great Britain. Republicans protested
Federalist policies that they maintained threatened American independence and the
country's survival.
69
Despite the fact that the French monarch Louis XVI had actually risked his crown
and life by helping to fund the American Revolution and contribute to its success, the
usurpation of monarchial power in France resonated with Jeffersonians who embraced
the French revolutionaries' attempts to conquer Great Britain and topple monarchies
everywhere. Disillusionment with Washington's policies forced Jefferson to resign from
his post as Secretary of State. In his opinion, the federal government had been corrupted
by monocrats. He and others thought that the same group that supported Hamilton's
fiscal programs and Washington's foreign policy, especially the controversial Jay Treaty,
were Anglicizing the U.S. government at an alarming rate. 70
Federalists were equally apprehensive about Democratic-Republicans' support of
France. Once the wars in Europe began, both Britain and France harassed American
commerce, but Fisher Ames felt compelled to criticize the Jeffersonians' quick judgments
about England. Even though the French had stopped or seized hundreds of American
commercial vessels, Congress "sit still; we say nothing; we depend on their justice; we
make excuses." Ames never condoned England's attacks, but his frustration exposes the
depth of hostilities Federalists had developed for France and its supporters in the United
69
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States. He complained to Christopher Gore that France "may rob us. . .cut off Tom
Paine's head, vote out the Trinity, kill their priests, rob the merchants, and burn their
Bibles; - [and] we stand ready to approve all they do."
71
The Democratic-Republicans'
'"French mania" was a wellspring of dissension and mayhem.
New York Federalist John Jay was appointed to negotiate a treaty with Britain:
but based on the treaty's liberal terms, Americans believed Jay had been too lenient with
the British, a signal that the nation had allied itself with Britain against France. For a
while, even in Massachusetts, there were loud protests. At a Boston town meeting,
citizens passed a resolution condemning Jay's treaty as "highly injurious to the [state's]
commercial interests" and complained that it imposed so many restrictions and
limitations on trade that the United States had reverted to colonial status.
72
Democratic-
Republicans further exploited fears of the administration's capitulation to England to
disparage Federalists.
73
The political impact of, and the disruptive nature of the French Revolution, its
subsequent wars, and Federalist foreign policy cannot be overstated. Political factions
existed in Massachusetts before the 1790s, but were generally fluid and short-lived. The
party politics that surfaced during the French Revolution permanently altered the political
landscape. In fact, events in Europe were powerful enough to divide families, which was
the case with Fisher Ames. Although sixteen years younger than his brother Nathaniel,
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the siblings had a cordial relationship until Nathaniel's conversion to Democratic-
Republicanism. Nathaniel served several terms in the General Court and even criticized
France for the executions of its monarchs in 1793. But ratification of the Jay Treaty
created a fissure between the siblings that permanently damaged their relationship.
Partisan antipathies ran so deep that after Fisher's untimely death in 1808, Nathaniel
refused to participate in the ceremony or attend the funeral because of the Federalists'
involvement.
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For others, acceptance of the Jay Treaty followed the initial rejection, especially
among Massachusetts' merchants who came to realize that the terms were not as
unfavorable as they first thought. The treaty actually failed to fully address neutral rights
and the trade in non-contraband goods between enemy ports. Furthermore, it avoided a
clear definition of blockades, which left open the possibility of erecting arbitrary barriers
to trade; so protests against Jay's treaty were not without merit. 75 Yet, the treaty also
offered merchants a share in the British trade, along with continued commerce in the
British West Indies and Far East. The treaty also provided compensation for previously
seized vessels. Within one month after Bostonians had condemned the treaty at their
town meeting, a majority began to favor ratification. 76
Massachusetts' support of the treaty could not stave off the violence that erupted
in other parts of the nation. John Jay was burned in effigy in Philadelphia; and Alexander
Hamilton, who published twenty-eight essays supporting the treaty, was nearly stoned for
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advocating it before 5,000 angry New Yorkers. In the South, the treaty's opponents had
an altogether different axe to grind. British forces had left with thousands of slaves who
fled to their lines for freedom after the Revolutionary War. The omission of language
offering compensation to southern slaveholders for their property was no small point of
contention among the treaty's opponents. Moreover, John Jay's antislavery sympathies
were public knowledge; and because he refused to press the issue of compensation or
recovery of their property, slaveholders never warmed up to the treaty, but continued to
hound Great Britain for remuneration. 78
Partisan politics became even more heated during John Adams' presidency. In
addition to being the first Massachusetts native to hold the office, after French officials
attempted to bribe American diplomats in the XYZ scandal, Adams created the
Department of the Navy in 1798, and waged the Quasi War with France to protect
commercial vessels in the Caribbean and Atlantic. The already sharp criticisms of the
Adams' policies escalated into a frenzy when Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition
Acts. Democratic-Republicans had a host of issues they could and did exploit during
Adams' presidency. Their anti-military angst exploded at the thought of raising taxes to
expand the military, and the Alien and Sedition Acts furnished proof that Federalists had
intended all along to suppress individual rights.
79
The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 echoed the states' rights principle
of Antifederalism, declaring the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional and in effect,
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not binding on the states. According to the resolutions, the Sedition Act violated the First
Amendment, and the Alien Act, by regulating the conduct of immigrants, assumed
powers not implied in the Constitution. The resolutions called on other states to nullify
the laws, but the Massachusetts General Court issued its own statement declaring both
acts constitutional. The Court argued that the Alien act affected only those persons
"whose rights were not particularly contemplated in the Constitution of the United
States.'' And contrary to the Kentucky and Virginia claims, the Sedition Act, the Court
concluded, did not violate the First Amendment because the Constitutional protection of
speech and the press applied only to those who "'utter and publish the truth," and never
pertained to speech that propagated "falsehood and slander." 80
By the end of the 1790s, in addition to their ancient enemies. Federalists had
alienated several classes of Americans, while Jeffersonians made themselves look
attractive by upholding the Bill of Rights, property rights, westward expansion, and
immigration. While Federalism remained strongest in areas with little population growth,
the Democratic-Republican Party was attractive to young voters and enterprising
Americans who wanted to take advantage of western lands. Republicans also attracted
tax weary farmers in the northern hinterlands of the Commonwealth, along with
merchants and others barred from the Federalists' cliquish circles of power. As an
alternative to Federalism, Jeffersonianism offered the displaced, disaffected, and
dissatisfied everything Federalists could not, namely, participation in the political
process, and most of all, prospects of economic growth and social mobility. Even areas
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once traditionally Federalist, such as seaport towns in Essex County and Cape Cod,
pledged their allegiance to Jeffersonianism.
81
Across the state Federalists watched as
Republicans reached into almost every town in Massachusetts and mobilized support.
82
Federalist Maria Sedgwick, member of the prominent Sedgwick family, describes
the ascension of Jeffersonian Republicans in Massachusetts. They had "much native
sagacity, they believed in themselves, some from conceit, some from just conviction" but
they all had an "intense desire to grasp the power and place that had been denied to them,
and a determination to work out the theories of the government.'''83 Their success
confirms Sedgwick's assessment. 84
The political culture in Massachusetts changed dramatically following the
Democratic-Republican victory in the presidential election of 1 800. Like Republicans,
Federalists disseminated their ideas through word of mouth, pamphlets, and newspaper
articles; but most did not recruit voters personally. But Democratic-Republicans also
wooed citizens at cookouts and similar public venues, organized clubs, held election
caucuses, and circulated the party platform through partisan newspapers and pamphlets. 85
Republicans also used runners and propagandists like Nathaniel Ames, who would take
to the streets and make vituperative an ti -Federalist speeches or spread the party messages
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and campaign promises to passers-by. Either way, Democratic-Republicans went
directly to the people and transformed Massachusetts into a two-party state.
Federalist success in national elections ended after their victory in 1796. John
Adams narrowly defeated Thomas Jefferson 71 to 68, but already the sectional
polarization of the nation had become apparent. Adams earned New York, and all of
New England, New Jersey and Delaware; but the southern and western states were
solidly behind Jefferson. Combined, the divided states, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, and North Carolina gave Adams 10 and Jefferson 49 votes; and seven of
Adams' ten votes came from Maryland. Federalists, who had barely managed to survive
the initial turbulence of the 1790s, did little to improve their chances in 1800. Their
policies generated prosperity but also raised taxes and by all appearances threatened to
curb civil liberties. Yet, internal divisions damaged the party more than Jeffersonian
propaganda. While president, Adams never had the full support of the Federalist cabinet
he inherited from George Washington. The source of Adams' frustrations was Alexander
Hamilton, who colluded with several members of the cabinet behind his back.
And then, during the presidential campaign of 1799, Hamilton published a
scathing polemic designed to sink Adams' chances for reelection. Hamilton's criticisms
of Adams were most often personal, but his primary objections hinged on the President's
recent gestures toward France. Adams brokered peace negotiations with France and
limited the size of the Navy, which rankled Hamilton and his cohorts, Secretary of State
Timothy Pickering and Secretary of War James McHenry, who promoted war with
France. Diplomacy led to a settlement under the Treaty of Mortefontaine (1800), which
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ended the Quasi War and restored U.S. relations with France. For his overtures toward
France, Hamilton questioned Adams' intelligence and character, calling the president a
jealous man whose vanity was "without bounds." He threw his support behind Federalist
candidate Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, explaining that Adams lacked
the abilities to make sound judgments, and was without ''the talents adapted to the
administration of government.'*
88
Undermining Adams' candidacy was certainly a factor in the Federalists' loss in
1800. The Adams-Pinckney ticket carried all of New England, New Jersey, and
Delaware. Adams also won half of Maryland's ten electoral votes, seven to Jefferson's
eight votes in Pennsylvania, and four to Jefferson's eight in North Carolina. Jefferson
89
won the election with 73 votes to Adams' 65. Adams was convinced that Hamilton's
philippic cost him the important New York votes, which had helped him win in 1796. He
never had the support of Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, or Georgia; and Virginia
had given Adams only one vote in his first election. Therefore, New York's twelve
electoral votes decided the election in 1800.
As it turned out, Hamilton only managed to outsmart himself and divide his party.
He underestimated Jefferson's influence in the South, and to his surprise Pinckney
received none of South Carolina's eight electoral votes, which as things stood, would
have led to an Adams-Jefferson tie instead of a Federalist victory. Hamilton also
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conspired with Pennsylvania Federalists to throw half their votes to Pinckney to prevent
an Adams victory. But the scheme failed. While Pennsylvania gave Adams more votes
in 1800 than it had in 1796, the Keystone State provided Jefferson with 8 of its 15
electoral votes. Most damaging was the fact that factions headed by Aaron Bun-
managed to capture the New York State legislature, which really handed Democratic-
Republicans all of New York's votes and the election. 90
Before he published his anti-Adams pamphlet, Fisher Ames warned Hamilton that
attacking Adams would divide the Federalists and cost them election, but Hamilton still
pursued the ''course of open hostility" he was cautioned to avoid. 91 Yet, even though he
was unable to deliver even his own state for the party, Hamilton lost sight of the larger
issues, bet on South Carolina's support, and lost. Ultimately, even though the Federalists
were defeated for several reasons in 1800, Hamilton's ploy contributed to his party's
demise in national politics. Adams turned out to be the last Federalist to win a
presidential election, and the damage done to the party was never completely repaired.
Sadly, Burr killed Hamilton in a duel for orchestrating a similar smear campaign against
him during the 1804 election. Afterward, Adams remarked that Hamilton's "Vice, Folly"
and villainy ''are not to be forgotten because the guilty wretch repented in his dying
moments."92
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Obviously, Jefferson's accession to the presidency was far from inevitable.
Aaron Burr received the same number of votes as Jefferson, which meant that the House
of Representatives had to decide the outcome. Massachusetts Federalists were not eager
to vote for either man. but there were divisions among the Hamiltonians in Congress.
House Speaker Theodore Sedgwick preferred Bun- to Jefferson, therefore, Hamilton who
hated and opposed Burr, had a hard time controlling the situation, even though he wrote
letters warning Federalists that a Burr victory would be catastrophic. Burr lost when he
seemingly did not accept the Federalists' endorsement gracefully. The apparent rebuff
swayed enough votes toward Jefferson to give him the presidency and Burr the second
seat. Oddly enough, Federalists have come under fire for backing Burr over Jefferson.
One historian questions Federalists' patriotism, describing Burr as an "amoral"
politician.
93
But if Burr was such a horrible choice for president, ought Democratic-
Republicans bear some of the responsibility for nominating him in the first place?
Jeffersonians obviously counted on Burr to win the election although few of them
held him in high regard; it was therefore as unpatriotic of Democratic-Republicans to
sponsor his candidacy as it was for Federalists to consider him for the presidency.
Federalists actually disliked both men, and had Democratic-Republicans been as precise
about the candidate they wanted for president as historians claim, then one of the
southern states should have followed Rhode Island's lead and cast one vote for a
candidate other than Burr to give Jefferson the majority - but this did not happen. Thus,
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when we take an objective look at events surrounding the election of 1800, neither party
emerges untainted.
In the end, Jefferson won the election by eight votes - enough to become
President, but not enough to justify the traditional interpretation of events. Historians
generally depict Jefferson's victory in two ways. It was either evidence that there was a
tidal wave of support for Jeffersonian ideals, or his victory was a national referendum
rejecting Federalist elitism and conservative politics. In her influential study of
Jeffersonian Republicanism, Joyce Appleby tells us that the election of 1800 was
revolutionary because it marked the '"defeat of aristocratic values in American politics."94
Indeed, the election of 1800 was a turning point in U.S. political history because as Peter
Onuf and Leonard Sadosky point out, Jeffersonians "sought to arrest and reverse"
Federalist polities. Yet, the election returns and Hamilton's plots reveal that Jefferson's
victory in 1800 was never the popular indictment of Federalism, or the sweeping political
coup that some historians claim.
93
Because the election was never a broad mandate for the implementation of
Jeffersonianism, Dame Fortune had to play a larger part in the success of Jefferson's first
administration than his policy changes. Jefferson inherited a nation on the brink of
prosperity. Under Washington, the Jay Treaty led to amicable, albeit tense relations with
Great Britain; and both the Quasi War and Adams' diplomatic success with France
contributed to the Treaty of Amiens (1801-1803). which temporarily ended hostilities in
Europe. The way was clear for Jefferson to establish a '"rising nation, spread over a wide
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and fruitful land...engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right."
as he described in his first inaugural speech.
96
Between 1801 and the resumption of warfare in Europe in 1803. the Jefferson
administration was free to repeal taxes, cut the military budget, reduce the Navy, and
watch Americans enjoy the financial benefits of a relatively safe and expanding
international trade. These auspicious circumstances were not lost on Federalists. Shortly
after the election, a Massachusetts Federalist noted that, '"much of Jefferson's work is
ready done in his hand. We are, by treaty, to embrace France. . .Frenchmen will swarm in
our porridge-pots, [and] Jefferson will say he only supports the friendly system of his
predecessor...These are great advantages for the new administration to start with."
97
If
the story ended here. Jefferson's presidency would have earned the accolades many
historians bestow upon it; but his political economy would soon stir sectional divisions
and political disasters that revealed that neither he nor his party would protect commerce
or "divorce slavery from their social vision," as one historians contends. 98
In Massachusetts, Federalists retained power on the state level after Jefferson's
election, which is why the state's nine electoral votes went to John Adams in 1800.
During Jefferson's first term in office, New England experienced economic growth and
the nation was delighted with the 1 803 purchase of the Louisiana Territory, which opened
the door to boundless opportunities for expansionists. Not only were the prospects
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inestimable; westward expansion had the earmarks of destiny. But Federalists questioned
the constitutionality of the President's acquisition of the Louisiana territory, because the
spread of slavery and statehood would mean an increase of southern power in the national
legislature." Federalists had already attempted to arrest the spread of slavery in 1798,
when George Thacher introduced a motion to prohibit slavery from the Mississippi
Territory. Invoking the "rights of man," Thacher explained that the "existence of slavery
in the United States is the greatest of evils" and hostile to republican government. They
failed in that case, and the prospects for success in Louisiana were dismal. 100
Overall, Federalists objected to slavery as immoral and evil, but they opposed the
entry of slavery in Louisiana Purchase lands because of its potential to diminish the
political power of the older states, especially Massachusetts, through the creation of new
slave states. Due to the three-fifths clause, the southern states would gain an unfair
advantage in Congress and control domestic and foreign policy. Constitutionally, New
Englanders could do nothing to check legislation that proved detrimental to their region.
Slaveholders' power was already growing in leaps and bounds and overwhelmingly, the
new states supported Democratic-Republicans. 101 Massachusetts and the rest of New
England was rapidly becoming the power base of the Federalist Party, and if the region
declined in importance, so would Federalism. Ironically, their attempts to preempt the
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southwesterly spread of slavery further damaged the party's support in the South and
helped to hasten the Federalist Party's decline in national politics.
102
Federalists are largely depicted as sore losers who retreated from public life or
grasped at feeble excuses to explain their fading popularity after 1800. But as the conflict
between Adams and Hamilton shows, early national politics was usually truculent,
terminally abrasive, given to unguarded personal attacks, and unforgiving. Most of the
Federalists' complaints were valid. Jefferson's cabinet and civil service choices did little
to attenuate the partisan atmosphere. He removed at least 146 Federalists from federal
offices after his first election. Ten collectors affiliated with the Federalist Party in
Massachusetts were ejected from their jobs, with the exception of Benjamin Lincoln, the
aging hero of the Revolutionary War, who put down Shays' Rebellion in 1787.
Generally removed for misconduct, old and new school Federalists were deposed. 103
The idea that Federalists staged a mass retreat from public life because they were
utterly defeated, as David Fischer suggests, is disputable. John Adams was nearly sixty-
five years old when he lost the presidential election in 1800. Adams spent a lifetime in
public service, helped found the nation, served as an ambassador and as the nation's first
vice president before succeeding George Washington in 1796. After dealing with a
hostile cabinet and Hamilton's conspiracies, Adams deserved retirement. Other
Federalists left office believing men from their own party would replace them. Theodore
Sedgwick retired from Congress assuming that another Federalist would take his place;
" See. Morison. Harrison Gray Otis. 425.
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and the same was true of Harrison Gray Otis, who for a while refused reelection to
Congress after 1800.
104
Fisher Ames was optimistic that his party would "rise again" within a year, but he
was forced to retire from public life after a debilitating illness. With a second child on
the way and a new home under construction, Ames contracted pneumonia or had an
upper respiratory infection complicated by asthma. Failing health and domestic concerns
prevented him from serving beyond the Fourth Congress. 103 Then again, even if some
Federalists retired, others, such as Timothy Pickering and John Quincy Adams, served in
the U.S. Senate or House of Representatives long after 1800.
Before the election of 1804, however, Jeffersonians became almost as popular in
Massachusetts as they were in the rest of the country. Much of this can be attributed to
the President's visions for the growth of the nation. In his first inaugural address,
Jefferson envisioned Americans "possessing a chosen country, with room enough for our
descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation." The concept of a blessed
people, occupying, and subduing a "chosen land" resonated with Bay Staters* confidence
in their fated "city on a hill".
106
The images Jefferson created were powerful and seductive. The nation was
already expanding westward, and opportunities were opening up for persons of every
stripe and occupation. Federalists feared that the Southwest would eventually have a
dominating voice in the national government and resisted legislation granting
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southerners' access to the Mississippi.
107
But already, the profits of New England
farmers were being undercut by the influx of agricultural goods more cheaply produced
in western New York. Many Bay Staters migrated west to join the competition, and
along with new settlements in the Ohio and Great Lakes regions, reduced Massachusetts'
population.
108
Foreign immigration also brought new settlers who traveled southward for
better climes and richer, more fertile soil than could be found in New England. The
demographic shifts astonished Federalists, who realized that along with the region's
population, its political power was also draining away. 109
By 1804, more Bay Staters were drawn to the Democratic-Republican Party. For
one reason, as a Boston paper points out, Jefferson endorsed the maxim "free ships shall
make free goods."
110
Jefferson's reelection in 1804 shattered Federalist hopes to retake
the White House. Unlike the close race of 1800, Jefferson was reelected in a landslide. It
is easier to mention the states he did not carry in the 1804 election since there were only
three: Connecticut, Delaware, and Maryland. And as usual, Maryland's eleven votes
were divided between the candidates: nine for Jefferson and the remaining two for
Federalist Charles C. Pinckney.
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In his first inaugural address, Jefferson mentioned commerce thrice, and at one
point advocated the "encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid." '
Federalists were not convinced that he had abandoned his penchant for agricultural
societies. Boston's New-England Palladium predicted that the President's affinity for
agrarianism was so strong he would pass an agrarian law, destroy commerce, and
redistribute wealth. After all, the paper continued, now that Jefferson was president,
"What is the mercantile interest compared to the landed?" The Virginian might earn the
trust of unsuspecting voters; but Federalists, who had combated his ideas in Washington,
doubted that he had turned over a new leaf. 113
The Bay State electorate continued to favor Federalist candidates in gubernatorial
races by large percentages until 1805, but the tide was slowly shifting. Elbridge Gerry
ran for governor from 1800 through 1 803, relying on his reputation as a merchant and
supporter of John Adams to create divisions among Federalists. Although he lost each of
the elections, Gerry's plan met with some success. Moderate Federalists endorsed
Gerry's appeasement politics, and some voted for Republican candidates, which as Paul
Goodman writes, led to "intraparty conflict." The success of the conciliatory approach,
the relative calm in international affairs, and national prosperity helped the Jeffersonian
cause in Massachusetts to such an extent that Jefferson actually anticipated the state's
support in 1804.
114
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Jefferson's popularity was also enhanced by the election of Bay State Democratic-
Republicans to the Seventh Congress. Republican condemnation of Federalist taxes and
elitism convinced voters to send John Bacon of Stockbridge, Josiah Smith from the First
Western district (which included the Berkshires and a few towns in Hampshire County),
and Richard Cutts a wealthy merchant from York County, Maine (a former Federalist
stronghold), to the U.S. House of Representatives. They joined Republicans Levi
Lincoln of Worcester, a future governor of the state, and Joseph Varnum of Dracut. a
prosperous Middlesex farmer, who served in the Revolution and entered the Fourth
Congress in 1795.
113
Federalists also lost the Plymouth and Bristol District elections, and
Republicans William Eustis and Jacob Crowninshield defeated John Quincy Adams and
Timothy Pickering in the Suffolk and Essex South congressional elections respectively.
At least in the case of Adams and Pickering, Federalists were sent to Congress after being
selected by the General Court to serve in the U.S. Senate. 116
Federalists lost even more support in the Maine districts when they snubbed
Federalist candidate Orchard Cook of Wiscasset. The Eastern Herald and Maine Gazette
of Portland, the Salem Gazette, and other newspapers endorsed Cook for his "integrity,
active habits, commercial knowledge, and general respectability." 117 Cook, who was a
judge of the Court of Common Pleas and a member of the Wiscasset and Augusta
Turnpike Corporation, was the front-runner in the First Eastern District caucus. Yet,
even though he led the race when the votes were tallied, adversaries within the party
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protracted the process, hoping to effect different results. In November, news leaked out
that some Federalists wanted Nathaniel Dummer instead of Cook, who was still ahead in
the primaries.
118
Democratic-Republicans explained that the problem stemmed from Cook's
disagreements with his party on key issues such as a standing army, but Federalists were
ambiguous and made a vague reference to Cook's powerful influence with the press as
the reason they "disown[ed] him as a federalist, and are ashamed of him as a man." Cook
pulled out of the race in the spring of 1802, and when he resurfaced for the 1804 election
as a Democratic-Republican, they were happy to have him. 119 Esteemed by his new party
for his rapport with farmers, mechanics, "merchants] and ship owners," Cook won the
election over the objections of his former party, which was regarded by Republicans as
"the strongest evidence" in his favor. 120
There was a correlation between Democratic-Republican and Antifederalists. As
with Federalists however, the candidates' connection to the state's commercial interests
was stronger. John Bacon, a heralded success for Jeffersonians in 1800, had been a critic
of the Constitution and consistently lost to Theodore Sedgwick until the latter retired.
More conventional, however, was Jacob Crowninshield of Salem, a close friend to
Thomas Jefferson. The Crowninshields were shut out of the British trade by Federalists
118
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but went on to become one of Essex County's wealthiest shipping families through trade
interests in British India, Sumatra, the Isle de France, and Reunion.
121 As their
credentials show, Jeffersonians did not represent a shift away from rule by the wealthy.
Overall, their leaders represented the wealthy merchant class.
The malaise that developed among Federalists after Jefferson's reelection in 1804
was conveyed in the diary of Essex County Federalist, Leverett Saltonstall. That March
he wrote, 'The sun of Federalism indeed is nearly set, and we have no better prospect
than a gloomy night of democracy. We look forward with fear and trembling. . .it must be
1 00
confusion and misery." Not everyone shared Saltonstall's pessimism, however; and
many of the state's younger Federalists stepped up their efforts to organize the political
base. Previously, few Federalists emulated George Cabot, who socialized with neighbors
at local taverns to exchange stories and a hearty laugh to earn their trust. But they soon
began to interact with voters and even attempted to create committees appointed by
popular vote. At the state level they established the Committee of Correspondence,
composed of Cabot, Gore, Harrison Gray Otis, and James Lloyd, in Boston. The party,
which previously held private caucuses, now conducted public caucuses. After attending
a party meeting at Faneuil Hall in May 1806, John Quincy Adams proclaimed it to be
1 2 3
''the first time I was ever present at a public caucus."
Through their committees, Federalists established networks across the country,
from Massachusetts to Georgia. Major cities such as Boston, New York, and
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Philadelphia became the hubs of activity and acted as communication depots. The
Federalists' first national caucus did not take place until the 1808 presidential election,
and then only eight states attended. By that time, the sectional limitations of the
Federalists' influence was evident. Absent from that meeting were representatives from
Virginia, Georgia, Delaware, and New Jersey, or the western states of Tennessee and
Kentucky. Charles C. Pinckney, the Federalist candidate in 1808, fully carried only four
out of sixteen states, and received a minority of the votes in two others. He lost the
election to James Madison in a crushing 122 to 47 defeat. 124 But before then, however,
broadening their caucus and committee activities gave Federalists some hope of
countering Republican success in state and congressional elections.
Transformations in the Federalists' nominating system did not seem to signal that
the party attempted to quarantine "state party affairs from the ills of national politics," as
one historian maintains.
12
'^ Holding on to power at the state level was directly related to
Massachusetts' fate in national politics. A Federalist majority in the General Court could
secure the state's electoral votes in presidential elections, and party activists on the state
level worked closely with delegates in the U.S. Congress. Especially helpful was the
legislature's ability to send two Federalists to represent the state in the U.S. Senate,
which they were able to do from the First through the Twelfth Congresses. In fact, after
the popularity of the Louisiana Purchase, Federalists learned not to rely on a general
ticket to choose electors. That was how the state ended up casting its nineteen electoral
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votes for Thomas Jefferson in 1804. which contributed to the 162 to 14 rout of their
candidate, Charles C. Pinckney.
126
While the losses of 1804 compelled Federalists to form a Central Committee,
initiate grassroots efforts, and electioneer through pamphlets, broadsides, newspapers,
and word of mouth to influence popular opinion, others turned their attention to the
southerly shift in the balance of power. Issues surrounding slave representation had
sparked no small controversy during the ratifying convention in 1788, and complaints
that the Constitution gave southerners an unfair advantage in the national government
resurfaced after 1800. Even during the drafting period. Theodore Sedgwick suggested to
Caleb Strong, a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, that he consider separating from
the Union as an alternative to sacrificing "everything" to "perpetuate our connection with
[the Southern states]."
127
Yet, during the ratification debates, leading Federalists, such as
Rufus King and Francis Dana, approved of the three-fifths rule "from a spirit of
accommodation" toward the South. It was only after Adams' defeat that the disadvantage
to the free states led King and others to join the criticism that Jefferson and Burr owed
their victories to "the influence of SLAVERY." 128
In June 1804, Congressman William Ely, representative from the Hampshire
North District, proposed an amendment to the Constitution calling for the repeal of the
three-fifths clause. Ely predicted that the Union could not survive unless everyone had
equal representation. The amendment had the support of Federalists in the House,
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senators Timothy Pickering and John Quincy Adams, and was also endorsed by the
General Court. But Ely's Amendment was killed by the Democratic-Republican
majority; and as Leonard Richard tells us, "it was at this point that Josiah Quincy... and
John Quincy Adams" recognized that they were embroiled with a "Slave Power." 129
Thus, after 1804, Federalist attacks on the Three-Fifths clause, the slave South,
and the Jefferson Administration intensified. Denunciations of slave representation
began to capture the attention of New Englanders worried that their region's importance
and prosperity were being undermined by the conspiratorial slaveholding gentry of the
South. The writer "Impartialist" condemned those who "boast of their love of liberty and
equality" while being served daily by ''people condemned by their laws to perpetual
slavery." Federalists also explained that slavery expansion into the Louisiana territory
meant that the inequities between the "Northern and Southern states" would only increase
and writers, such as the pseudonymous "Massachusetts Farmer" called for a
Constitutional amendment as the only acceptable solution. 130 Jeffersonians defended the
three-fifths clause and reminded Federalist naysayers that they were the ones who
ardently defended the clause when they wanted to ratify the Constitution and editorialists,
like "Publius," defended slave representation and southerners against the Federalists*
hostile harangues.
131
While some Federalists shied away from discussions of disunion, others took an
extreme position suggesting that the North and South, like Abraham and Lot, should go
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their separate ways. " Of those that surfaced at this time, the most pronounced
disunionist was Timothy Pickering, who advocated an end to slavery and took the
extreme position that it was in New England's best interests to separate from the slave
states. Pickering became convinced that slavery rendered the northern and southern
cultures incompatible, and that the North had "nothing to countervail the power and
influence arising from the Negro representation." If Massachusetts, "the most powerful"
state took the lead, Pickering surmised, the rest of New England, followed by the Mid-
Atlantic States, would combine forces and form a Northern Confederation, which would
leave the South with its slaves and take slave representation out of every equation
affecting government.
133 He devised a plan to create a northern confederation, but
received scant support before shelving the idea. Nevertheless, in December 1084,
Pickering introduced a constitutional amendment to repeal the three-fifths clause, but it
was ordered to lie for consideration.
134
Amidst the Federalists' calls for constitutional reform, other issues that surfaced
promised to rejuvenate the party. Wars between France and Britain resumed in 1803, and
already policy gaffs exposed innate flaws in Democratic-Republicanism. As Federalists
predicted, Jeffersonians, especially those representing the South, had little compassion
for the security of commerce. When the chance to implement commercial coercion
presented itself again, Jeffersonians adopted policies injurious to New England's
economy. Jeffersonianism was proving itself incapable of addressing issues of national
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security without destroying commerce and the rhetorical subtext of commercial
restrictions demonstrated an agrarian and regional bias in Republican domestic and
foreign policy. Unfortunately, more than a few scholars have preferred to examine
Jefferson and his Democratic-Republican disciples through theoretical or philosophical
lenses. This allows historians to engage in uncritical interpretations of Jeffersonian
idealism with little regard for facts on the ground. But whether or not Jefferson was
sincere, historian Drew McCoy acknowledges that his "naivete and poor judgment were
unequivocally confirmed by the subsequent course of events." 133
As it turned out, between ratification of the Constitution in 1788 and Thomas
Jefferson's second presidential victory in 1804, the relationship between Massachusetts'
political parties and the federal government was transposed. Federalists, the original
advocates the Constitution, were suddenly cast outside the realm of power, largely the
victims of internecine squabbling and the inequities apparent in the very government they
helped to create. Jeffersonians, who once feared that the corruptive influence of
centralized power would end in monarchial or aristocratic tyranny, had become a
powerful political entity, assuming the role in government they fought so hard to deny
Federalists. Federalists found themselves calling for constitutional reform while
Democratic-Republicans relished the Constitution's most controversial clauses. 136
Legislation promoting internal improvements, commercial prosperity, protective
tariffs to safeguard domestic shipping, and the encouragement of manufacturing and
agriculture were what Federalists hoped to extract from the federal government after
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1787. Aware of their obligations, Federalists continued to spar with southerners in
Congress even though they had dwindled down to minority status. In the meantime, for
Massachusetts' Republicans to continue enjoying success at the national level, they had
to make distasteful compromises that included aligning themselves with the South on
issues involving slavery, and supporting other measures contrary to their state and
regional interests.
137
Overall, Federalists would never be the savvy politicians that Democratic-
Republicans proved to be. They never produced a guide equivalent to Jefferson's Notes,
nor were they of one mind on how to govern the nation. During the life of the Federalist
Party, its ideas, and philosophies emanated from several sources. Federalists did
recognize that Republicans were going to attempt to guide the nation through the wars in
Europe, and the belligerents' attacks on neutral commerce, with commercial restrictions
and other policies that would alienate New Englanders. They had a keen understanding
of Jefferson's prejudices and the boundaries of his liberalism, which moved one
Federalist to write optimistically, "The cause of Federalism, we trust, has passed its most
gloomy period. The ebb tide has arrived to its utmost point, and will shortly be
succeeded by a flood, which will overwhelm its enemies in on prodigious ruin." 138
137
Richards, Slave Power. 85. 86.
Thomas Green Fessenden, Democracy Unveiled; or Tyranny Stripped of the Garb of Patriotism
(Boston: D. Carlisle, Printer, 1805), 122.
63
CHAPTER 2
"EMBARRASS ALL OUR FOREIGN COMMERCE," 1805-1806
While returning to Newburyport, Massachusetts from a commercial voyage to the
West Indies, the schooner Joseph was captured by the French privateer Adet. John
Saverneau, captain of the Adet, forced the Joseph, along with its cargo and crew, to a port
in Cuba where they destroyed the American vessel. The captain of the doomed schooner,
John Lurney, lodged protests with the Spanish government, but he had been robbed of his
clothes, all of his personal belongings, and left "without a dollar on which to subsist" in a
foreign port. The six owners of the Joseph tallied their losses at £19, 734: £2,500 for the
ship and £17,234 for its cargo. By 1805, several Newburyport merchants compiled data
on the seizure of their ships and the mistreatment of seamen as part of an appeal to the
Jefferson administration for ''compensation" and for ''that protection which a regard to
the honour [sic] of our country. . .dictate and require." 1
The frequency with which Americans had experiences similar to, or more
traumatic than, those of the Joseph triggered an influx of memorials from the commercial
states. Thus, when the Ninth Congress convened for its first session on 2 December
1805, its most pressing issue was the protection of the nation's commerce. As their
petitions and memorials indicate, merchants engaged in the foreign trade were
beleaguered by seizures and impressments at the hands of the French and British once
war resumed in 1803. Congress received letters from merchant affiliations and individual
seamen begging the federal government to intervene and protect their livelihoods and
1
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property, or recover lost vessels and cargoes. This chapter examines Congress' response
to these entreaties, and argues that the Democratic-Republican majority sparked a
backlash in Massachusetts that helped to rejuvenate the Federalist Party. The
Democratic-Republicans' response to piracy, loss of property, and sometimes the loss of
life raised issues regarding the state's survival in the young republic. From 1805 onward.
Congress embarked on a course that deepened sectional animosities and escalated calls
for constitutional reform to check southern power along with commercial policies and
attitudes that were antithetical to New England prosperity.
Historians have noted for some time that 1805 ushered in a momentous period in
national politics, but generally argue that the Republicans' most detrimental policy gaffe
was the Embargo of 1807-1809. Yet, resistance to the Embargo was neither the
beginning nor the end of the Federalists' assault on Jeffersonian political economy.
Successful opposition to republican policies began in 1805-1806 after complaints of
French and British spoliations of American commercial vessels failed to produce the
desired results. Even before the Embargo of 1807, Massachusetts' Federalists were
responded to commercial restrictions they perceived to be harmful to their state and
malevolent in intent. The first policy they regarded as a threat involved the incremental
cessation of the Haitian trade. This chapter examines developments leading to the St.
Domingo Nonintercourse Act (1806) and discusses its role as the genesis of the
Federalists' most compelling critique of Jeffersonian politics.
Historiographically, the Act to Suspend The Commercial Intercourse between the
U.S. and Certain Parts of the Island of St. Domingo has entered the historical narrative as
a controversial political measure, but is seldom discussed as part of the struggle between
65
Federalists and Jeffersonians." The policy's political implications, at least from a
Federalist perspective, has frequently escaped historical analysis. Historians from Henry
Adams through Winthrop Jordan and Michael Zuckerman have approached severance of
trade between the United States and Haiti (Saint Domingue) almost exclusively as a
manifestation of the Jeffersonians' proslavery ethos or hunger for territorial acquisitions. 3
Exceptions to this can be seen in the work of Linda Kerber, Paul Finkelman. and
Garry Wills, who when looking at the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act, also emphasize
the Federalists' progressive attitudes which were manifest in their willingness to deal
with the black leaders of Haiti. Yet, their studies do not examine how Jefferson's Haitian
policy contributed to the Federalists' opposition repertoire, or political revival.
4 An
investigation of the Federalists' reaction to the Haitian act is therefore long overdue.
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Restrictions on the Haitian trade stoked the embers of anti-southernism. which had been
growing since the First Congress assembled in 1789. and as we shall see. the policy
opened the door to a stinging critique of the Democratic-Republican Party and its
Southern leadership that dominated Federalist discourse from 1805 to 1815.
From the Federalists' perspective, congressional debates surrounding Saint
Domingue exposed weaknesses in Republican ideology that indicated a growing
estrangement between the Commonwealth and the federal government. By 1805.
Republicans had the support of Bay State voters who not only backed Thomas Jefferson
in the presidential election of 1804, but also elected Republicans to ten out of seventeen
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. How then did the policies of 1805-1806
become critical to Massachusetts Federalists? Robert Tucker and David Hendrickson
argue that 1805 was pivotal because, for the first time, Jeffersonians initiated policies that
"constituted a reaffirmation of a set of attitudes central to the Republicans' public
philosophy."
0 Doron Ben-Atar concurs, noting that the calamitous strategies that began
in 1805 were the "culmination of Jefferson's long-held commercial views.**6
Scholars emphasize the Jeffersonians' response to Britain's disruption of
America's neutral trade as a crucial turning point in diplomacy and domestic politics.
However, the following discussion argues that Jeffersonian policy, as revealed in the
Haitian embargo, was a turning point. Federalists were able to confirm that for
Jeffersonians, commercial coercion, and not the protection of commerce, was the way to
secure America's safety and earn the respect of the European powers. They rejected such
3
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policies as philosophically flawed and economically disastrous. Thus, after Democratic-
Republicans began to institute their policies, the rhetoric of Bay State Federalists became
more acerbic and contentious.
Commercial ties between Massachusetts and Saint Domingue antedated the
republic. The North American colonies traded fish, salt meat, provisions, and slaves for
large amounts of Saint Domingue's sugar and molasses through the Mole-Saint-Nicolas,
a port the French opened to foreign vessels in 1767. 7 After the American Revolution,
Massachusetts cultivated and enjoyed a mutually beneficial relationship with the federal
government. The erection of harbor lights, fishing bounties, foreign tonnage duties, and
other policies, enhanced the state's economy through the growth of its maritime
industry.
8 Along with the rest of the young nation, Massachusetts enjoyed expansion into
new markets, especially new ports in the French West Indies. The economic expansion
in Massachusetts and other maritime states contributed to national prosperity.
France's post-war alliance with the United States led to the opening of other ports
in Saint Domingue, including Cap Francois, Port-au-Prince, and Cayes-Saint-Louis. 9
American merchants added coal, salt beef, salt fish, rice, corn, and vegetables to the list
of commodities they exported to the island, and imported thousands of pounds of sugar
and coffee from Saint Domingue per annum. 10 It was not until February 1793, when
France declared war on Great Britain that serious problems began to emerge. With most
7
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9
Tansill. United States and Santo Domingo, 4.
10
Donald R. Hickey, ''America's Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806,'* Journal of the Early
Republic 2 (Winter, 1982): 362, 363.
68
of Europe engaged in war, American profits as a neutral nation increased tremendously.
Foodstuffs were needed in Europe and European colonies. Americans furnished supplies
to both the French and British West Indies. Between 1793 and 1797. Massachusetts'
total foreign exports grew from S 3.7 to $7.5 million; and tonnage involved in the foreign
trade rose from 135,599.68 to 187,447.47 tons.
11
Yet, the belligerents soon found the increased American presence exasperating
and challenged the nation's neutral rights by detaining vessels found trading with the
opponent's colonies. To avoid another war with Great Britain, the United States worked
out several points of contention through the Jay Treaty in 1794. When the treaty was
ratified in 1795, the French Directory authorized the seizure of all neutral ships trading
with the British. The French initiated a policy of treating Americans with the same
animosity they had previously reserved for the British. 12 Between 1798 and 1799, French
efforts to stifle America's trade with Saint Domingue forced total trade with the island to
decline from $8 to $2.7 million. 13
France claimed that Jay's treaty violated the 1778 Franco-American treaty of
amity and commerce, but tensions between the United States and France cannot be
entirely attributed to the treaty. Naval historian Michael Palmer notes, "from the start of
the war in Europe in 1793, the French tried to bully the United States into a more pro-
French alignment with threats, periodic harassment of commerce, and interference in
11
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American domestic politics." 14 Although U.S. merchants opened new markets in Europe
and Asia, Britain remained one of the country's largest trading partners in the postwar
years. Massachusetts' merchants, who renewed ties with London bankers, enjoyed the
timely disposal of goods in addition to convenient lines of credit that could be used for
repairs or to recover from losses while in foreign ports. Others rekindled ties with
loyalist relatives, friends, and associates who helped establish new trade routes around
the world.
1?
While the arrangement was not without controversy, the French grimaced at
America's revived accord with Great Britain and resorted to harassing U.S. commercial
vessels.
In June 1797, at Congress' urging. President Adams called for a report detailing
cases of impressments and seizures since October 1796. Adams assigned the task of
assembling the report, which contained the names and ownership of vessels, locations of
violations, and the foreign nations involved, to Secretary of State Pickering. Pickering's
report listed hundreds of violations committed by France, Spain, and Britain, but placed
special emphasis on France's offences in the West Indies. Pickering argued that the
Caribbean was the location of **the most lamentable scenes of depredation." French
tribunals condemned ships without allowing merchants to present a defense, and their
treatment of American seamen was particularly odious. While in French custody,
Americans had been "beaten, insulted, and cruelly imprisoned," and their ships and
cargoes seized by agents "'without any pretence or [for] no other [reason] than that they
14
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wanted [them]." Several vessels had been attacked, detained, and plundered before being
burned by French cruisers.
16
Commonwealth merchants owned several of the vessels in Pickering's report. As
Congress deliberated over how to handle the problem, the French continued to seize
American ships. The French privateer Victoire captured the schooner Industry, which
sailed from Boston for Surinam in July 1798. After the French condemned and sold the
vessel, the owners calculated their loss at $18,555.00. A similar fate befell the schooner
Delight when it left Boston in July 1799. The ship, owned by Bostonians Asa Payson
and Edward Holbrook, was subdued and condemned by the La Courageuse [sic],
although its cargo consisted of bacon, soap, candles, butter, but no munitions. The
owners' insurance claims were paid, but they still suffered a loss of $6,302.00. In
February 1800. the schooner John, which left Salem for Martinique, was seized by the
frigate La Syrene, burned, and destroyed. Lastly, the Rose, an armed vessel, sailed from
Newburyport for Surinam in July 1799 and engaged in battle with the French cruiser
Conquest ofEgypt for over two hours. Three Americans were killed and fourteen
wounded in the fray, and the Rose was seized and condemned at a loss of $90, 129.52. 17
By 1800, the over 1,853 cases of French seizures and destruction of U.S. property cost
Americans an estimated $7.1 million. 18
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Pickering's report noted that the British were primarily guilty of impressing
seamen. The Secretary of State assured Congress that the number of British infractions
had "'not been numerous." Nonetheless, Josiah Hart of Newburyport, John Whiting of
Gloucester, and Benjamin Eldridge of Falmouth, were listed along with scores of
American sailors who had fallen victim to British impressments in Caribbean waters.
Pickering made assurances that the British were handling impressment cases with justice
and had, on occasion, thwarted French attacks on U.S. Vessels. One instance involved a
ship from Newburyport, Massachusetts. In December 1796, the Commerce, en route to
Jamaica, was pursued by a French privateer until a British ship of war appeared. When
the privateer caught sight of the British vessel, it abandoned the chase. Either
inadvertently or deliberately, the British saved an American vessel and crew from certain
imprisonment and condemnation at the hands of the French. Other Americans escaped
the French under similar circumstances, but the United States could not rely on Great
Britain to protect its maritime commerce. The federal government needed to ensure the
safety of its merchants because West Indian waters were "'swarm [ing] with privateers and
gun boats" authorized by the French government to capture and condemn neutral
vessels.
19
Of course, we should examine Pickering's portrayal of British cooperation and
consider each case on its merits. There are indications that the British followed legal
protocol, though not always to Americans' advantage. Before the ratification of the Jay
Treaty, the Boston firm J. &T. H. Perkins received a letter in March 1794 regarding a
schooner and its cargo of coffee, sugar and indigo, which had been seized by the British
19 American State Papers. 1. Foreign Relations 2: 15. 56-90, 315, 316, 593.
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as it left Port-de-Paix, on the northern tip of Saint Domingue. The writer. James Carter, a
passenger on the ship, witnessed the fate of Americans and their property at the hands of
the French and British. At first, Carter explains the judicial process and complains that
the treatment of Americans and their property "'is really insufferable." Soon, he discovers
that the British judge ''stop'd libeling American property" while the French continue to
do so. 20 Carter described favorable treatment from the British; but based on the
information gathered by the Secretary of State, and accounts recorded in newspapers,
Americans captured by the French were generally treated as pirates and sometimes
subject to torture. 21
Pickering's report and the increasing loss of life and property in the West Indies
forced Federalists, led by John Adams, to prohibit trade with all French colonies in the
West Indies, create the Naval Department (1798), and wage the Quasi War with France. 22
On 25 June 1798, Congress passed legislation allowing merchant vessels to arm and
defend themselves against attacks by vessels sailing under French colors or under the
authority of the French republic. Any armed French ship suspected of seizing or
attempting to seize an American vessel could be pursued and captured to recover stolen
property. Merchants were required to post bond equal to double the value of their vessel,
firearms, and ammunition to gain clearance. All munitions were to be accounted for
upon returning to the U.S. to insure that merchants were not selling guns or ammunition
James Carter, to James and Thomas H. Perkins. 31 March 1794. Thomas Handasyd Perkins Papers.
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in foreign ports, in violation of neutral laws. The law was in effect for one year or until
the French ceased their attacks on American commercial vessels. 23
The government also safeguarded the interests and lives of American seamen and
commercial vessels in an undeclared naval war with France. During the Quasi War
(1798-1800), fought primarily in the Caribbean, American shipping was aided by the
success of the Saint Domingue slave revolt (1791-1804). 24 At the same time, Britain's
interference with French privateers greatly reduced the number of seizures. This
generated renewed interest in the Haitian trade, and Federalists adopted the policy of
protecting and expanding commerce with the former slaves under an informal trade
agreement.
When John Adams' presidency began in 1797, the former slave Francois
Dominique Toussaint L'Ouverture had been the leader of rebel factions in Saint
Domingue for four years. Adams was uncertain about the effects that an independent
state governed by black men would have on the United States. Initially, he thought,
''independence is the worst and most dangerous condition they can be in, for the United
States," but he also acknowledged that his uneasiness over black independence was
"liable to so much uncertainty, that no great dependence can be placed upon it." Adams
may have adopted a favorable disposition toward recognition of the freed slaves as
leaders of an independent state, which no doubt contributed to his decision to resume
trade with the island when French privateering subsided. Adams concluded that if the
United States intervened, it "had better leave the independence of the island complete and
23
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total, in commerce as well as legislation, to the people who assert it. the inhabitants of the
island." Toussaint did not declare independence during Adams' presidency, but Adams
did not shy away from protecting commerce or trading with the former slaves.
Adams encouraged negotiations with Toussaint L'Ouverture and reopened trade
with portions of the island under the black leader's authority.
26 The President issued a
proclamation in June 1799, and announced the policy change to the Sixth Congress that
December. In his message Adams announced that trade with "Cape Francois and Port
Republicain, formerly called Port-au-Prince" could be "safely be renewed." His
willingness to deploy the military to protect American trade was so popular that southern
Federalists received a boost at the polls that temporarily rejuvenated the party in that
region. Thus could Adams boast, '"Since the renewal of this intercourse, our citizens
trading to those ports, with their property, have been duly respected, and privateering
from those parts has ceased." Therefore, beginning August 1800, Adams lifted all
prohibitions on trade with the former slaves of Haiti. A treaty between the Haitians,
British general Thomas Maitland, and the United States (though unofficial), guaranteed
American commercial vessels safe passage when trading in ports under Toussaint
L'Ouverture's control. Both the U.S. and Great Britain dealt with the island's former
slaves as the ''Government of St. Domingo."27
The Adams administration obviously did much to protect the nation's maritime
trade and economic prosperity. While the United States did not formally acknowledge
25 Adams to Pickering 17 April 1799, Works ofJohn Adams. Second President of the United States: With a
Life of the Author, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press. 1969), 634.
26 Adams to Pickering. 1 May 1799: Works ofJohn Adams, 639 n 2.
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Toussaint's domain as an independent state, the government's official position was one
of congenial intercourse with the island's black leadership. Adams had a personal stake
in safeguarding the property and commercial prosperity of his constituents in
Massachusetts. Between 1798 and 1800, the Fifth and Sixth congresses passed five laws
to protect commercial vessels and their crews. The legislation allowed armed vessels to
reclaim seized ships and cargoes, and to profit from the capture of French privateers. 28
Merchants from Boston and Salem voiced their '"approbation" for the measures Adams
had taken to protect the foreign trade, and pledged their support for their government's
efforts - at all costs.
29
Adams showed little angst over whether the Haitian trade threatened southern
slavery. During a crucial period for the nation's maritime industry, the federal
government authorized the export of provisions, and sometimes guns and ammunition, to
aid the revolutionaries in Saint Domingue. Federalists facilitated the expansion of black
hegemony, and battled colonialism through their support of Toussaint L'Ouverture in his
civil war with pro-colonial forces under the mulatto general Andre Rigaud. Americans
participated in the capture of ships caught trading with Toussaint' s enemies, and
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering collaborated with Alexander Hamilton to draft a
new form of government for the victorious leader. 30
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With Massachusetts Federalists at the helm, the federal government performed
vigorously in behalf of the nation's commerce. Their labors included support of a slave
revolt that led to the independence of France's most productive colony. As their calls to
arrest the spread of slavery into the Mississippi Territory in 1798 reveal, most
Massachusetts Federalists considered slavery evil and were not averse to calling for its
abolition. Already, abolition or gradual emancipation laws insured the eradication of
slavery in the North - and threats to slavery could even be found in the upper South. 31
Helping the former slaves of Saint Domingue maintain their independence satisfied the
Federalists' growing disdain for France and their abhorrence to slavery, the economic
culture that gave southerners undue political influence in national politics.
In light of these efforts, it is difficult to understand why Federalist reaction to the
St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act, especially in Massachusetts, has not been more closely
examined. Bay State merchants welcomed the resumption of trade under Toussaint's
command, and insurance companies lowered their rates once the navy reduced the risk of
seizures.
32
The repercussions from the Republicans' reversal of this policy merit
exploration if we are to fully understand the developments that revived and extended the
life of Federalism in the Commonwealth. It is also important because it questions the
role historians traditionally ascribe to Federalists when discussing the political tensions of
the era.
1
Annals of Congress, 5
Ih
Cong., 2
nd
sess.. 1306, 1310: Tim Matthewson. A Proslavery Foreign Policy:
Haitian-American Relations during the Early Republic (Westport. Ct. 2003), 51, 61, 62-64..
~ 2 See George Little to Thomas H. Perkins 18 January 1800, and Harry Corbiero to James and Thomas H.
Perkins 27 October 1798, Thomas H. Perkins Papers. MHS (microfilm, WEB).
77
In September of 1800, before leaving office, Adams engineered the Treaty of
Mortefontaine, which ended America's hostilities with France, and led to the withdrawal
of U.S. naval forces from Saint Domingue. Adams' final proclamation regarding Saint
Domingue was on 9 May 1800. The government dealt with the African-Caribbean
leaders in certain matters, but officially, the U.S. still considered Saint Domingue a
French colony and withheld formal recognition of the former slaves' independence. 33
When Adams left office in March 1801, the new president. Thomas Jefferson, a southern
slaveholder, did not extend courtesies to the island's black leaders.
34
The Republicans'
assessment of how to deal with Saint Domingue would be radically different from those
of its predecessors. In ensuing years, it would become clear that Jefferson's election
altered the federal government's relationship to Massachusetts.
In 1802, two years after Franco-American accord was reached, France and Britain
worked out a temporary cessation of hostilities under the Treaty of Amiens. The treaty
ended the wars of the French Revolution (1793-1801) and eliminated the tensions that
facilitated Anglo-American aid to Toussaint L'Ouverture. The rebels of Saint Domingue
were now vulnerable to Napoleon's armies. Napoleon set his sights on subduing the
black revolutionaries and returning them to slavery. Once again, Americans trading with
the former slaves were harassed by the French and turned to the federal government for
relief.
3
^ Yet, not only did war resume in Europe in 1803; Napoleon's attempts to
reestablish French control and slavery in Saint Domingue were a dismal failure. His
33
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army's bitter defeat was punctuated by the massacre of remaining whites and the creation
of the independent republic - Haiti - in January 1804. Haitian leaders immediately
asserted the rights of a sovereign nation to trade freely without interference from France.
Even before declaring independence, the island's new ruler, Jean Jacques Dessalines
contacted Jefferson to establish a dialogue.
36
Jefferson ignored the letter, an action which
itself had diplomatic repercussions. French agents became aware of Jefferson's hostility
toward the Haitians and seized the opportunity to exploit his attitudes toward race and
slavery. Upon observing Jefferson's revulsion to the Haitians and detecting similar
prejudices among slaveholding Republicans. France resumed its assaults on merchant
vessels engaged in the Haitian trade. 37
Merchants had no recourse but to arm their vessels as they had during the Quasi
War. Before long, both France and England complained to the administration about
armed commercial vessels. In a letter dated 7 May 1804, the French Charge d' Affaires
complained that merchants trading munitions to Haiti were violating the laws of
neutrality and engaging in a "'private and piratical war" against France. 38 A letter from
the British envoy, dated 31 August 1804, also complained that Americans were violating
laws of neutrality by trading "contraband articles to the enemies' possessions in the East
and West Indies" but Britain's concerns were different. The British knew of at least two
armed vessels that were captured while trading with the Haitians, but they were chiefly
disturbed by the fact that the ships and their munitions were now in France's
36
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possession." Although neither power wanted American ships to strengthen their enemy
with provisions, there were notable differences in their complaints. For the British, the
issue was that France was being fortified with arms they confiscated from American
vessels. The problem for France was that Americans were trading with their former
slaves.
The Jefferson administration was also receiving information from merchants and
others regarding seizures. In February 1804, Vincent Gray at the American Consulate in
Havana, Cuba, notified Secretary of State James Madison about several American vessels
seized in his vicinity. Among these was the brig Dove, the property of Bostonians James
and Thomas H. Perkins. The Dove and its cargo of coffee had been captured by the
French privateer Regulator and sent to Cuba. The coffee was stolen during the night and,
Gray believed, the ship would be towed and scuttled, which was "'now the way they [the
French] clear of the Vessels after robbing them of their cargoes." Gray said Madison
should intervene because the French agent in Cuba had been instructed to use national
ships and privateers to seize any vessels entering or exiting from Haitian ports. 40
In March 1804, Madison responded to Spanish demands regarding the Haitian
trade. Spain was France's ally and participated in seizures and the destruction of
American property. In a letter to Carlos Fernando Martinez de Yrujo, Spanish Minister
to the U.S., Madison was irritated over Spain's attempt to insert itself into an already
frustrating situation. He denied Spain's right to demand that the United States ''control
39
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the commerce of their citizens, in provisions of every sort, with, Negroes of St.
Domingo. " If France had a problem, that was one thing, but Spain "as a Neutral nation,
cannot be permitted to assume to herself these exceptions; much less to extend them to
cases not within the rights of a belligerent Nation."
41
Madison was aware that the alliance system that had developed in Europe
compounded the administration's problems, but he was adamant. As in the late 1790s,
diplomacy with France involved America's trade with its former colony and had nothing
to do with Spain. An exasperated Madison told Robert Livingston, Minister to France,
"It is the more important that something should be done in this case and done soon, as the
pretext founded on the supposed illegality of any trade whatever with the Negroes in St.
Domingo is multiplying the depredations on our Commerce." The whole situation was
"highly irritating" and initiated "extensive claims and complaints" from American
merchants. Madison suggested that if Livingston told the French that the U.S. would
place some prohibitions on their merchants trading in Haiti, even though it was not bound
to do so, perhaps they would temper their aggressions toward commercial vessels and
'"put an end to the evil" they were inflicting on the nation's commerce. "
Since France was not disposed to correct the evil, Congress would have to address
the problem. The choices facing the Eighth Congress in 1804-1805 mirrored those that
faced the Fifth and Sixth Congresses. The government had to decide whether to protect
the merchants, allow seamen to protect themselves, or prohibit the arming of commercial
vessels. Owing to its partiality toward France and the interests of its southern leadership,
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Democratic-Republicans in Congress pursued the third alternative. When the House
began its debate over a bill to regulate the clearance of armed commercial vessels in
December 1804, Massachusetts Republican Jacob Crowninshield objected to a proviso
that targeted the West Indian trade. John Eppes, one of the bill's chief proponents,
actually agreed with Crowninshield, but only because "he did not approve of allowing
merchant vessels to arm at all." Citing the president's message of November 1804,
Eppes, who vowed to ''pledge the treasury of the United States" to destroy the "Negro
government," admitted that the bill was intended to end trade with "a class of people it is
in the interest of the United States to depress and keep down."43
Thomas Lowndes, a Federalist from Charleston, South Carolina, was even more
blunt and told his colleagues they should have the courage to either agree that trade with
the black people of Haiti is unlawful and end it, or decide to protect the merchants
engaged in the Haitian trade. The former, he emphasized, was what the President's
message really '"pointed at" anyway. Massachusetts Republican William Eustis, who had
already lost Sussex County's 1804 congressional election to Federalist Josiah Quincy,
said that the bill, as worded, would affect more than the Saint Domingue trade; it would
jeopardize the lives and property of merchants trading in Cuba and other parts of the
West Indies. Eustis acknowledged a few "irregularities" in the Saint Domingue trade but
believed that "merchant vessels must arm in order to get to St. Domingo, or many of the
West India islands." This, he concluded, "is necessary for the safety of the vessel and the
lives of the crew." Joseph Clay, of Pennsylvania, agreed and added that Congress'
prohibitions would needlessly punish American merchants, especially since the trade
43
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would continue and enrich the coffers of the British. Danish, or some other nation.
Congressmen continued to debate the geographic scope of the bill, amounts of bonds to
be posted, and the temperament of merchants. Virginians such as John Wayles Eppes,
who was Jefferson's son-in-law, and an ardent opponent of standing armies, berated
maritime merchants for their low characters and avarice. '"American merchants are not fit
to be trusted with arms, more than highwaymen are with pistols," he carped.44
Despite several sound objections, the bill passed the House, was submitted to the
Senate, and on 28 January 1805, a motion was made asking Jefferson to produce
information regarding complaints against armed merchant vessels. The President then
released information from his January 31 message to Congress, which included a report
from James Madison enclosing the 1804 letters of grievance from France and Britain, and
authenticated accounts of French privateering. The French brig Fresbriskey, a privateer
sailing under English colors, attacked the ships Hopewell and the brig Rockland. The
Fresbriskey fired on the Rockland, which got off a few rounds before it was boarded.
Several men were wounded, and the first mate and another seamen were killed during a
scuffle on the ship. The captain, who was also wounded, later died while in detention in
Guadeloupe. Leaving only three men on the Rockland, the Fresbriskey then attacked the
Hopewell. A gunfight ensued, but the Hopewell was outmanned and outgunned. Three
Americans were killed, and six were wounded. The French found 100 letters addressed
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to various locales in Saint Domingue, and two generals on board, one of them black.
This was enough to condemn the ship. 4:1
The black general, who remained unnamed, attempted to destroy the ship with
explosives before turning a gun on himself. When the account was recorded, the crew of
the Rockland was still detained in Guadeloupe where the surviving crews of other
American vessels, such as the armed schooner Snake in the Grass, were also being held.
Under French orders, American vessels "bound to St. Domingo, if taken, shall be treated
as pirates." The crew beseeched the government to intervene. 46
The Senate was now convinced that Congress should regulate the conduct of
armed merchant vessels through the pending legislation, but disagreed over the wording
of specific clauses regarding penalties and bonds. Massachusetts Federalists John Quincy
Adams and Timothy Pickering stalled the bill by rejecting proposals to extract a bond
double the amount of the vessel, cargo, tackle, and furniture, and an amendment that
unlawful acts committed on the seas be tried as if they had been committed in the United
States. Nonetheless, Congress passed the act to regulate the clearance of armed
commercial vessels on 3 March 1805, the last day of the Eighth Congress. 47
The final version of the act contained many of the stipulations that Massachusetts'
congressmen and senators had opposed during the debates. The law specifically targeted
ships headed toward the West Indies. No armed vessels could clear for Saint Domingue.
so captains of armed vessels had to swear an oath that they were not headed there. They
45
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also had to post bond equivalent to double the value of the vessel and its arms,
ammunition, tackle, apparel, and furniture, on the condition that arms would only be used
48
to defend the seamen and vessels from "involuntary" hostility. The law was to be in
effect until the end of the next session of Congress, but it was already apparent that
Republicans were planning to end the Haitian trade. On February 23, Senator George
Logan, a Jeffersonian from Pennsylvania, announced that he would introduce a bill to
completely end the Saint Domingue trade. 49
Massachusetts Federalists immediately recognized the direction Republican
policies were taking. Congressional debates were printed in newspapers, as were
supporting or rebuttal commentaries. Federalists defended the legality of the Haitian
trade. "If the blacks of St. Domingo are slaves, who are the masters, and in whom is the
lawful property?" Americans, Federalists asserted, had a right to trade with any nation
that welcomed their business, especially when it was a legal trade with the new republic,
Haiti.
30
Jeffersonians saw it differently. Albert Gallatin, Treasury Secretary, stated the
Republican position when he advised New York senator Samuel Mitchill that this
particular branch of the West Indian trade was illicit "in toto" and assured him that
France had a right to search and seize any vessels trading with the former slaves of
Haiti.
37
Just a day before Gallatin penned his letter, Federalists decried the President's
instruction to Congress that "merchants should be prevented from arming their vessels,"
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and protested that "the trade to St. Domingo, the most lucrative which our country
enjoys, should thereby, be interdicted.'02
Bay State Federalists were convinced that the Republicans' strategy was hostile to
their state's interests. Federalist accusations are usually depicted as partisan tirades but
should not be dismissed. Historian James Banner rightly cautions against condemning
the Federalists' protests as "partisan hyperbole" because the people of Massachusetts
came to believe that Jefferson's policies were incompatible with their economic
independence. 33 More importantly, we need to recognize that the Federalists' charges
issued as much from the sectional bias in the Jeffersonians' defense of their policies as
they did from restrictions on maritime commerce.
A Salem Gazette editorialist contrasted Jefferson's assertions that "Commerce and
Navigation were then most thriving when left most free to individual enterprise," with the
recent government action toward the Haitian trade. "The government undertook the last
session of Congress to discountenance it, and seemed for some weeks absolutely bent on
prohibiting the intercourse altogether." Instead of allowing commerce to thrive, the
editorial noted, merchants trading with the portions of the island controlled by the black
rulers of Haiti, ran the "risk of being convicted of piracy," and could expect no assistance
or intervention from the government. The only foreseeable way to protect life and
property was to abandon the trade altogether; and anyway, Congress had "exposed and
shackled" the business to such an extent that it was no longer profitable.
34
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The article's foreboding had merit. Jefferson's message was a death knell for the
Haitian trade. When the Ninth Congress met on Friday, 20 December 1805, Senator
Logan reminded his colleagues that they needed to consider his bill "to suspend the
commercial intercourse between the United States of America and the French island of
St. Domingo." President Jefferson had already put the matter before Congress when he
argued that while complaints had been received from American merchants, others,
namely France and Great Britain, were incensed over armed merchant vessels trading in
the West Indies. The Charge d' Affaires' letter of 7 May 1804 and the British dispatch
dated 31 August 1804 were Logan's evidence that Congress was obliged to end the
Haitian trade altogether.
35
After reacquainting senators with the contents of the President's message, Logan
pointed out that armed merchant vessels were still trading with Haiti, violating the act of
3 March 1805. Moreover, trade with the black rebels of Saint Domingue jeopardized
Southern slavery. Logan's role in the Haitian affair has been attributed to pacifism, but
he was the logical sponsor for several reasons. In January 1 805, Logan presented an
antislavery petition from Pennsylvania Quakers, which was hotly contested by
southerners and strongly supported by Massachusetts' senators who previously proposed
an amendment to repeal the three-fifths clause of the Constitution. But during the
heightened hostilities of 1798, Logan defied the Adams administration and traveled to
France to strike a citizens' accord. He was considered a threat to national security; and
an act, called the Logan Act, passed in 1799, fined and imprisoned anyone attempting to
33
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negotiate with a foreign power without authorization from the federal government. 36 But
if Jeffersonians thought that Logan's bill would escape the scrutiny and opposition it
would have if introduced by a southerner, they were mistaken. 57
Massachusetts Federalist John Quincy Adams objected to the bill because its only
purpose was to "prohibit a branch of our commerce, which... was proved to be of great
importance to the country." Adams thought the Logan bill should be defeated because it
could "have an unfavorable effect upon the commercial interest, or at least injuriously
affect individual merchants, in the course of their affairs." Not only that, but the
complaints Logan presented to support his bill were the same old letters they had
discussed in 1805. Others attempted to assuage southerners' fears about slave
insurrections by arguing that American trade with the island actually kept the former
slaves confined to the island. Senator Samuel Mitchill of New York, not convinced by
Gallatin's reasoning, concurred with Adams and told his colleagues that Congress had
already complied "in the true spirit of good neighborhood, and correct principle" toward
France, when they restricted the carrying of weapons to Saint Domingue. Nothing had
changed. They had done everything they "politically could or that we honorably
ought."
58
Opponents regarded the prohibition of the Saint Domingue trade as a gross
overreaction to a problem that had already been solved. They refused to end a profitable
avenue of trade on old and dubious complaints from foreign powers at war, or because of
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the racial intolerance of slaveholders. A New York Senator warned, "If we agree to
interdict this intercourse, we may, at the next session, be informed that we ought to
withdraw from some other important port or region." James Hillhouse. a Federalist from
Connecticut, thought the bill "ill-timed'" and said merchants expected Congress to do
"something energetic and spirited" to protect their rights. "How great will be the surprise
if the first step taken by the Senate of the United States is found to be a further restriction,
or a total restriction of a lawful and lucrative branch of our commerce?" A "more proper
and dignified course" would be for the government to act as it did in the 1790s. "[S]end
armed ships into those seas, to capture or demolish those bucaniers [sic] and pirates, who
rob us of our property, and insult and murder our citizens.*09
Proponents of the measure replied to almost every objection, but their responses
failed to address justifiable concerns about the future of the nation's commerce. They
also disregarded questions about the how the law would affect the nation's status in the
eyes of its citizens and the European powers. Sectionalism surfaced when John G.
Jackson of Virginia criticized Adams' objections on the grounds that "arguments had
been advanced on the bill to prohibit the importation of slaves. ..and the same arguments
had been rung in our ears by Quakers and others, ever since the Constitution had been in
operation, and not a new one had been produced."60 Slaveholders had to put up with
antislavery petitions, so now northerners just had to cope with redundant arguments to
pass legislation that would protect slavery.
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The debates were not continued as planned, and the Senate requested that the
president provide more documents relating to the Saint Domingue trade. On 10 January,
Jefferson complied and presented letters written in 1805 and 1806 by French officials
Louis Turreau, Minister Plenipotentiary, and Charles Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign
Affairs. These letters reiterated the complaints of 1804, but placed more emphasis on the
degradation incurred through trade with the former slaves who were described as ''the
reproach and the refuse of nature." 61 On 17 January 1806, Logan submitted an amended
bill, renewable in one year at the president's discretion. The penalties it outlined
included the forfeiture of vessel and cargo. ' Thus, the Republicans' primary reasons for
ending the Haitian trade included its affront to France and the danger it posed to slavery;
but it was not a step taken to defend America's commerce.
A few southern senators tried to extend the one-year time limit, stressing their
aversion to white merchants trading with the blacks of Haiti. Federalist Samuel White of
Delaware, who later published a pamphlet criticizing the act, thought it feasible to keep
the trade status quo. In this way, the Haitian trade averted "the calamity which some
gentlemen seem so much to apprehend." Yet, neither his nor other objections to the
measure were enough to dissuade its proponents. On 20 February 1806, amidst sharp
criticism, the Senate passed the final version of the bill in a 21 to 8 vote. Two of the
eight '"nay" votes came from the Massachusetts Federalists John Quincy Adams and
Timothy Pickering.
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The House received the bill on 21 February and referred it to the Committee of
the Whole for Monday the 24th . That Monday, as soon as James Sloan of New Jersey
asked for a third reading of a bill to tax slaves, Peter Early of Georgia, a transplanted
Virginian who unapologetically defended slavery and the slave trade, insisted that they
postpone consideration of that bill because ending the trade with Saint Domingue
demanded their immediate attention. Early, who threatened civil war over any northern
interference with slavery, was quite annoyed that the bill had already taken so long to
pass. When debate resumed the next day, Massachusetts Republican Jacob
Crowninshield broke with his party and stated his opposition to the bill. He felt the
proposed embargo would be "extremely burdensome" to the country's merchants and
would not stop the trade anyway. As Crowninshield warmed to his topic, he admitted
having reservations about offending the Haitians, and declared, "I think we have a right
to trade with the inhabitants of that island."
64
Before Crowninshield could finish his next statement, which began with a
supposition regarding similar circumstances affecting the Jamaican trade, Early
interrupted to ask if Crowninsheld was out of order. Although he was not out of order,
the disruption upset Crowninshield' s rhythm; he lost his thought and concluded with a
wish that the bill would not pass. Early almost certainly timed his intervention to silence
Crowninshield' s defection. 5 Other Massachusetts Republicans might be persuaded to
oppose the bill; after all, Crowninshield had influenced several congressmen to oppose
64
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the arms restriction bill in the Eighth Congress. Republicans could not let
Crowninshield' s apostasy protract the debate or threaten the bill.
Massachusetts Federalist Josiah Quincy chimed in with certainty that Boston
merchants might be only mildly affected by the law. but he still objected to the
Republicans' effort to rush the bill through the House. Due to "the magnitude of its
principles and consequences," the bill certainly merited more time for consideration. He
recommended that Congress restrict only the shipment of arms and '"military apparatus,"
but not food or other "necessities and conveniences of life."66 When William Ely
addressed the House, he said the language used by the bill's supporters during the debates
gave him more reasons to vote against it. Before refuting the assertion that he and others
who opposed the measure did so because they wanted a war with France, Early asked,
''Have these Haytians no rights?" But Democratic-Republicans stood by their
justification that the United States, as a slaveholding republic, could not acknowledge the
Negro leadership in Saint Domingue, or offend France. As in the Senate, the Republican
majority passed the bill 93 to 26. Every Massachusetts Federalist voted against the bill,
while all but one of the state's Jeffersonians, Jacob Crowninshield, voted for the
67
measure.
Obviously, because Democratic-Republicans formed the majority in both houses,
they were impervious to Federalist objections. John Quincy Adams told his father,
before the bill passed Congress, that ending the trade was a fait accompli. "The
66
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prohibition of the trade to St. Domingo is now upon its last stage in Senate, and in all
probability before I close this letter will be passed." 'The general tendency of opinions
and passions which govern our administration has always been such that this course
might have been expected from the commencement of our session," Adams concluded.
The Federalist press kept a close watch on the debates and had much to say even before
the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act was passed. The Federalist press has been unfairly
maligned for appealing to sectional prejudices, but the truth of the matter is that
Republicans gratuitously supplied the material that fueled the opposition. Jeffersonians
defended slavery and expressed racist sentiments liberally during the debates.
Federalists quickly responded to the prohibitions placed on the Haitian trade.
Henry Adams tells us that "the whole body of Federalists, who hated the South and the
power which rested on the dumb vote of slaves, were exasperated. . .in regard to their
trade with St. Domingo."70 Not only had southerners demanded and then passed a policy
inimical to New England trade, the rapid ease with which Congress prohibited "Trade
with the black ports of St. Domingo" was clear evidence of the government's Francophile
bias. "The Parliament of Paris could not have registered an Edict of Louis XIV with
greater promptitude than the loyal Congress of the United States. . .to annihilate the trade
of the United States."
71
As
John Quincy Adams to John Adams. 1 1 February 1806, Writings ofJohn Quincy Adorns, ed. Chauncey
Ford Worthington 7 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1914), 3:134.
69
Jeffrey Pasley, "The Tyranny of Printers": Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001), 235. 236: Ronald P. Formisano, The
Transformation of Political Culture: Massachusetts Parties, 1790s-]840s (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983), 16.
70
Adams, History of the United States, 662.
71
Salem Gazette, 7 March 1806 (Italics theirs).
93
When the government, which had previously protected commerce, suddenly
outlawed a profitable avenue of trade, for the first time since 1 800, it began to appear that
Jeffersonians might have as little regard for the interests of New England's maritime
economies as Federalists predicted. A Newburyport Herald writer lamented, "In the
present situation of our country. ..if depredations are committed upon her commerce, if
her seamen are violently impressed on board foreign ships, and feel no pride of national
honor; if the government is insulted by foreign ministers...we are prepared to say that the
measures of the administration are feeble and ruinous.
"
72
Under the new law, merchants could legally trade only with parts of the island
under French domination. Vessels were prohibited from even traveling to areas under
black control. Owners or captains had to "give heavy bonds, that said vessels are not
bound to the Negro parts of the islands, nor will voluntarily suffer them to be carried
therein." Americans caught trading with Haiti were on their own, and could expect no
aid from the government if their vessels and cargoes came under attack. 73 To Federalists
the legislation represented shameful acquiescence to French dictates, and earned the
administration a series of unpleasant accusations.
The Federalists' response can be understood when we examine what this act
meant for New England's seamen. Over 63 percent of the nation's dried fish and 80
percent of its pickled fish were purchased in Saint Domingue, and by the outbreak of the
Quasi War, over 600 ships engaged in trade with the island. 74 Merchants were not only
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being told that they could no longer trade with the Haitians, but if they wanted to do
business in Saint Domingue, they would have to deal solely with the French, who had
been confiscating their property and harassing them for years. Shipbuilders, sailors, and
owners of vessels who had expected relief and support from the government had no
choice but to protest the policy. And they continued to read about atrocities on the high
seas, including seizures, physical abuse of American citizens, and the indiscriminate
torture of person of African descent.
73
Even without authentication, this type of story made a strong impression,
reminding merchants of the real dangers several of them had experienced while engaging
in the Haitian trade. The government had not responded as most in Massachusetts had
hoped. As Hillhouse had suggested, the nation's businessmen expected something
'"energetic and spirited." Yet, instead of protecting the state's commerce, the people of
Massachusetts were deprived of an important source of revenue. The legislation had
grave implications, as one Federalist lamented. 'The precipitancy with which this
measure has been adopted is no less extraordinary than the measure itself." The Haitian
embargo, he complained, "will greatly embarrass all our foreign commerce, and must
prove completely ruinous to a lawful and valuable part of our trade.' 76
The Republican scheme, as Federalists were beginning to view it, was to
subjugate New England's prosperity to cater to the demands of southern and French
slaveholders. Banning a lucrative trade "with colonies madefree by a decree of the
French Convention; which Bonaparte is now endeavoring to reduce to slavery" left no
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doubt. The act also confirmed that Republicans never fully accepted the ideals of the
American Revolution. This, Federalists explained, was why they displayed hostility
toward the Haitians, who were "men standing in the same relative situation as the
colonists of the United States stood in 1775, when Great Britain was endeavoring to
enslave them!"
77
The other reason, as Federalist Samuel Taggart observed, was the
"peculiar aversion they have to considering any people with a black skin as free and
independent." Thus, Federalists condemned the bill because it dismissed the protection
of Americans and a valuable source of revenue at the behest of a foreign nation, and
because Jeffersonians were interfering with commerce to indulge their racial prejudices
and protect slavery. One Boston Federalist commented sarcastically, "Split my timbers,
but ain't [St. Domingo] an independent nation!"
Fisher Ames, who tussled with southerners over commercial policies during the
1790s, had much to say about the Saint Domingue crisis. During the early days of the
debate, in 1805, Ames wrote, "Congress may restrict the trade to Saint Domingo, and
hang the traders or permit the French to do it." Ames felt that leaving American traders
defenseless was inexcusable, and added that "the peril of capture by the French, — I
should think, would exculpate our government and nation" if military action were taken.
A trade prohibition should not have been a consideration, he insisted, because the black
rebels of Saint Domingue had "just the same right, the right of the strongest, to
independence, that other nations found their exercise of it upon. It is already de facto,
Salem Gazette, 7 March 1806, (Italics theirs).
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and of course de jure, independent." Historians have described Ames as mercurial, but
in this case his principles were not like those that David Fischer describes "as unstable as
his personality."
80 Opponents of the bill in Congress. Federalist and Republican alike,
consistently espoused the belief that the Negro leaders and citizens of Haiti had earned
their independence and the right to conduct trade without France's interference.
Ames sharpened the Federalists' critique of Jeffersonianism. He said the
Jefferson administration was composed of "knaves, who happen to be in a situation to do
more than ordinary mischief," and added, "If any one should doubt the exact justice of
this character, their unspeakable servility in the St. Domingo business would fully
establish it." Ames also published letters and articles that further articulated the
Federalists' growing demarche. According to Ames, Jefferson, "whose chief merit is
grounded on his having penned the declaration of independence has done more than any
other man living to undo it." He decried acquiescence to French demands, and
Napoleon's efforts to reassert French authority and slavery "over the blacks of St.
Domingo," which was for Ames and most Federalists, was "a degree of servile
o I
condescension beneath" the former slaves.
The commercial policies were a fulfillment of prophecy for Ames and other
Federalists, who had predicted that the Jeffersonians would "paralyze and distract our
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measures and our counsels."82 At the beginning of Jefferson's second term, Federalist
Leverett Saltonstall, of Salem, apocalyptically anticipated the "gloomy night of
democracy" with "fear and trembling." The Republicans' first attack on the state's
commerce fed these fears and compelled Saltonstall, first mayor of Salem and future
congressman, to echo Ames' resentment: "I do think that our Congress in their present
session have degraded the nation, and while they afford us amusement, deserve our
utmost indignation. If last fall I had been a wavering federalist, I should now have been
confirmed." 83
A Hampshire Federalist contributor suggested that Jefferson, "the greatest man in
America, " behaved as if frightened by French officials and chided, "If we were governed
by real women there would be some sort of apology for such conduct." During the
Washington and Adams presidencies, the country had been exalted "to the summit of
respectability abroad and prosperity at home." But under Jefferson, "Instead of gaining
respectability with the increase of our physical strength, our government has become the
sport of diplomatic insolence. . .the nation prostituted and debased. . .and our
congress... are about to pass a law by which the trade of St. Domingo is entirely
84
interdicted."'
The arguments put forward by Massachusetts Federalists were not uniquely theirs.
John Quincy Adams praised Federalist Samuel White of Delaware for delivering what he
described as "one of the most powerful and beautiful speeches I have ever heard in
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congress." White published a pamphlet excoriating the St. Domingo Konintercourse
Act, invoking Vattel*s Laws ofMan ( 1 758) to show that the trade was legal, and that the
United States was under no obligation to abandon its commerce. Haiti, he stressed, was
independent because its inhabitants "refuse allegiance to any foreign power" and "have
organized a government for themselves." The Haitians' struggle with France was clearly
a civil war, and imposing commercial restrictions in that case departed "from Neutral
ground, and [was] an infraction of the laws of nature." Like others who opposed the ban.
White was concerned that the Haitian embargo set a bad precedent because it invited
further attacks on the country's commerce.
86
Northern Democratic-Republicans, on the other hand, were compelled to defend the
trade prohibition. Massachusetts Republican Orchard Cook said, for the record, that he
had voted for the St. Domingo bill, knowing it was "calculated to have a favorable effect
on the Southern States." Cook admitted that the policy would adversely affect
Massachusetts' merchants and the state's economy, but said he was willing to sacrifice
his constituents' interests for what he called "the common good." 87 The Democratic-
Republican press, which also published congressional debates and commentary, assured
readers that Republicans in the national legislature would command "ground in defence
[sic] of our violated rights." This was true of Crowninshield, and even Cook to some
extent during the debates. However, in an attempt to diminish Federalist assertions and
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find an excuse for supporting measures that were against their regional interests, Bay
State Jeffersonians told their constituents that the Federalist opposition was not to be
trusted because of its inconsistencies. Federalists, they averred, did not actually oppose
their commercial policies. Their grievances, as one Republican newspaper explained,
were "'rather against men than measures." Suggesting that the Haitian embargo was in
harmony with Federalist policies, Democratic-Republicans claimed that the problem was
not that the policies were "bad in Themselves that Federalists found fault with them," but
that merely that they were "the measures ofMr. Jefferson and his friends.
" 88
Yet, Federalists had substantial reasons to oppose the act. For one thing, several
Bay State businessmen traded heavily with the island. The Perkins brothers (James and
Thomas Handasyd) of Boston had commercial ties with Saint Domingue before, during,
and after the slave revolt. The Perkins family ran several thriving businesses, traded in
Canton, Smyrna, and other foreign ports, and established a business and residence in
Saint Domingue in the late eighteenth century. The firm J. & T. H. Perkins even supplied
insurance and vessels for other merchants engaged in the Saint Domingue trade. 89 Joseph
Peabody of Salem, whose schooner Fishhawk transported brown sugar, coffee, and
molasses from Cape Francois on at least thirteen voyages between 1799 and 1804, was
also adversely affected by the passage of Logan's act. 90 As late as 1805, William Bentley
recorded that a shipment of "9 millions weight [of coffee] was exported from St.
Domingo, from the Cape only & above 3 million from other parts [of St. Domingo]'*
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arriving in Salem.
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Clearly, at the time that Republicans ended the Haitian trade. Haiti
was an important source of revenue.
Not every trader, however, had the status or capital of a Perkins or Peabody. For
some, Saint Domingue was the only source of income. This helps to explain why
merchants explored ways to continue trading with the Haitians. The verdict in the case
United States v. Penelope encouraged the manipulation of loopholes in the law. The
Penelope was not owned by a resident of the United States and had been used as an
intermediary in trade with the restricted areas of Saint Domingue. The Pennsylvania
district court determined that as worded, the law applied only to persons who had
established a permanent residence in the United States.
92
The decision "excited some
attention" in Massachusetts and opened the way for merchants to continue trading with
Haiti and escape the penalties. This method of circumventing the law encouraged the
British to offer their services to assist merchants still interested in the trade. To
compound matters, an advertisement from the president of Haiti, resembling a modern
travel ad, enticed businessmen to ''come, then, with confidence, trade to our ports;
exchange the fruits of your industry for our riches, and be assured that in trusting to our
promises you will never find your confidence to have been misplaced." 93
James Madison even suggested to the President that commercial intercourse with
Haiti be conducted surreptitiously. Madison, who never supported the Haitian embargo,
asked Jefferson ''whether it [would] be expedient to make any appt. at this time, which
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may seem to favor the trade to St. Domingo thro' a Danish Island." Madison admitted
that the "the law agst. a direct trade has gone beyond our legal obligations," and surmised
that because "the trade will certainly go on indirectly thro' other merchants, if not thro'
ours, it may seem not unfair that ours should reap the harvest."94 Obviously, third party
trading and other violations of the law were widespread; but this never rendered the St.
Domingo Non Intercourse law a dead letter. The owners of vessels that violated the law
found their ships condemned, their cargo seized, and themselves entangled in legal
battles. Cases were tried in district courts from New England to South Carolina; and in
some instances, appeals were taken to the U.S. Supreme Court. In United States v. The
Schooner Betsey and Charlotte, the court reviewed a violation case wherein the ship had
been condemned and its cargo forfeited. The district court ruling had been overturned by
the circuit court of Columbia, yet, besides the Betsey and Charlotte, the claimant owned
two other ships that were also caught breaking the law while trading at Cape Francois.
This contributed to the decision to uphold the district court's ruling. Thus, while untold
numbers of merchants escaped capture or found ways to evade the law, government
officials took the act seriously, enforced it, and prosecuted offenders. 93
For their part, Federalists were developing the defensive position that the trade
prohibition was an attack on Massachusetts. By assuming the role of caretakers of the
Commonwealth, Federalists were in a position to address the fears provoked by
94
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Jefferson's commercial policies and recapture control of the state's delegation in the
national legislature. While historians criticize Federalists for being partisan opportunists,
it is impractical to expect a conciliatory posture from Federalists when Republicans
refused to check their own sectionalism and invective during congressional debates.
They could hardly be accused of exploiting the fears of merchants since many of them,
like the entrepreneur Thomas H. Perkins, were Federalists already. Moreover.
Democratic-Republican support of colonialism and slavery, which was evident in their
sponsorship of the Haitian policy, challenged Jeffersonians' commitment to
Revolutionary ideals, which they promised to restore in 1800. 96
If, in our efforts to understand Massachusetts Federalism, we fail to look beyond
the party's internal restructuring and what one historian calls the Federalists' "self-
characterization with their description of the Republicans," the dynamic political climate
that informed their dialogue loses it potency. 97 Federalism was redesigned as much by
the flaws in Jeffersonianism as by the Federalists' desire to shape the Commonwealth in
their own image. Jefferson's appeasement of the French lead to charges of colonialism
and an inability or unwillingness to act in behalf of the nation's merchants. Jefferson's
gunboat program, authorized to protect American coasts, hardly addressed the issues at
OR
hand. A profitable trade route had been outlawed under dubious circumstances, with
little regard for their region. Petitions for help had been transmogrified by an
administration that decided it more feasible to "restrain the irregularities of our own
%
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people" than to show naval strength as the Adams administration had done under similar
circumstances." One newspaper correspondent summarized the angst associated with
Jefferson's commercial policies. "Ask the merchant... and the brightness of his
countenance will speak his heart. Yet, when Mr. Jefferson came into office, the ships
were scattered to the Four Winds of heaven. And what is the consequence? The plunder
of our commerce... while the coach of the Southern planter is exempted. 100
Did Federalists present an accurate assessment of Jeffersonianism? In an attempt
to detach Jefferson from the proslavery rhetoric of his party, several scholars place the
onus of the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act on congressmen. Merrill Peterson and Tim
Matthewson argue that Jefferson viewed the black rebels positively and accepted them as
the de facto rulers of the island. This argument is largely based on a letter Jefferson
wrote to James Monroe, Minister to England, in which he stated that the former slaves of
Haiti had '"established [themselves] into a sovereignty de facto and have organized
themselves under regular laws and government." 101 Because they consistently interpret
this statement to be an acknowledgement of African-Caribbean governance on the island,
historians look elsewhere to explain Jefferson's support of the act, such as the annexation
' Albert Gallatin to Thomas Jefferson 29 October 1804. in Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress.
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of Florida, which remains a popular explanation for his approval of the Haitian
embargo. 10"
Yet. this argument is deeply flawed on several levels, beginning with the assertion
that Jefferson accepted the former slaves of the island as its rulers. In his letter to
Monroe, Jefferson was discussing Haiti as a possible place for the colonization of African
Americans and not accepting the Haitian Revolution. In 1800, a slave conspiracy in
Virginia resulted in the execution of at least thirty African-Americans and raised
concerns about the hazards of exposing the large population of free, successfully
rebellious black's of Haiti, to Virginia's slaves. The Virginia Legislature consulted
Jefferson who concluded that Saint Domingue would be a perfect place for unruly slaves
and free blacks in general. 103 Actually, recognition of black rule in Saint Domingue was
never the administration's official posture, nor did Thomas Jefferson seriously consider
it. Unlike Adams, who dealt with the Haitians although never officially acknowledging
the former slave's independence, Jefferson always maintained that Saint Domingue
remained a French colony and refused to open any communication whatsoever with the
Haitians. This position dictated the Republican response to grievances from foreign
nations and complaints from merchants. Madison, Monroe, and Gallatin made it clear on
several occasions that the administration never entertained the idea of entering into any
type of agreement with the black leaders of the island. The official policy was that
~ See also. Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti. 1776-1891
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 153; and Tansill, United States and Santo
Domingo, 109.
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France was still the power in Saint Domingue, even after the Haitians declared
independence in 1804. 104
The interpretation that Jefferson precipitated the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act
to annex West Florida is also mistaken. Historians claim that Jefferson ended the Haitian
trade to appease Napoleon, who might reciprocate by convincing Spain's King Charles
IV to relinquish his claims to Florida. Part of this interpretation rests on correspondence
between Madison and Robert Livingston, in which the boundaries of the Louisiana
territory and discord over trade with the Haitian portion of Saint Domingue were
discussed. Madison advised Livingston that the United States would legislate changes
affecting arms shipments to Saint Domingue, but never suggested that the government
prohibit commerce in return for Florida. Madison only proposed restricting the
munitions trade as a way to end French harassment of American commercial vessels. 105
Florida remained a separate issue; and as mentioned earlier, Madison continually
maintained that the U.S. had gone beyond its obligations when it interfered with the
Haitian trade on France's behalf.
Indeed, Madison was fearful that England would monopolize the Haitian trade in
America's absence. Ending the trade in arms as a concession to end depredations on
1
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commercial vessels was an equitable compromise. If the Haitian embargo was part of an
attempt to annex West Florida, it was a lame sacrifice compared to Jefferson's Mobile
Act of 1804 (which attempted to claim the territories surreptitiously), his proposal to
repudiate Spain's (and France's) spoliation debts from the 1790s, or his request in 1806
for a two million dollar appropriation to acquire the territory.
106 Each of these attempts
failed, and since France had no hope of recapturing Haiti, the final failure should have led
to a repeal of the prohibition. It did not. In fact, according to New Hampshire senator
William Plumer, before the year was over, one of the act's architects, Louis Turreau.
regretted the passage of the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act.
In December 1806, Turreau reportedly confessed that "as a Minister he could not
interfere and request the repeal of said law - but as a man he would say its repeal would
not be displeasing to him or to his court - for that since that law has existed, the trade of
that country has almost entirely fallen into the hands of the British, who are, in general so
well armed as to bid defiance to French Privateers." 107 Furthermore, Federalists would
have found a connection between Florida and Saint Domingue irresistible, and would
have seized every opportunity to criticize the administration on those grounds.
Federalists grumbled over the President's efforts to pay for the Florida territory because it
was supposed to be a part of the Louisiana Purchase, but they did not link the annexation
1 08
of Florida with the Haitian embargo. This is because the nexus between Saint
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Domingue and Florida is an imaginative effort to detach Jefferson from the implications
of the distasteful rhetoric his party brought into the congressional debates.
Through the years, scholars have also resisted linking Jefferson with the
perpetuation of slavery; but along with other Virginians, he never abandoned the notion
that slave revolts were contagious. The dread of insurrection in Virginia was heightened
by the presence of refugee slaves from Saint Domingue. The so-called "Secret Keeper"
conspiracy and "Pennack" letter of 1793, the Valentine conspiracy of 1797, and Gabriel
Prosser's revolt in 1800, confirmed Virginians' suspicions that contact with the tainted
slaves of Saint Domingue was dangerous. 109 In fact, Jefferson vigorously attempted to
recover his own escaped slaves, and freed only a few who spent their lives in his service
(most of them posthumously). 110 Since slavery was in Virginia to stay and Jefferson
planned to live the remainder of his life there, the Haitians posed a threat that had to be
eliminated.
In 1799, when the Adams administration opened trade with the black
revolutionaries, Jefferson told Madison that Virginians could expect the unregulated
activities of "black crews, & supercargoes & missionaries thence into the southern
states." This, he assured his friend, was a source of "combustion'" they should fear.
Succumbing to the hysteria that most slaveowners experienced during and after the
Haitian revolution, Jefferson argued that Virginia would be isolated if a slave insurrection
should erupt. He argued that it was delusional to believe that all of the other states would
1
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come to Virginia's aid, cautioning slaveholders to do something about the revolutionary
spirit among the state's Negro population lest they become "'the murderers" of their own
children.
111
Jefferson also expressed deeply entrenched prejudices in his Notes on the
State of Virginia (1781 ), and could never countenance persons of African descent as
political economic, or social equals. It is therefore preposterous to deny that Jefferson's
views on race influenced his policy toward Haiti. Jefferson's conduct substantiates
Michael Zuckerman's argument that "Jefferson lost his philosophical bearings when he
1 1 7
confronted the question of color, or at any rate when he addressed its African aspect."
There is, however, another reason for Jefferson's support of the Haitian embargo
that has been obscured by the slavery issue. Federalists warned Republicans that
compliance with French demands would have dire economic consequences. Federalists
came to understand that when Jeffersonians weighed the prospect of war against the
value of commerce, commerce was at a disadvantage. Jefferson was not opposed to
expanding into global markets for the sale of agricultural products, but he believed that
commercial coercion was the best way to confront problems in international diplomacy.
Saint Domingue was no different. When we peel back the debate over whether the
President was a shrewd statesman or a slaveowner who put slavery above the commercial
interests of the nation, we find the ideological constraints that informed the Republicans'
foreign policy.
Doron Ben-Atar meticulously chronicles the development of Jefferson's aversion
to Anglo-American interdependency, war, and commerce by exploring the philosophies
111
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that governed his foreign policy. After the Revolutionary War, although unsuccessful at
every turn, Jefferson persistently attempted to end the United States' dependency on
Britain through trade agreements with France. He believed that commercial coercion was
the most effective way to force European nations to treat Americans justly and respect the
country's neutral rights. Jefferson also believed that unrestricted commerce threatened
republican virtue. When these ideas coalesced in 1805-1806, they put Jeffersonians on a
course that, Ben-Atar concludes, "destroy[ed] American commerce in order to save it." 113
Massachusetts Federalists saw clear manifestations of his political economy during the
conflict over Haiti.
Timothy Pickering was so disturbed by the turn of events that he penned a nine-
page epistle forewarning Jefferson about the consequences of ending the Haitian trade.
In his efforts to deter the President from signing the bill into law, Pickering wrote, "The
measure in question, tho' apparently originating in the Senate and presented in the
ordinary form of a law for your approbation, will be pronounced yours and you will be
held responsible, in more than your executive capacity, for all its consequences." If
Jefferson would not use naval force to protect commerce, Pickering suggested that he
would "encounter the reproaches of his fellow citizens" who made a living through the
trade. Like other Federalists, he considered the Haitian bill the beginning of a pattern
that would lead to more restrictions on commerce. "Sir. the moment you sign this act
(and you will sign it if it passes the House of Representatives). . .One act of submission
begets further unwarrantable demands, and every subsequent compliance still further
113 Doron Ben-Atar. Origin of Party Politics, 169 - 170.
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debases the nation.""
4
The president signed the bill into law. which helped to begin, in
Massachusetts, the downward spiral of his presidency.
Pickering and other Federalists were apprehensive for the right reasons. Jefferson
would not go to war to protect merchants, and Republicans had already taken steps to
preclude an Adams-like response to French or British spoliations. After gaining control
of the federal government in 1800, Republicans reduced the navy and decreased the
amount of funds allocated for coastal fortifications. The number of all commissioned
vessels declined from approximately forty-five in 1799 to fourteen by 1802. 113 Haiti was
proof that Democratic-Republicans were unwilling to defend merchants. "No argument
(arms with Mr. Jefferson are out of the question) is made use of to preserve a commerce
which is lawful, which rewards the enterprise of our merchants, benefits our farmers,
employs our seamen and mechanics, and swells the revenue of the United States,'"
complained a Hampshire Gazette writer. Francophilia and anti-commercial sentiment
where the only way to explain the disarming of merchant vessels and why "trade to St.
Domingo, the most lucrative which our country enjoys, should thereby, be interdicted." 116
Neither inside nor outside of Congress, especially in Massachusetts, did
Federalists silently comply with southern demands to end the Haitian trade. Among New
Englanders, there was no general consensus that slavery was as crucial to the survival of
the nation as some historians claim.
117
Federalists, who always supported a strong naval
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force, effective coastal fortifications, and the protection of commerce, rejected the law at
every turn. But because historians have assumed that Federalists and their counterparts
kowtowed to slavery, they seldom recognize the extent of Federalist opposition to the St.
Domingo Nonintercourse Act. Federalists were also much less inhibited in their
treatments of slavery, race, and colonialism than Jeffersonians. Any interaction with the
independent black men and women of Haiti suggesting that they were persons of social,
economic, and political equality with whites was anathema to the southern oriented,
liberal Democratic-Republican Party.
On the other hand, even the moderate Federalists such as Timothy Dwight,
Massachusetts born president of Yale University, writes, "remember ere too late / The
Tale of St. Domingo's Fate / Tho Gabriel dies, a host remain / Oppress'd with slavery's
galling chain / And soon or late the hour will come / Marked with Virginia's dreadful
doom." 118 Similarly, in his entreaty to the President, Pickering asked Jefferson how he
could reconcile his support for the French Revolution with his abhorrence toward the
Haitian revolt. What Pickering grasped and threw at the executive, in vain, was that the
Haitians' only infraction was having "a skin not colored like our own." 119 Federalists
were well aware that the protection of slavery had much to do with the enactment of this
policy, and they were concerned that the future of the state's economy was in jeopardy.
These fears informed their response to prohibitions on the Haitian trade and subsequent
trade restrictions.
11S Quoted in Kerber, Federalists in Dissent, 46 n. 61. 49; New-England Palladium 6 January 1801 (italics
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Events surrounding and leading to the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act added
substance to the Federalists' claims that southern power in the national government
would have a detrimental effect on the balance of power in national politics. With
northern Democratic-Republicans supporting proslavery and anti-commercial policies,
Massachusetts was losing the ability to protect its interests. Neocolonialism,
relinquishment of American rights to mollify France, failure to protect America's
merchants, and malice toward commerce, rightly dominated the Federalists* critique of
Republicanism in 1805-1806.
In less than a decade, Massachusetts' merchants went from receiving vigorous
support and defense from the federal government, to imposed restrictions, and thwarted
trade routes. The Commonwealth's profits from foreign exports, which had grown from
$3.3 to $14.5 million between 1803 and 1805. had already declined to $13.9 million in
1806.
120 What would happen when Congress investigated merchants' petitions regarding
the British? Would Massachusetts Republicans be like Orchard Cook and rhapsodize
about the interdependency between agriculture and commerce and then vote against their
state's economy? Perhaps things would be different since Republicans had appeased the
slave interests by ending the Haitian trade. Understandably, Federalists nervously
awaited the Republican response to the escalating problem with Great Britain. The wait
would not be long.
0 Thomas C. Cochran, ed., New American State Papers, 1789-1860, 47 vols. (Wilmington, DE, 1973), 2:
312,3:29.
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CHAPTER 3
"OLD FRIENDS AND STEADY HABITS," 1806-1807
On 2 December 1805, notary public Michael Hodge recorded and verified a story
dictated by the captain and crew of the brigantine Lucretia. In August of that year, the
ship left Massachusetts for the West Indies. Everything went smoothly and according to
plans until the 20th of September. On that day, at 5:00 p.m. a British ship called the
Andromeda fired on the Lucretia, and according to the ship's captain, William Morris,
British privateers then boarded the ship and held the crew at gunpoint while they robbed
the Lucretia of its valuable cargo. The thieves returned and removed some of the ship's
equipment including "canvas, candles, pump nails, and cabin stores." After taking
everything they could from the ship, the raiders returned to steal Morris' watch and
clothes, and the crew's shoes, clothing, and other personal items. At about midnight, the
British let the Lucretia go, but not before they viciously attacked many of the crew;
beating them with clubs and striking Captain Morris across the face with a tiller, when he
asked them to leave. 1
The Lucretia 's seven-hour ordeal and similar accounts of cruelty and plunder by
the British convinced the federal government that some action had to be taken to protect
commerce. Yet, there was little agreement in the Ninth Congress on how or even if this
should be accomplished. Federalists had encouraged amicable relations with Great
Britain and settled hostilities through the controversial Jay Treaty in the 1790s. But
Democratic-Republicans had a different set of priorities and advocated the use of
1
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commerce as a diplomatic weapon. After the Haitian trade was discontinued, it became
apparent that "the eastern states have an interest different from that of the southern,'* as
Senator William Plumer, a Federalist from New Hampshire, surmised. But it was also
apparent, as he observed, that Congress had not been supporting that interest." 2
Congress needed to solve this problem, but New Englanders were apprehensive as
the legislature began deliberations. Mostly because Democratic-Republicans had just
dealt with problems involving French spoliations in the West Indies by outlawing the
Haitian trade. When it came to the Atlantic trade, adopting a similar policy would prove
catastrophic to the economies of the commercial states, so even if their reasoning
differed, New England's congressmen, from both parties, had a stake in influencing the
outcome of the upcoming debates. The following discussion is a close examination of
the complex philosophical, sectional, and political divisions that surfaced as the Ninth
Congress attempted to deal with British assaults on New England's commerce. This
study argues that the debates over the carrying trade exposed the philosophical and
practical limits of Jeffersonian political economy and forced Bay State Federalists, as the
minority party in Congress, to reassess their approach to congressional debates and the
crisis.
At the start of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), respect for America's neutral
trade under treaty arrangements with France and Britain took a dramatic turn. The
Convention of Mortefontaine of 1800 ended the Quasi War; and France agreed to respect
American neutral rights and not seize nonmilitary goods, even if owned by the enemy.
", William Plumer. William Plumer' s Memorandum ofProceedings in the United States Senate, 1803-1807,
ed. Everett Somerville Brown (New York: Macmillan Company, 1923), 337.
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The treaty stopped the wide scale abuse of American vessels. 3 But in part, as a
conciliatory gesture toward France, the United States opted to end the Haitian trade after
France resumed its attacks on American commercial vessels. Other nations, especially
Great Britain, monitored the Jeffersonians' handling of the Haitian crisis and several
members of Parliament approached Ambassador James Monroe to find out how the U.S.
would handle the situation. When the English asked about the official response to French
privateers in the West Indies, Monroe replied that privateers had been fitted out in
Spanish ports, and agreed that the U.S. did have a "cause of complaint against Spain," as
the British suggested; but France was another matter. Monroe added that the French
would end their spoliations and leave American trade alone once the U.S. confirmed that
it would never enter into a treaty with the black leaders of Haiti. Yet, the British asserted
that France was attempting to manipulate the U.S. presence in the West Indies. If that
were so, Monroe responded, American frigates could be sent to the Caribbean to "coast it
awhile thro' the Islands, tho' under secret orders to touch no vessel.'* That, the American
ambassador assured them, would "impose an useful awe on freebooters'" and benefit both
France and the U.S.
4
Based on Monroe's answers, it was evident that Jeffersonians would take no
military action to protect American commerce from French spoliations. France would
either run Americans out of the West Indies, or induce them to join the war. With
Americans out of the picture, Napoleon could concentrate his efforts on British trade in
Clifford L. Egan, Neither Peace Nor War: Franco-American Relations. 1803-1812 (Baton Rouge:
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York: AMS Press: 1969), 220-221.
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the Caribbean. Massachusetts Federalists, such as Fisher Ames, who thought the United
States should enter into a treaty with Haitian leader Jean Jacques Dessalines, condemned
the Republicans' Haitian policy as a precursor to future commercial restrictions,
favorable to France.^ But the larger issue for Federalists was that Republicans had
curtailed the livelihoods of many Massachusetts merchants who were engaged in the
Haitian trade. If Jeffersonians had no qualms about appeasing Napoleon, whose weak
naval forces could not have withstood protracted or even limited warfare against the
American or British navies, what was next?
The British could hardly ignore the implications of Monroe's suggestion that an
illusion of force might be used to deal with the French, but this did not excuse their
atrocious conduct. When the war resumed, Great Britain also returned to a malevolent
treatment of America's neutral trade. The carrying trade, which involved the transport of
foreign goods in American bottoms from a belligerent's colonies to their mainland,
became Britain's primary target. The Jay Treaty, which was still in force in 1803, lacked
a neutral trade policy and the definition of contraband items. These omissions left
American commerce subject to judiciary fiat. In 1800, the Polly decision sanctioned
broken or circuitous voyages to neutralize goods from a belligerent's colony. In practice,
merchants would bring goods (except contraband of war) into the United States, a neutral
country, unload the cargo, pay a duty, and reload. 6
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The Polly decision governed maritime practices until 1805, when the Prize
Appeal Court of the Privy Council handed down the Essex decision. The Essex was
engaged in the re-export of goods that had been stored in Salem, Massachusetts for nearly
a month before it set sail for Havana, Cuba and was seized and taken to New Providence.
Four years later, after a trial and an appeal, the British prohibited the broken trade. The
Essex ruling the reversed the Polly decision by ruling that the transport of belligerent
goods through a neutral port did not neutralize the cargo for reshipment. 7 Thereafter,
transporting enemy cargo was considered a violation of British maritime regulations and
subjected American commercial vessels and their cargo to seizure. 8 One reason for this
reversal is that the revenue from the carrying trade swelled from $13.5 to $60.2 million
between 1803 and 1806. Not only did Britain's turnabout reveal a growing hostility
toward America's foreign policy, it also exposed that nation's desire to reap some of the
profits of the carrying trade.
9
Ships already at sea had no idea that a new ruling rendered
their actions illegal, and had their property and ships confiscated.
Britain also escalated its impressment of American seamen into the Royal Navy.
Great Britain did not acknowledge the right of expatriation; and because of the war,
demanded the services of every able-bodied man. The navy employed press-gangs to
search ships or the streets of seaport towns to find deserters and British subjects to press
7
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them into service. Because the practice likely began during the Renaissance,
impressment was already widespread when Parliament legalized it in 1650. While there
were British deserters working on merchant vessels and in the American merchant
marines, the primary dispute arose over the frequent impressment of American citizens,
which the United States had been unable to stop since the early 1790s. In 1803, Secretary
of State Madison submitted an abstract to Congress listing Bay State residents among
forty-three impressed seamen. 10 But after the Napoleonic Wars began in 1803, Britain
needed over 135,000 men for its expanded navy. As a result, the aggregate number of
documented impressments had reached over 2,000 by 1806."
Although they failed to solve the impressment problem under Washington and
Adams, Federalists attacked Republicans for displaying apathy toward American seamen.
They asked why Republicans, who prided themselves on being the advocates of
democracy, were not interested in protecting the nation's mariners. In election
campaigns, Republicans had promised to stop impressments when they came into power,
but this was just "a fine sounding promise." They had not solved the problem and "after
9 years of continual clamor," the Hampshire Gazette observed, '"how do the democrats
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protect American commerce and American seamen? They dismantle our infant navy;
they dismiss the best commanders, and turn adrift the sailors." 12
On the other hand, the Jefferson administration responded more energetically to
the kidnappings of American seamen by Barbary pirates. Since the American
Revolution, American seamen trading in the Mediterranean had been kidnapped and
enslaved by Barbary pirates. Under treaties brokered by Washington and Adams, the
federal government paid tributes to the Barbary States - but treaty violations occurred
frequently. In what was essentially blackmail, the leaders of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers
extracted payments amounting to almost $1.2 million from the U.S. as a stipulation of
peace. Jefferson resisted their extortion, and in May 1801, as an American squadron
headed to the Mediterranean to pay the agreed upon amount and no more, the Pasha of
Tripoli declared war on the United States. The Tripolitan War (1801- 1805) taxed
America's already depleted navy since several U.S. naval vessels were captured in the
Mediterranean. Peace was not declared until 1805, when the U.S., entered into a treaty in
which it promised to pay a $60,000 ransom for the release of American prisoners. But
the 1805 settlement was far from final. As soon as the U.S. withdrew its navy from the
Mediterranean in 1807, the Dey of Algiers returned to piracy and graft. America's
problems with the Barbary States were not resolved until President Madison urged
Congress to declare war on Algiers in 1815. A naval blockade and land expedition from
Egypt ended in a truce that required neither ransom nor tribute from the United States.
Algiers, on the other hand, was required to pay the U.S. $10,000 in reparations. 13
12 Northampton Hampshire Gazette, 12 September 1804.
13
Bemis. Diplomatic History-, 107. 176-179: Hickey, "Federalist Defense Policy in the Age of Jefferson,
120
An important outgrowth of the Barbary State kidnappings was that formerly
captive seamen published dramatic accounts of their enslavement and brutality suffered
at the hands of the North Africans. Antislavery advocates recognized similarities
between slavery in the Barbary States and slavery in America. The enslavement of
American seamen, in their eyes, exemplified the cruelty, degradation, and embarrassment
of slavery in the United States. The sailors' experiences inspired some of the nation's
earliest antislavery plays. In many of these dramas, seamen, awakened to the horrors of
slavery through the atrocities they suffered under Barbary slave masters, adopt the
antislavery cause upon returning to freedom. Thus, the plight of American seamen in
North Africa became a conduit through which eighteenth century abolitionists staged
heartfelt depictions of slavery to encourage emancipation.
14
But even though problems continued in the Mediterranean, solving the escalating
dilemmas of impressments and seizures was foremost in the minds of Massachusetts'
merchants and their representatives in the Ninth Congress, and memorials from the
state's busiest seaport cities were presented to the legislature. Salem merchants
complained that Britain's "new interpretations of old rules, and new glosses on ancient
doctrines" were costly. Merchants wanted government intervention, and if diplomacy
failed, they asked that the impressment of Americans and the "plunderings [sic] of
privateers" be opposed by "national force." 15 Admittedly, commerce had also been
harassed by France and Spain, but Britain's infractions, the memorialists complained
1801-1812." Military Affairs 45 (Apr.. 1981): 65.
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were "more numerous and extensive." No matter where they sailed, their vessels came
under siege, and even ships engaged in the direct trade of American produce were
harassed. Besides the monetary losses, "our commerce has been checked and
embarrassed." 16
The merchants did not have long to wait for a response. On 26 February, shortly
after voting to end the Haitian trade, the House took up the matter of fortifying and
defending the nation's pons and harbors. Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina suggested
that the United States lend its navy to another nation that could manage it better, and in
response, Massachusetts Republican Orchard Cook, a former Federalist, changed the
direction of the debate. Macon had recently won election of Speaker of the House, which
became a sectional contest when he ran against Bay State Republican Joseph Vamum, so
his proposal met immediate opposition from northerners. 17
Cook opened the floodgates by announcing that his constituents in Maine were
growing hostile toward the administration because its policies appeared anti-commercial.
Moreover, because the government had neglected the navy, "Our merchants have
suffered greatly; some half, and some wholly ruined." Cook argued that commerce
needed to be encouraged and protected by the navy, or the destruction and losses would
continue. The only practical solution was the purchase of "line-of-battle ships and
frigates" to protect commerce. He was optimistic that southerners would respond
favorably to his motion because he had supported their efforts to protect slavery during
16
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the Haitian crisis. Nevertheless, Cook's question, "Shall we or shall we not increase the
navy to meet the exigency of our affairs?" segued into heated debates that revealed the
18
sectional and anti-commercial biases undergirding Jelfersonian commercial policies.
Cook advocated the erection of land fortifications and the protection of
commerce, measures that Federalists had always viewed as important, but from 28
February to 26 March, Democratic-Republicans battled among themselves and
exchanged insults as charges of anti-commercialism and sectionalism filled the air. A
Vermont congressman commented that even impressments were likely to be viewed as a
sectional issue because most of the impressed sailors were from the Northern and Middle
States.
19 While Republicans, such as Cook, wanted to protect commerce or allow
merchants to arm themselves, others supported a stringent nonimportation law. When the
nonimportation bill was introduced, however, it met heated resistance from Southern
Republicans. And as everyone soon noticed, Massachusetts Federalists were
uncharacteristically silent during the protracted debates.
Samuel Taggart, a Federalist from the Hampshire North District, nervously
scribbled, "No Federalist has spoken on the subject. It seems to be their determination to
let the majority manage all these affairs in their own way, without doing anything farther
than give a simple vote." Taggart was not convinced this was the correct course of
action; and although he had decided at one point to enter the verbal fray, he ended up
yielding "to what appeared to be the general opinion." But former Massachusetts'
congressman Fisher Ames, who was forced to retire because of a recurring illness,
18
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warned Federalists that they were "carryfingl their reserve to an extreme." The nation
was naturally interested in how Congress would handle the crisis; and amidst all of the
divisions within the Republican Party, it behooved Federalists to let "the nation know that
they still exist."
20
If they hoped to survive as a political party, they needed to act.
The Federalist minority had argued adroitly for more time to research the
evidence and deliberate before Congress took a final vote on the Haitian embargo. Once
their requests were denied, in the time allowed, Federalists continued to fight to keep the
trade open and suggested that the government deploy the navy to protect Americans from
costly French seizures in the West Indies. After the majority's glib dismissal of New
England's interests, Federalists concluded that it was only a matter of time before
Republicans would self-destruct. "We have reason to believe," one Federalist
commented, "the defects of the national administration in talents and efficiency, and their
utter ignorance of the true interests of this country" would soon become apparent.
Federalists expected the voters in commercial states, especially in New England, to return
to "their old friends and steady habits" in the 1806 congressional elections. 21
Perhaps another reason for the Federalists' quiescence was that they advocated
the use of the navy to protect commerce, and at this point it was apparent that neither
most northern nor southern Jeffersonians would seriously rally around the military option
to protect commerce. In his response to Ames' irritation of their withdrawal from the
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debates, Pickering explained that House Federalists decided to let their enemies "knock
their heads one against another' rather than participate in another useless squabble. 22
In reality, no aspect of the majority opinion was acceptable to Federalists.
Southerners spumed nonimportation and wanted to eliminate the carrying trade
altogether, and most northern Jeffersonians supported nonimportation as a way to force
Britain to respect American neutral rights. Federalists rejected the southern proposal for
obvious reasons and were firmly opposed to using commercial coercion as a diplomatic
tool, especially since it could damage commerce. Cook came closest to reflecting the
Federalist position; but as for the rest of Massachusetts' Democratic-Republicans,
Federalists no doubt agreed with Josiah Quincy that they would persevere as subservient
members of the majority. "'As New England has so long been in a practice of being the
dupe of her southern neighbors, it is to be expected she will not soon change it." New
England's congressmen had taken matters out of "the hands of southern men," but were
now placing the burden of commercial restrictions on their own shoulders. 23
Nor could Democratic-Republicans resist commenting on the Federalists* silence.
Thomas Newton of Virginia applauded the lack of "steady opposition" in Congress. He
supported nonimportation and berated Federalists for their constant warnings that
Jeffersonians would prostrate commerce. Now that the nation was in a critical situation,
he chirped, "the former champions of commerce have hung up their coats of mail - the
helmet and the buckler, the sword and scabbard, are thrown aside - the prophetical finger
22
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no longer points to war. . .from my heart I wish it an uninterrupted repose. Thus, no
matter what Federalists did, they could not avoid partisan harangues. It was obvious that
Republicans were not seeking bipartisan solutions, and Federalists refused to be hectored
into another fruitless debate. If they did as Pickering told Ames, "their usual opponents'*
would simply close ranks and dismiss their proposals. 25
Now that Jefferson had successfully ended the Haitian trade, according to the
Hampshire Federalist "his minions in Congress have begun a warfare against the British
trade."'
26 And as if to fulfill the opposition's prophecies, in March Representative
Andrew Gregg from Pennsylvania introduced a bill calling for the nonimportation of
British goods into the United States as a way to deal with the impressment crisis and
problems caused by the Essex decision. Like Jefferson and Madison, Gregg was sure that
Britain relied too heavily on America's trade to let hostilities deteriorate into warfare or
to endure nonimportation for an indefinite period. But Gregg's proposal was not
intended to protect "American merchants, engaging in that wild, extravagant carrying
trade." Only those engaged in the direct trade of American agricultural goods deserved
protection, and Gregg promised that he would never risk the safety of the nation over an
illegitimate form of commerce. 27
Gregg's assumptions further divided Democratic-Republicans, mostly along
sectional lines. Opponents of nonimportation responded to the bill with rhetoric that
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linked their policies to sectionalism, antipathy toward commerce, and disregard for New
England's economy. Northern Republicans, who like Orchard Cook, thought that
supporting the St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act would move southerners to
accommodate northern interests, were soon disappointed. Others, like Jacob
Crowninshield, strongly supported nonimportation and defended the carrying trade, but
sincerely believed that restrictions on imports would deprive Britain of its valuable
American market and, in the end, command policy changes that would safeguard
commerce.
28
All were frustrated by the response of southern Republicans.
Southerners were violently opposed to any bill that affected their export trade
with Britain, especially the carrying trade, which they condemned as corrupt. Burton
Spivak suggests that southerners "hung back" when they challenged the morality of the
trade in "language primarily economic," but after a closer look at the debates it becomes
apparent that they did not hang back far enough. By and large, their arguments were
vitriolic and driven by regionalism. 29 John Randolph of Virginia, the long-winded and
flamboyant states' rights agrarian who clashed with Jefferson and regularly brought his
dog with him into the halls of Congress, severely rebuked the nonimportationists. 30 The
bill's supporters, he scolded, deserved "a straight waistcoat, a dark room, water gruel and
depletion." Randolph was especially hostile toward Crowninshield and accused the New
Englander of attempting to start an Anglo-American war strictly for profit. But since the
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United States is an agricultural country, Randolph snapped, it was not going to be
dominated by seaport cities. The federal government was not going to protect New
England's commerce, especially the carrying trade, which was a "fungus of war." 31
Even southerners loyal to Jefferson opposed nonimportation because the export of
cotton, tobacco, and other agricultural products to Britain might suffer and cost the South
eighty percent of its income. 32 They would rather suspend the carrying trade than
sacrifice their agricultural interests. A South Carolinian argued that the memorials read
in Congress did not represent the sentiments of the American people, and if Congress
listened to them, "The whole of agriculture would be sacrificed to the mercantile
interest." Had he known that Crowninshield had assembled about 150 merchants to draft
one of the Salem memorials, his accusations would have been more damning. Yet, even
without this information southerners were, understandably, not open to sacrificing "good
markets and high prices" to protect a wartime trade that none of them believed should
even exist.
33
The parameters that southerners placed on acceptable or legitimate commercial
practices during the debates, spoke to the limitations of Jeffersonian liberalism. As long
as the maritime industry confined itself to the direct trade of agricultural goods, it had
value and should be protected. But the carrying trade was a moneymaking venture that
had nothing to do with the agrarian south, so government should not use its resources to
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protect it. Hence, defense of the carrying trade, merchants, and commerce in general,
came from Massachusetts' Republicans.
Expecting the government to take an active role in the impressment issue also
repelled many southerners who condemned greedy merchants for hiring British deserters.
Bay State Republican Bamabus Bidwell called impressment a fate worse than "African
bondage," and more than one of the bill's proponents used slavery as an analogy to try to
convince southerners that impressed seamen were subjected to horrendous cruelties in the
British navy. Yet, they were unimpressed and maintained that the carrying trade was
more trouble than it was worth.
34
Historians Robert W. Tucker and David C. Henderson agree with southerners and
argue that the United States lacked the legal and moral authority to protest seizures
related to the carrying trade or take offence at impressments. 35 Because the trade was
based solely on conditions created by war, they argue that it was immoral for "the United
States to fatten on the follies of Europe." Yet, this line of reasoning does not take into
account the fact that the carrying trade had only come under fire through what many aptly
called Britain's most recent "changes of the day."36 It was not until the aforementioned
Essex decision of May 1805 that the situation changed and the political dispute emerged
in earnest.
If moral rectitude is an acceptable gauge for historical analysis, the southern
position has also been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The agricultural
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products that southerners praised as the backbone of the nation's economy relied on
chattel slavery, a form of labor that other Americans considered immoral. Slavery was
one of the reasons Federalists frequently criticized Jefferson as a hypocrite for holding
slaves while preaching about liberty. He was also a prime target because of the Three-
Fifths clause and rumors of his sexual liaisons with his slave Sally Hemmings: "Great
men can never lack supporters / who manufacture their own voters / Besides, 'tis plain as
yonder steeple/they will be fathers to the people" wrote Thomas Fessenden. Critics also
charged that Jefferson and other slaveholders were so accustomed to abusing slaves that
their violent conduct spilled over into the halls of Congress. The violence of slavery was
manifest in their bitter insults, duels, and unwillingness to accept bipartisan solutions to
IT
the nation's commercial crisis. Certainly, whenever slavery was endangered, such as in
the case of the Haitian trade, southerners assumed the moral and legal right to
protectionist legislation. The southerners' condemnation of the carrying trade speaks
more to sectional exclusivity and antagonism toward New England's maritime culture
than to the immorality of the trade itself. Thus, instead of focusing on the morality of the
carrying trade, it is more useful to look at how it threatened southerners' social and
economic visions for the nation.
The maritime industry benefited the African-Americans in New England and
Mid-Atlantic communities. Black men, with limited employment opportunities, found
~
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work and a level of egalitarianism not present in other occupations. Sometimes, ships
sailed with entirely black crews. In Massachusetts and other northern maritime states, the
presence of African-Americans on merchant, whaling, and other vessels exceeded their
percentage of the population. The majority of these men were older family men who
received wages equal to, and sometimes, based on their skill levels, greater than, those of
their white crewmates.
38 Such color-blind policies shocked southerners, who during the
nonimportation debates, criticized mariners for lacking the sophistication to practice
racial discrimination. New England seamen, they asserted, would deal with "a white
39
emperor or a black one - with Bonaparte or Dessalines - it is all one" to the merchant."
In addition, southerners such as Jefferson and Madison embraced a vision of
America that stifled Massachusetts' capitalist impulse. In their eyes, merchants and their
questionable ethics represented a deterioration of republican values. The carrying trade
was directly responsible for endangering the lives of seamen, derived purely from the
love of money, and did little to support the country's agricultural interests. 40 During his
harangue of nonimportationists, Randolph invoked James Stephen's War in Disguise
(1805) to show that this form of trade altered existing laws. Stephen, a British publicist
and influential abolitionist, argued that England's war with France had been protracted
because America's so-called neutral trade replenished France's resources. Stephen
furnished the intellectual foundation for the Essex decision when he argued that Britain
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had a right to regulate neutral trade and intercept American ships suspected of furnishing
supplies to the enemy.
41
Since Americans transported goods and staples from French
colonies to France and its allies in Europe, the carrying trade was anything but neutral; it
was in fact a war against Britain - in disguise.
Stephen also published the pamphlet, Obsen>ations on the Speech of the Hon.
John Randolph (1806), in which he categorized Republicans as the "French faction" and
criticized the recent Haitian embargo. If the Jefferson administration continued its bias
toward France or implemented nonimportation, Britain would simply find new markets
for its manufactured goods. The British economy, he explained, would certainly not
collapse if the nation severed its trade relations with the United States. Yet, Stephens
was optimistic that healthy Anglo-American relations would be restored, even to the
point where the nations would cooperate to enforce the slave trade prohibitions
Parliament was about to pass.
42
In his indictment of commercial coercion and Francophilia in U.S. policy,
Stephens shared many of the Federalists' criticisms; but like northern Republicans,
Federalists stopped short of condemning the carrying trade. Stephens' discourse says
much about the attitudes among a few dissenting Republicans, and of course, spells out
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the perspectives that informed British policy. Unfortunately, as Stephen articulated them,
Britain's strategy conflicted on several levels with the economic philosophies that
dominated American political thought. Either way, there were serious obstacles in the
way of diplomacy.
As the debates over nonimportation continued, southerners' opposition escalated.
Not only did they reject the policy as a feeble response to a serious problem; they also
criticized the bill as an attempt to damage the South' s export trade. On 6 March
Randolph made another speech assailing northern merchants for caring about nothing but
monetary gain, which as he explained, was why they would stoop to conduct business
with the blacks of Haiti. On Monday, the 10th of March, North Carolinian Nathaniel
Macon reiterated his assertions that nonimportation would have detrimental effects on the
South. The Federalists' Quasi War or "sort of half war," he added, had already injured
the South by lowering the prices of certain produce, so if nonimportationists wanted to
get serious they would "cut off all intercourse" with Great Britain. But this, Macon
scoffed, was out of the question because it would affect the northern states and not just
the South.
43
Tennessee congressman George W. Campbell confessed that he had always
thought it wrong for the government to protect any type of commerce that was "out of
sight of our own territory, or beyond the reach of our cannon from our shores." Like
Macon, he suggested that prohibiting all trade with Great Britain would send a stronger
message than nonimportation. Jacob Crowninshield was able to reiterate his earlier
arguments and added that, if he were sent to an insane asylum, John Randolph would be
43
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there, right beside him. He then declared that merchants would be ruined if Congress
refused to "hold out [its] protecting arm towards them.*' The carrying trade, he stressed,
was as legitimate as the direct trade in agricultural goods; and if either were impaired,
southern agriculture would suffer. Southerners were not willing to give up their slaves;
therefore, they needed to "afford a reasonable protection to Commerce.*' 4
The rhetoric southerners used to denounce the carrying trade challenges the
interpretation that Jeffersonians were progressive liberal thinkers who advanced
democratic institutions, while Federalists floundered in philosophical darkness. The
maturation of capitalism required progress and imagination beyond the constraints of
revolutionary republicanism and the South' s plantation economy. In her praise of
Republican ingenuity and economic progressiveness, Joyce Appleby argues that Jefferson
protected the carrying trade "'on the grounds that the Constitution guaranteed such
protection.'* Yet, the debates over the Haitian embargo and Nonimportation Acts
demonstrate the pervasiveness of a very different mindset among Republicans.45 The
central question facing congressmen, along with every other American, was the nature of
free enterprise in the United States. Deep sectional and philosophical schisms within the
Republican Party informed its negative response to violations of the neutral trade, and
belie any unqualified glorification of Jeffersonian political economy as liberal and
modern. The nonimportation debates anticipated the economic and theoretical
underpinnings of the free versus slave labor conflicts of the antebellum period.
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Several of the arguments made by the opponents of nonimportation dated back to
eighteenth century republicanism. This is especially true in statements wherein the
carrying trade was seen as a corruption of civic virtue. Historians have shown that the
theory supporting agriculture as the economic safeguard of a virtuous society found
expression in the philosophy of the French Quesnaysian Physiocrats. Based on the
socioeconomic inequities created by a privileged mercantile class, most agriculturalists
denounced the poverty, decadence, and decay endemic to manufacturing and commercial
economies. The promotion of a free market economy in the hands of virtuous and
industrious citizens supplanted many of these fears. But, as historian Drew McCoy
explains, "Physiocrats articulated most clearly a resonant cluster of fears and concerns
that were to find extensive expression among republican thinkers in America." Thus, in
the 1780s and 90s, Jefferson and Madison grappled with the directions of economic
progress hoping to avoid the social "decay" of a "mercantilist government" that "catered
to the demands of privileged groups and special interests." These fears were behind
objection to the Hamiltonian system, and based on their language, they also informed
objections to government-sponsored defense of the carrying trade.46
The ideological foundation for the American Revolution, which commingled
classical republicanism, civic humanism, and Physiocratic philosophies, included the
belief that England, France, and the rest of Europe had become corrupt because they
eschewed the simplicity of agriculture for the corruption of mercantilism. The United
States could only hope to escape the scourge of a poor, unhealthy, and unholy laboring
class, as well as a corrupt political system, by limiting foreign entanglements and the
46 Drew McCoy, Elusive Republic, 40-47.
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expansion of commerce. One of several speeches reflecting the influence of classical
republicanism in Jeffersonian political economy came from Tennessee Representative,
George W. Campbell, who announced glibly, "It would have been well for us, sir, if the
American flag had never floated on the ocean, under the authority of Government, to waft
to this country the luxuries and vices of European nations, that effeminate and corrupt our
people." If commerce had been left to fend for itself, he noted, the nation would not be
as entangled, as it already was, in the affairs of the decaying and base European nations.48
Nonimportationists themselves reflected certain aspects of revolutionary thinking.
Commercial coercion was a weapon used by the First Continental Congress to force
Britain to repeal its Intolerable Acts, a group of duties and restrictions imposed on the
colonists in the 1770s. Jefferson advocated commercial restrictions such as
nonimportation. First, because of his belief that Britain valued American markets so
much that they would submit to his demands, and second, because he believed that
economic coercion was an effective way to regulate merchants, encourage domestic
manufacturing, and expand agricultural economies at the same time. 49 These ideas
influenced both northern Jeffersonians, who defended nonimportation, and southern
Jeffersonians, who opposed any legislation to protect the carrying trade unless every
avenue of trade with Britain were interdicted.
50
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The dominant interpretation of early national politics suggests that Federalists
were so out of touch with the political climate by 1800 that the Jeffersonian "revolution"
was inevitable. Federalists, according to Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "could not
function at all in the freeze of anxiety that penetrated every corner of [their]. . .psychic
landscape," which compelled Americans to reject their brand of republicanism.^ 1 In fact,
elitism and conservatism have become synonymous with Federalism, and some studies
use the adjective "conservative'* to supplant the noun "Federalist."32 Yet, it was
Federalists who applied a liberal economic philosophy to the needs of the trans-Atlantic
trade. Like Democrats, Federalists inherited the ideologies that fueled Revolutionary
thought in the eighteenth century. However, unlike their opponents, Federalists adjusted
to the economic prosperity of the 1790s and accepted government's role in its growth and
defense.""'
3
As with agriculture, success in maritime industries required hard work, fostered
economic independence, and nurtured ambitions that compelled men to become virtuous
citizens. Historians are just beginning to come to grips with the contradictions between
the Federalists' conservative image and their conduct. As Steven Watts explains,
"Federalists were not simply traditional, antidemocratic reactionaries. Indeed, they had
played a large role in the early republic promoting various innovations—commercial
51
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expansion, [and] entrepreneurial individualism."' Therefore, it is more useful to
examine how the parties responded to problems that affected economic growth and
diplomacy, than to focus mainly on the philosophical aspects of party ideology, which
did not consistently inform public policy.
While thrashing out the details of the nonimportation bill, New England
Republicans looked for a solution to the escalating impressment problem. Great Britain's
impressment of personnel from aboard commercial vessels was always a nasty business.
Britons fleeing from the normally harsh treatment and grisly labor awaiting them in
British naval service either left the country or deserted. Historians estimate that at least
20,000 men dodged consignment or fled from their service in the Royal navy during the
wars, with approximately 10,000 finding refuge on American merchant vessels.
Although Great Britain never sanctioned the impressment of Americans, over time, press
gangs became less discriminating and forced thousands of U.S. citizens into British naval
service.
36
When Federalists were in power, they attempted to protect Americans, and in
1796 passed an act that authorizing the distribution of citizenship certificates called
"protections," and requiring customs officers to register the names of American citizens.
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering also made numerous requests to the British
54 Steven Watts. "Ministers, Misanthropes, and Mandarins: The Federalists and the Culture of Capitalism.
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government to free impressed seamen, and stationed an American agent in the British
West Indies to preempt further impressments in the Caribbean. The appearance of the
protections varied by state, but each one certified that the bearer was a U.S. citizen.
57
Apparently, some states issued protections that made no distinction between naturalized
and native-born citizens and over time, the certificates were counterfeited and sold
indiscriminately for about ten dollars. Due to their ambiguous wording and the
circulation of forged documents, protections quickly lost their value.
58
Then too, British officers were often not interested in determining the validity of a
certificate or verifying a seaman's nationality. Captains had to fill quotas, and one even
admitted that he did not bother to look at protections when his ship was "in distress."
This verifies the account given by James Durand, an impressed sailor from Connecticut,
who describes several instances when protections were blatantly disregarded. One
British captain, Durand recalls, struck an impressed American and knocked him below
deck just for showing his citizenship papers. 59 Thus, regardless of the government's
efforts, by 1806 the impressment of Americans was still a serious problem.
Some scholars argue that the solution to impressment "lay mainly in American
hands" and that it became a precarious and "intractable" issue because of the carrying
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trade. It is true that the United States could have ameliorated hostilities by imposing
penalties on merchants who employed British subjects. 60 However, the number of
American deserters in Britain was miniscule compared to British deserters on American
vessels. The Jefferson administration estimated that half of the approximately 18,000
seamen employed by American merchants in the foreign trade were English. British
estimates were of course higher, and the problem was further complicated by the fact that
the press gangs were haphazard and, of the men they impressed, returned only one out of
ten British subjects. 61
So, neither side can be fully absolved of misconduct when it comes to
impressment. Americans employed British subjects illegally, while the British ignored
the true nationalities of many of the sailors they impressed. Opponents of nonimportation
argued that Gregg's plan would do nothing to end impressments. In any case, as one
nonimportation opponent pointed out, there were more British subjects employed by
Americans than the other way around. "
Maryland congressman Joseph Nicholson accused nonimportationists of sneaking
the volatile impressment issue into the debates to hide the fact that their chief concern
was the carrying trade. Nicholson said he previously attempted to introduce legislation to
affect impressments but could not get it through the House. He was sure that "strong
measures were not then the order of the day, nor would they be now if the impressment of
American seamen was the only ground of complaint." Diplomacy was the only viable
60
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alternative since nonimportation would lead to war. If Republicans ran "headlong into
war," Nicholson predicted, they would not be burdened with conducting it. "The people
will supply our places with other representatives, they will not so readily forgive us."
63
Nicholson was somewhat correct about the political consequences of starting a war, but
this criticism of the nonimportationists was misleading. Jacob Crowninshield, who was
shocked by the estimated number of impressed seamen, brought the issue to the attention
of the Eighth Congress in anticipation of the Essex decision. However, at that time. John
Randolph moved that consideration of the issue be postponed, which it was. 64
During the final days of debate. Southern opponents of nonimportation refuted
claims that commerce and trade were handmaidens, arguing that the U.S. could be
agricultural without being commercial. It was out of a general distaste for merchants that
Macon asked if anyone earnestly thought nonimportation would end impressments.
Congress could alleviate the suffering of American sailors, Macon said, if it forced
merchants to stop hiring British subjects, and "If the merchants really be the friends of
the American sailors, they would willingly agree to such a regulation."
Nonimportationists then pointed to the horrors of impressment, such as "flogging through
the fleet" to emphasize British mistreatment of American citizens.63 For infractions such
as striking an officer or attempting to escape impressment, sailors were sentenced to
receive hundreds of lashes, administered as the sailor was transported from ship to ship
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until he had been flogged aboard every ship in the fleet. 1 But the opposition stuck to its
guns and regardless of such atrocities, maintained that commercial coercion was not the
way to protect mariners.
After the debates ended, nonimportationists had to settle for a watered-down
version of Gregg's original bill. The final version, which was sponsored by Joseph
Nicholson of Maryland, became law on 18 April, and prohibited the importation of
certain articles from Great Britain, Ireland, and all British colonies beginning 15
November. Shipmasters, agents, importers, and consignees were required to take an oath
of affirmation, sweating that they would not knowingly violate the act and would report
anyone who did. Violators risked the loss of their cargo and would be fined three times
the value of the confiscated merchandise, and any person caught purchasing forbidden
items received penalties double the amount of the purchase. All forbidden items were
seized and impounded until related court cases were settled. , 67
Once the act passed the House, Federalists vehemently attacked the Republicans'
nonimportation policy. One newspaper correspondent assailed the administration for
lacking the talent, wisdom, or determination to draft legislation "proper for extricating us
from our present difficulties. 7 ' All Jeffersonians need do to end the crisis is "send our
Frigates and armed vessels to protect our commerce on our own shores and in the West-
India Seas.*' The St. Domingo Nonintercourse Act had humiliated the country enough,
Federalists charged; and now Democratic-Republicans were willing to sacrifice every
66
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avenue of commerce if it would appease France and throw the country into war with
Great Britain. And since Democratic-Republicans would never endorse the Federalists"
military solution or settle the nation's differences with Great Britain, an Anglo-American
68
war was inevitable.
The Federalist press made use of any anti-French or anti-nonimportation
speeches, and although John Randolph was garrulous and condescending, his speeches
were published in several Federalist newspapers.
69
Despite his eloquence and anti-
administration tirades, many newspapers began to castigate Randolph and other
southerners for insulting their representatives in Congress. For some time, they took
issue with the verbal abuse southerners heaped upon their representatives. The attacks
were purely sectional, so party affiliation was inconsequential. Randolph had assailed
several congressmen in his speeches, "and particularly his old and very humble supporter
Mr. Crowninshield," newspapers noted. Since southerners apparently found northern
Republicans so contemptible, Federalists were perplexed that they continued to support
southern interests and kowtow to the administration. At least Federalists responded to the
verbal scorn and abuse that Bay State Republicans seemed to generally absorb without
protest.
70
Sadly, members of both parties found it hard to find points of agreement although
there were many. Orchard Cook espoused the Federalists' policy on military protection
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for commerce, even though this was unacceptable to most Republicans. After defending
the merchants* rights and the government's obligation to defend commerce with naval
force, Cook argued that the "power to wage war is the best security for peace." 71 His
thinking was so antithetical to Republican policy one Federalist made the remark, "I see a
good speech of one Cook. If we get into a serious broil, this would be a Cook very much
to my palate. Who is this new Cook?'' 12 Still, Federalists were cautious about publicly
praising Republicans, especially those who, like Cook, had defected from the party. Plus,
even if Democratic-Republicans were not "all tyrants" a Federalist pamphleteer
reminded readers that they were still led by the "haughty and imperious demagogues,"
those "slave-driving-nabobs of Virginia."
73
In addition to refurbishing the navy to serve as escorts for commercial vessels,
Federalists argued that the only other way to deal with the crises was to have able
diplomats negotiate a treaty with Great Britain.
74
Not only was nonimportation
worthless; it would lead to war. '"What a spirited and energetic Congress we have!"
noted the Salem Gazette. They "pass a bill against England, the very face of which
declares it cannot and was never intended to be executed.*'
7
^ After sitting out the
previous debates, as soon as deliberations over coastal fortification resumed, Josiah
71
Annals of Congress 9
th
Cong., l
sl
sess.. 528.
72
Peters to Pickering 20 March 1806. Pickering Papers (emphasis his).
73 Thomas Green Fessenden. Democracy Unveiled; or Tyranny Stripped of the Garb of Patriotism (Boston:
D. Carlisle. Printer, MA. 1805). 3. n.4 (Italic theirs).
74
See McHenry to Pickering 19 February 1806; Wingate to Pickering 4 April 1806: Richard Peters to
Pickering, 20 March 1806, Pickering Papers (Italics theirs).
75
Salem Gazette. 15 April 1806.
144
Quincy took issue with the arguments that had been made earlier. The decision to fortify
the ports and harbors had been introduced in January, and an allocation of $150,000.00
was proposed as a starting point, according to Massachusetts Federalist William Ely.
Amendments to increase the amount were resisted by congressmen, especially
Republicans from the South, who questioned commerce's value to the nation and the
propriety of spending any more on the coasts.
76
Quincy was already aggravated over the blatant attacks on the maritime interests
and called the Jeffersonians' objections "narrow, selfish, local" and "sectional." In an
argument quite similar to that made by Cook, he suggested building "line-of-battle ships"
as the only way to combat the enemy's encroachment on commercial vessels. What
really bothered Quincy was Congress' refusal to allocate more money for coastal defense
at the same time that it planned to spend millions on "Southern land," the exploration of
new western territories, and the purchase of the Florida to protect the southern frontier.
The commercial states were simply asking "for reciprocity. . .for the security of the North
and East," and now southerners complained that there were no available funds. If the
sectional bias in Congress continued, Quincy thundered, there would either be a change
in government or the Union would be dissolved. 77
As Quincy most likely anticipated, his propositions and arguments were ignored.
Congress passed the Actfor Fortifying the port and harbors of the United States andfor
budding Gun Boats, on 21 April 1806, and allocated only $150,000.00 to fortify ports
and harbors. The act also supported further depletion of the Navy by permitting the sale
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of any aimed vessels deemed unfit for service at the president's discretion. After they
had allowed the nonimportation bill to go through Congress virtually unchallenged,
Federalists convinced themselves that the Democratic-Republicans' inability to solve the
problems of seizures, condemnations, and impressments would persuade voters to return
to their "old friends and steady habits."79
However, Federalists soon realized that they had missed the opportunity to win
over voters in 1806. Fisher Ames, who had little faith in voters' ability to see the dangers
of the "Jacobin party,** was chagrined by his party's lack of initiative. The
nonimportation debates had been no time for them to woolgather on the sidelines,
especially since the issues under consideration directly affected Massachusetts' economy.
Ames told Federalists that recapturing voters in Massachusetts and the rest of New
England would take constant "exhortation, consolation, and encouragement,** but they
failed to take his advice.
80
Safe to say, it is possible that one of the reasons Randolph's
speeches were briefly popular during the debates, is that he came closest to furnishing the
type of anti-administration tirade readers were accustomed to Federalists providing.
Had Federalists challenged Republicans during the debates, voters would have
had an alternative to Democratic-Republicans that might have helped them at the polls.
To onlookers, it no doubt appeared that Massachusetts Republicans were at least trying to
devise a way to protect seamen and had to combat Southerners single-handedly. Overall,
the Republicans' inability to effect positive change through diplomacy or military action
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was becoming increasingly apparent; but Federalists had presented no clear alternative.
Massachusetts' economy stood to suffer even more if Jeffersonians continued to impose
economic restrictions.
One historian argues that it was not until the Embargo of 1808 that Federalists
exposed "the vulnerability of Republicanism in Massachusetts" and reversed "steady
Republican growth."' 81 Yet, scholars seldom look at the elections of candidates to the
national legislature, which is important if we want to understand how voters responded to
the Republicans' commercial policies. Dwindling support for Republicans in the
congressional election of 1806 gives us an early indication that Massachusetts' voters
were becoming disenchanted with Jeffersonianism. Even though Federalists did not get
the results many hoped for, and even lost a seat in the process, returns from the
Massachusetts' congressional elections show less support for, and some dissatisfaction
with, Republican policies. In the Ninth Congress (1805-1807), Republicans held 10 out
of Massachusetts' 17 congressional seats, or 58.8 percent of the state's delegation.
One striking example of a change at the polls is the Essex South District
congressional race. Merchant Jacob Crowninshield, who defeated his opponent by 561
votes in 1804, was reelected to the Tenth Congress by only 267 votes. Crowninshield
began as a supercargo and rose through the ranks to become a ship captain before
heading his family's firm in Salem. In Congress, he was a consistent defender of
mariners' rights and maritime interests in general; and in 1804, he even turned down an
appointment to serve as Secretary of the Navy. Nevertheless, Crowninshield was still
81
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influential in shaping the administration's policies and endorsed commercial coercion.
Republicans sighed in relief when Crowninshield was re-elected, but Essex South
Federalists were also optimistic because they saw Jeffersonian dominance waning at the
polls. Federalists suspected that they might have won the district or made an even better
showing had they not waited until the last minute to nominate candidate Samuel Putnam,
and add him to the ticket only two days before the election. 83 As it stood, the Salem
Gazette excitedly reported, "the federal vote was better than the best hopes and
calculations could promise... a few days of preparation might have given a different
result; as it was Mr. Cs majority is 300 less than in 1804."84
Other seaport districts also began to show a decline in their support for
Democratic-Republican policies. Maine district incumbents held on to their seats in
1806, but did so with fewer votes than they had received in the previous election.
Republican's also captured the Cumberland, Maine seat when Federalist Peleg
Wadsworth chose not to seek reelection. Even Orchard Cook of Lincoln, who
demonstrated personal commitment to maritime interests, and fought vigorously to
protect commerce by arming merchants or deploying the military, won reelection in 1806
by only 140 votes in a two-man race, which was 57 fewer votes than he had earned in the
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three-way election of 1804. The same was true of the Kennebec candidate John
Chandler, who carried his district with 263 fewer votes than in 1806. 8:>
Maine had a solid Democratic-Republican base that was dominated in most cases
by an elite merchant class, as the York District campaign demonstrates. York was the
district of Federalist George Thacher until the late 1790s when war with France appeared
probable. To avoid an interruption of their trade, the Cutts family gained control of the
district by forging alliances with merchants. When Richard Cutts, a scion of the district's
mercantile gentry, was first elected in 1802. Joseph Bartlett enthusiastically supported his
candidacy.
86 Over time, however, they had become bitter political rivals, and in 1806
Cutts faced Bartlett and Federalist Joseph Leland in the congressional race.
Bartlett charged Cutts with corruption and controlling elections through patronage
and intimidation. He maintained that deference to the wealthy Cutts family was the only
road to success in York district politics. Cutts had legitimate ties to commerce, but his
''foreign attachments," such as his commercial partnerships in France, and his ties to the
Virginia gentry through marriage to James Madison's sister, clearly influenced his votes
in Congress. Bartlett urged voters to elect "New-England men who have attachments in
uniform with those of their constituents." Cutts' record in Congress, he said, was "a
blank piece of paper, with perhaps, here and there a blot."87 Even splitting the
S:>
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Republican vote, however, could not defeat Cutts, who defeated both Bartlett and Leland
by 146 votes. 88
Outsiders like Bartlett were not only running against a powerful Democratic-
Republican machine; he was also combating the acrimony that had developed toward
lawyers in post-Revolution Massachusetts. Lawyers, primarily Federalists who gained
political influence and power through family connections, came under fire in the mid
1780s. The legal elite dominated the state's congressional delegation until Republican
merchants, mechanics, and farmers, were elected to Congress. 89 The mercantile
congressmen representing the Maine and Massachusetts districts promoted democracy to
appeal to disaffected voters; but in the end. a Democratic-Republican aristocracy with a
jealously guarded stranglehold on local politics had replaced the Federalist elite.
Republicans without the proper family ties or the proper credentials had to submit to the
same type of deferential politics Federalists had been condemned for practicing. 90 It had
therefore been almost impossible for a Federalist to break through the Republican
machines in Maine, especially since their anti-French posture threatened the elites.
Although some of the faces changed, Federalists held on to six districts: Sussex,
Essex North, Hampshire (North and South), and Worcester (North and South). Edward
St. Loe Livermore, who would serve three terms in Congress before becoming a Justice
in the New Hampshire Supreme Court, won Jeremiah Nelson's Essex North seat, and
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Jabez Upham was elected to take the Worcester South seat formerly held by Seth
Hastings who declined the 1806 nomination. y| Once the November elections were over,
each district, in its way, had demonstrated the importance, as the New-England
Palladium observed, "that some person should represent us to Congress who is
acquainted with our commercial interests, who is friendly to them, and who, by his habits
and talents is able to... detect and oppose such measures as may injure them."92
Thus, although voters sent Jeffersonian Republicans with mercantile backgrounds
to Congress, too many of them believed that commerce should be used as a weapon.
This, along with resistance from the southern wing of the party, destroyed the chances
that solutions favorable to commerce might be reached. Republican majorities in the
Eighth and Ninth Congresses had managed to deprive merchants of arms, end the Haitian
trade, and pass a nonimportation act. It was evident that except for restricting commerce,
they would do nothing to protect seamen from French spoliations or British attacks.
Impressment was becoming an increasingly volatile issue and there was no solution in
sight. Of course, Congress dealt with other matters that could have affected the elections,
such as the impeachment of federal judges appointed by Adams. Yet, even if the
impeachments and the administration's schemes for acquiring West Florida, Spanish
privateers on the Mississippi, or other issues contributed to the party's declining
popularity, in Massachusetts policies affecting foreign trade were a priority because the
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prohibitions Jeffersonians placed on commerce would have serious repercussions on the
state's economy.
By the end of 1806, the shortsighted reasoning that informed the Federalists"
strategy during the nonimportation debates was coming into focus. The invective
southern Republicans leveled at Bay State Republicans substantiated Federalist
contentions that southern interests, pursued by the dominant Virginia wing of the party,
would precipitate the destruction of commerce and Massachusetts. 93 Still, the defense of
commerce came primarily from Bay State Republicans, so it was fitting to attack
southerners who were unconcerned with protecting maritime commerce, even though
Federalists were more theoretically aligned with the southerners" opposition to
nonimportation than they cared to admit. Federalists remained the friends of commerce
and showed solidarity with Massachusetts' delegates without openly expressing support
for an unpopular policy or southerners who delivered anti-commercial tirades in
Congress. If Democratic-Republicans were successful, Federalists might be heralded for
their cooperation and bipartisanship; but in the event of a Republican failure, which was
expected, Federalists would emerge as the true guardians of Massachusetts' interests - the
best and only alternative at election time.
In December, Jefferson recommended that the Nonimportation Act be suspended
so Congress extended the activation date of nonimportation to July 1807, while James
Monroe and William Pinkney negotiated a new treaty with Great Britain. Congress
concurred, and also gave Jefferson discretionary powers that enabled him to suspend the
Springfield Hampshire Federalist, 21 October 1806.
152
law within one year if he should see fit. Postponing the Nonimportation Act gave the
U.S. and Great Britain a chance to settle their differences through diplomacy. It also, as
one historian writes, "guarded the Republican party's northern flank."
95
Unfortunately,
early in the negotiations diplomats Monroe and Pinkney were unable to reach an
amicable settlement over the neutral trade or impressments. In the meantime, the British
demanded the suspension of the Nonimportation Act, which they considered an act of
hostility.
96
In the House, Massachusetts Republicans split over clauses in the suspension act
that relinquished power over commerce to the executive. Jacob Crowninshield, who
communicated regularly with Jefferson and sent him various types of wheat and fish,
argued that the executive branch should not be given the authority to suspend the
Nonimportation Act at will. 97 If the Monroe-Pinkney negotiations showed progress, he
would support suspension later in the session; but that had not happened, and the
Constitution gave Congress authority over commerce, not the Executive. Barnabas
Bidwell disagreed because he wanted to make sure that the law did not go into effect or
that a special session of Congress were called if a diplomatic solution should be reached
after adjournment. Bidwell, along with Richard Cutts, supported the expansion of
presidential powers, but Joseph Barker. Crowninshield, Isaiah Green, Ebenezer Seaver,
and the rest of Massachusetts' Republican delegates were opposed. Bay State
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Federalists, who were fundamentally opposed to commercial coercion anyway, voted for
the amendment.
Federalists were shrewd to support suspension of the Nonimportation Act because
disapproval of commercial coercion escalated after the original act was passed. They had
finally begun to speak up, and by December, Randolph, the strongest anti-administration
voice until now, had fallen from grace. The Federalist press turned against his verbose
diatribes, and the editors of the Boston Repertoi-y prefaced one of his speeches with the
introduction "Mr. Randolph. . .Again."99 Federalists filled the void by criticizing
Jefferson's policies and reminding Bay Staters that commerce was still not protected
against seizures and that seamen still had no defense against impressment. They were
content that they had helped to suspend the Nonimportation Act, which newspapers were
calling "that stupid offspring of democratick ignorance and obstinacy," that had rightly
been "knocked in the head." 100
Even though Democratic-Republicans raked in fewer votes in the recent
congressional elections. Federalists actually took a step backward. The Tenth Congress
would begin its first session with six Federalists and eleven Republican delegates from
Massachusetts - one Federalist less than in the Ninth Congress, which was hardly
progress. Republicans were obviously headed for disaster, but retreating from the
controversy had proven to be a costly and ineffective way to earn Americans' confidence.
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It had been a colossal blunder during an election year—but it was a mistake Federalists
would not repeat.
In Congress, Federalists had been depending more on Republican failure than on
positive politicking.
101
Others had been making many of the Federalists' arguments for
them. Orchard Cook sponsored their military solution, and John Randolph adopted their
critique of the Francophilia in government policy. Even southerners advocated measures
agreeable to Federalists when they supported negotiations with Great Britain. This may
account for some historians" assessment that the Federalists' opposition to commercial
coercion did not appear until the Embargo of 1807- 1809. 102
If the Monroe-Pinkney negotiations had succeeded, a strategy change would have
been necessary anyway, which seemed to be the case when on 27 December 1806, the
diplomats contacted James Madison with news that they had agreed on the terms of a
treaty with Great Britain. 103 The terms were still a mystery, but at the end of 1806, this
was a step in the right direction for the nation. The year was certainly ending more
positively than it had begun.
If successful, the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty would end attacks on neutral trade, end
the impressment of American sailors, and avert the onset of nonimportation.
Congressional Federalists might possibly hurl themselves into political abeyance, and
there would be no reason to pull them out. If this were the case, even the vitriolic anti-
commercial and sectional language that issued from southern Jeffersonians could be
101
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dismissed. Judging by their expressions, however, Federalists had faith that the outcome
would work to their advantage. Much of this rested on what they had recently learned
from British Minister Anthony Merry, who apparently met with Josiah Quincy and other
Federalists to explain that there was no chance Great Britain would agree to the
administration's terms.
Britain, Merry claimed, had been willing to limit impressments in 1803, but
Jefferson and Madison had become so inflexible in their demands that Britain would not
cooperate. Of course, Merry was still reeling from the president's lack of decorum. He
became convinced that Jefferson, by presenting himself ''standing in slippers" and
dressed in his underclothes, while Merry appeared in full diplomatic regalia, had intended
to insult Great Britain. In retribution, Merry stoked the fires of sectionalism, and also
informed Federalists that Virginia's laws protected British deserters. 104 Not only had
hostility to Britain had informed Jefferson's conduct and mistreatment of the Crown's
emissaries, but American diplomats would fail. Merry predicted, because of the
Jeffersonian administration's unwillingness to make "any amicable adjustment, except on
terms, which they very well knew, G.B. would never concede." 105
Federalists were familiar enough with Jeffersonians to know that Merry's
descriptions, no matter how vengeful, found their basis in truth, so they had good reason
to anticipate rejection of the treaty. Jacob Crowninshield told James Monroe that as far
104
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as he was concerned, Britain had no right at all to search American vessels for its
defectors. "The search for British subjects should be done away" since the American flag
should "protect the whole crew." Although the English, he believed, were interested in
taking navigators, their procedures had also resulted in the seizure of several valuable
ships.
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Britain's intransigence over impressment, coupled with Jefferson's poor
reception of British ambassadors, and the deep resentment many of that party had for
Great Britain, gave Federalists another chance.
Caught in the middle of the sectionalism and partisan acrimony in the federal
government were American sailors, merchants, and the economic interests of the
Commonwealth. Congressmen from both parties were well aware that the issues they
debated affected the lives of real people in Massachusetts who cared for themselves and
their families in occupations related to maritime commerce. The citizens of the
Commonwealth needed and expected for an effective policy or some other action to be
taken in their behalf. However, the state's Democratic-Republicans were themselves
divided over which course to pursue, and in any case, were at variance with the southern
wing of their party. Federalists had alternatives; but they were a shrinking minority in
Congress, essentially proscribed from national debate by opponents from every region.
Perhaps the future of the party rested on what they would do next. There was still much
at stake for Bay Staters as a new year furtively arrived on the heels of December twilight.
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CHAPTER 4
"THE SQUABBLES IN MADAM LIBERTY'S FAMILY," 1807-1808
Following the disappointments of the 1806 congressional election, Massachusetts
Federalists realized they could no longer afford to watch in silence as Jeffersonians
restricted commerce in order to address problems in foreign policy. Important issues
such as seizures, condemnations, and the impressment of American seamen had to be
tackled head on - in and outside of Congress. Fisher Ames had been saying this to Josiah
Quincy for some time. "What your party neglects to do and say seems to me very wrong,
for it leaves us to the impression of the clumsy arts of your adversaries. They do what
ought not to be done, they neglect what ought to be done, and all seems right to us, the
people, so long as you good men in Congress forbear to expose the facts." 1 The failure of
the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty meant that Congress would need to tackle the
administration's inability to settle its differences with Great Britain. If they wanted their
party so survive, Federalists would need to participate in the upcoming political debates.
James Monroe and Charles Pinkney had the unenviable task of striking an accord
with Great Britain, on the one hand, and extracting from them the concessions Thomas
Jefferson demanded, on the other. Each man understood that failing could have
devastating consequences. If diplomacy were successful, Jefferson could add to his
presidential legacy the orchestration of amity with the belligerent powers during the
Napoleonic war, respect for America's neutral rights, and commercial prosperity for the
nation. This, of course, is not what happened. The envoys reached an agreement with
Great Britain, but the President was more than slightly displeased with the terms of the
1
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Monroe-Pinkney Treaty. The concession he coveted the most, the end of impressment,
was unobtainable. Great Britain could not afford this particular compromise and
Jefferson rejected the treaty.
The failure of diplomacy and the events that followed drew the nation closer to
war and further away from political and sectional harmony. Jeffersonians put their
economic philosophy to the test by passing a highly controversial Embargo. Yet, even
though the Embargo precipitated widespread discontent and marred Jefferson's second
term, it is the Federalists' objection to commercial coercion that scholars criticize and
which continues to subject them to what one historian describes as the "condescending
regard of so many historians.'* 2 This chapter reassesses Federalist conduct during the
Embargo.
Studies of the period during which the Embargo was in force traditionally
investigate political developments from the Jeffersonian perspective, which usually leads
to a skewed depiction of the opposition party. On the other hand, the following study
analyzes Federalists during the Embargo within the context of the political rivalries and
sectional enmities that informed their deportment during the Jeffersonian era. In his
recent examination of Federalism, Andrew Siegel argues that historians lack respect for
Federalists because they tend to obfuscate "important sites of conflict." 3 Clearly, a look
at the Federalists' direct interaction with Jeffersonians is long overdue. By shifting the
focus away from the traditional context, a balanced view of the political "site of conflict"
2
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is possible. This approach yields a more evenhanded interpretation of Federalist politics
than seen in earlier works. It also provides a clearer picture of the political arena and the
transformations that occurred during a critical period in the nation's history.
Jefferson had several objections to the treaty, which the envoys signed on 31
December 1806. As mentioned previously, his primary grievance was the treaty's silence
on impressment. Perhaps the closest reference was in article ten, which provided that
"Neither of the parties when at war shall, during the continuance of the treaty, take from
on board the vessels of the other the subjects of the opposite belligerent unless they be in
the actual employment of such belligerent."4 This, however, dealt more with enemy
combatants than the problem of impressing American seamen. Jefferson made it clear
that without precise references to ending impressments, any further compromises, even
over other important matters such as paper blockades, restrictions in the Caribbean, or
repudiation of the Essex decision, would be moot. 5
In a letter to Monroe and Pinkney, dated 20 May 1807, James Madison made
Jefferson's terms for ratification clear. "The President. . .laments more especially that the
British Government has not yielded to the just and cogent considerations which forbid the
practice of its cruisers in visiting and impressing the crews of our vessels covered by an
independent flag. . .which ought to be sacred with all neutrals." The Secretary of State
spelled out the dire implications if the United States acquiesced to frequent searches of its
vessels and the impressment of its citizens, the number of which was far greater than the
4
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press gangs' recovery of bona fide British subjects. The ministers plenipotentiary were
instructed to try again and to understand, according to the first statement on the agenda,
"without a provision against impressment. . .no treaty is to be concluded."6
As the Federalists had expected, no treaty was forthcoming. Jefferson's rejection
of the Monroe-Pinckney Treaty was not made official until early 1808, but by June 1807,
the deterioration in Anglo-American relations manifested itself in startling ways. On 23
June, as the U.S. ship of war Chesapeake departed Chesapeake Bay for the
Mediterranean, it was stopped, near Cape Henry by the British man-of-war Leopard.
Captain Henry of the Leopard intended to search the Chesapeake for deserters, but the
Chesapeake's captain Commodore Barron refused to allow the British onboard. The
British then fired on the ship, killing three men and wounding eighteen. Four seamen
were taken off the Chesapeake; but only one was a British deserter, and he was later
hanged. The other men were native-born Americans who had recently escaped
impressment. Jefferson immediately issued a proclamation ordering the British to vacate
American waters. 7
The nation was appalled by the attack on the Chesapeake. In Massachusetts, even
virulent Federalist newspapers expressed solidarity with the President. Articles censuring
Great Britain for committing an act of war appeared immediately after the attack. On
July 10, papers published Jefferson's proclamation, which in addition to ejecting armed
6
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British vessels out of American ports forbade any interaction with these ships or their
crews. In Salem, Federalists endorsed a public meeting held to "to support the
president.'* Salemites discarded partisan differences and united with Jeffersonians in
response to the unprovoked attack. "The President would speak the language of the
whole country, in demanding an explicit disavowal from the British government,"
Federalists announced. They were behind any steps the President would take to protect
America's shores. If the British refused to denounce the attack, an embargo, they
recommended, would avenge the Chesapeake and most likely evoke an apology. 8
As usual, Federalists advocated military preparation. "We want and must
ultimately have a sufficient armed force of some kind, and if the government will not
provide one for us, why not, by voluntary- contribution prepare it ourselves." Jefferson,
they anticipated, would convene a special session of Congress, suspend commercial
intercourse, and then enact an embargo against Great Britain. 9 The president was so
stunned by the Federalists' support, biographer Merrill Peterson says, "[he] was tempted
to exclaim with the Psalmist, 'Lord, what have I done that the wicked should praise
me!"'
10 Upon learning that a call for the militia was in the near future, Federalists
assured the President that Massachusetts' 1 1,000 volunteers would gladly serve the
interests of national security. Near the end of July, a Boston town meeting selected a
committee that included John Quincy Adams, Harrison G. Otis, and Christopher Gore to
communicate the city's support to the administration. The committee adopted a
K
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resolution expressing Boston's "full approbation of the course of policy adopted by the
executive," but according to Adams the meeting was not well attended, and the majority
of those present had been administration supporters before the Chesapeake-Leopard
incident.
11
Had Jefferson called for an embargo in the summer of 1807, the measure w ould
have had strong bipartisan support. At that time, the nation would have endorsed any
response the administration might adopt, especially since the British refused to evacuate
American waters as the President had ordered. If the Jeffersonians ever desired popular
support for commercial coercion, the Chesapeake incident furnished the perfect
opportunity. Even Federalists espoused commercial coercion as a retaliatory measure at
this time. Yet, Jefferson did not call a special session of Congress in the summer, nor did
he take any measures to satisfy the public's thirst for retribution.
A lack of initiative on the President's pan was one of the reasons that the period of
bipartisan support was short-lived. By the beginning of August, Federalists had begun
questioning the circumstances surrounding the Chesapeake attack and the
administration's failure to act. Why had the President returned the Monroe-Pinkney
Treaty without consulting the Senate, they asked. If anyone bothered to notice, Jefferson
was pursuing his usual pacific course; so why had everyone else worked themselves into
an uproar? If the administration was so adamant about ending impressments, why had it
not demanded the return of a single impressed American, and if it had, why was the
public left in the dark? Federalists said they were not backing down from the defense of
11
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their country, but the situation read like a '"governmental peace and a citizen war. "
Before the Chesapeake-Leopard crisis, President Jefferson had refrained from any
serious steps to end impressments or protect the neutral trade, and "Now [that] a frigate
has been attacked, and our seamen killed, the whole country. . .are going to war and
marching militia to the sea shore to shoot porpoises." 12
Old grievances resurfaced quickly. No one discussed the status of the negotiations
with Britain, and having no answers, Federalists focused their invective on the
Jeffersonians' foreign policy. "The truth is, that for the last four years we have had no
cabinet, no government; everything has been smothered and the nation kept in utter
darkness.. . .Let the people see what they have been negotiating about. . . in what it is that
Great Britain refuses justice and where she is guilty of wrong...." Ironically, when they
were in power, Federalists concentrated on national security and protecting commerce;
but the electorate mistakenly voted them out of government. Now, after only five years,
the " feeble and insidious" partisans in Washington had to call for the militia because of
their bungled diplomacy. Federalists reiterated what they had been saying all along -
Jeffersonians were leading the country to war. "[B]e assured I am not sneaking out of a
war," a Salem Gazette correspondent wrote. "I think it must happen; it has been brought
to us not by King George, but King Thomas; it has been invited by weakness, by
temporizing, by... all that malevolence and timidity that a wretched party-going mob
courting policy could produce."
13 When the nation eventually did go to war with Great
Britain, and there was no doubt that it would, Federalists wanted it understood that the
12 Salem Gazette, 4 August 1807.
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Jeffersonians* had precipitated the conflict that they spent the first twelve years of the
republic trying to avoid.
Yet, President Jefferson did not call a special session of Congress until October
1807. In his communication to them, Jefferson underscored the seriousness of the attack
on the Chesapeake and directed Congress to decide what was best for the country. He
also explained that he had rejected the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty because, while the
diplomats thought the English had compromised on several key points, "no sufficient
provision was made against the principal source of irritations and collisions,'* namely,
impressments. Moreover, the situation had not improved since the June attack. The
British were still defying Jefferson's proclamation to evacuate American waters, which in
addition to being a sign of mounting of hostilities, challenged the nation's sovereignty.
Another problem was that the British Order in Council, issued in January 1807,
blockaded French ports and increased the danger of seizures. American commerce was
in danger of being "swept away" from the Mediterranean trade, Jefferson insisted. Great
Britain was disrupting every nation's commerce to get at France, but the U. S. was paying
the price.
14
The Senate quickly submitted the message to a committee for consideration, but
things did not proceed as smoothly in the House of Representatives. When Federalists
attempted to participate in the management of the President's message, they were
manhandled. The foremost victim of the Democrat-Republicans' venom was Josiah
Quincy. Quincy, along with Timothy Pickering, was becoming one of the most
outspoken and controversial Federalists in Congress. On 29 October, Jeffersonians
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suggested that the contents of Jefferson's letter be relegated to several committees. The
plan vivisected the President's message by assigning the consideration of aggressions by
foreign vessels, violation of neutral rights, military preparedness, and public safety to
different committees. Josiah Quincy, who had been conspicuously silent during the
nonimportation debates, took Fisher Ames' advice to heart, complaining that the
resolution treated the issues of trade, the Chesapeake, and any military response as if they
were unrelated.
13
The president, as Quincy rightly interpreted it, had been specific in his message to
Congress, and because the attack on the Chesapeake had been made by "a particular
nation... all the other circumstances mentioned are stated merely as aggravations of this
attack." Quincy proposed that the matter be assigned to one committee and that that
committee be given specific instructions to make the necessary inquiries into the facts
suiTOunding the attack. After all, the special session had been called because of the
Leopard's assault on the Chesapeake and it was this specific event "which stood most
prominent in the public mind" and "had occasioned a great degree of irritation." The
objective should have been to provide information so that the "public would no longer
remain ignorant of circumstances" surrounding the attack. 16 As Quincy suggested, the
Democratic-Republicans' proposal would not give the matter the scrutiny it deserved.
Jeffersonians immediately went on the offensive. They accused Quincy of trying
to justify the British attack and attempting to "cramp the operations of the committee by
giving them special instructions." Quincy, they claimed, had misunderstood the
15
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resolution. Since the President had not provided the House with any other information, a
direct inquiry into the Chesapeake incident was "premature." Quincy snapped back that
he was not defending Great Britain, but simply wanted to "have the whole detail of the
affair respecting the Chesapeake laid upon our tables.*" There was no reason for him to
justify the British attack, Quincy added; he was just as American as any Jeffersonian in
Congress. If the House hoped to competently address the President's message, it had to
"fix on a single object, and not to extend our views over the whole horizon." Regardless
of what an inquiry might reveal, all parties involved would eventually demand to know
the details of the Chesapeake attack. America's relations with Great Britain and France
were on the line, and it was Congress was obliged to provide a comprehensive report for
the record.
The issue was not solved until debates resumed on Thursday 5 November. Quincy
again called for a direct inquiry into the attack. Newspapers had been printing erroneous
information, and Congress had a duty to set the record straight. He reiterated that it was
because of the outcry occasioned by the attack that Jefferson had called a special session
of Congress to begin with. The way things stood, the House had taken the President's
message, "cut it up into parts. . .taken as many of those parts as we pleased and referred
them" to different committees. A full investigation was essential; "the people of the
United States wish to know something on this subject" and should not have to rely on the
dubious "facts" they read in newspapers or passed along by word of mouth." 17
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Quincy was on his own until Connecticut Federalist Samuel Dana, whom Fisher
Ames regarded as one of the brightest stars in Congress, defended his motion. 18 The only
other Massachusetts Federalist to voice an opinion on the matter was newcomer Jabez
Upham from the Worcester South District, who also agreed with Quincy. Quincy'
s
proposal was sound, but the President's men were not open to logical suggestions from
Federalists. Not surprisingly, the motion was rejected by a vote of 93 to 24, with all of
the Bay State's Federalists backing Quincy. 19 The episode might have ended there but
for a newspaper article that appeared four days later. The National Intelligencer
published a short piece on its front page gloating over Quincy 's defeat. The paper
congratulated the Jeffersonian "five sixths" of Congress for uniting against the
Federalists. It went on to accuse Federalists of taking any opportunity to bolster their
image and then assailed them for being hypocrites when they warmed up to the
administration after the Chesapeake attack. Hence, the summer of bipartisanship, as
short as it was, had been an unappreciated waste of time and effort. As for any
Jeffersonians who supported Quincy' s motion, "their motives, undoubtedly were pure,
though we differ from them as to the correction of one vote that they gave."
Jeffersonians were obviously not concerned with anything Federalists had to say.
Partisan rancor, abundant on both sides of the aisle, cut a deep and ever widening swath
through the country—Federalists continue to receive a lion's share of the criticism. For
example, even though historians admire Josiah Quincy' s abilities, erudition, and
18 Ames. Works, I: 896.
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eloquence, they generally deprecate his provincialism and describe his political
perspective as "distorted by regional and political hatreds." 21 Quincy is also denounced
for his particularism toward Massachusetts, an affliction John Quincy Adams tried to
cure him of, but failed. 22 Nonetheless, these qualities, as it turned out, made Quincy
popular with his constituents. This was, after all, the reason the Sussex electorate sent
him to Congress. Yet, similar pejoratives are seldom applied to Democratic-Republicans,
not even southerners who fought vehemently for their region. Josiah Quincy exposed the
Jeffersonians' choleric behavior and "political hatreds" as historians frequently fail to do.
After the final report on the Chesapeake was delivered on 17 November, Quincy
asked that the President forward members of the House a copy of the proclamation
banning British ships from American harbors. Anticipating opposition, Quincy cited
precedents in parliamentary procedure to validate his request. Several Jeffersonians
immediately lambasted him for referring to precedents from foreign nations. Then, Jacob
Crowninshield, the erstwhile defender of commerce, complained that Quincy" s demand
was unwarranted because the proclamation had been "published in almost all papers in
the Union.'' Quincy replied that congressmen should not need to lift proclamations from
newspapers and added that he could not understand why the official document had not
been presented to Congress in the first place. He was also at a loss to account for the
inordinate hostility that met his request. Could it be, Quincy asked rhetorically, that
Jeffersonians were antagonistic to his motion because they had predetermined, "to vote
* See Spivak, Jefferson's English Crisis, 137-138.
" Sears. Jefferson and the Embargo, 153, 156.
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down at all events any question that might be moved, or any inquiry that might be
requested" by Federalists?23
Quincy then produced the aforementioned National Intelligencer article, and read
an excerpt that instructed Jeffersonians to always respond to Federalists as they had when
they voted down his proposals for handling the Chesapeake inquiry. Quincy remarked
that it seemed as if a newspaper publisher was directing the House majority. He could
not otherwise account for their opposition to a simple request for an official copy of the
President's proclamation. Jacob Crowninshield became incensed. He could apparently
tolerate a barrage of personal insults from John Randolph— that was all in the family—
but he could not countenance being challenged by a saucy Federalist from his home state.
Crowninshield rebuked Quincy for alluding to the article, which was published, he said,
before he himself had arrived in Washington. He then pointed out that gentlemen had "a
means of satisfaction" when they felt personally slighted. All of a sudden,
Crowninshield* s tempo changed. Perhaps he thought he had gone too far, especially if he
was telling Quincy to invoke the processes of the code duello over the newspaper article
or the defeat of his motion. Whatever the reason, Crowninshield appeared embarrassed
and abruptly adopted a more tempered tone. He ended his retort by admitting that
customarily the President did not lay papers before the House. Exposing the
Jeffersonians' partisan tactics worked - this time. Quincy' s resolution passed by a vote
of 70 to 32; and a committee that included the wily Quincy, was chosen to approach the
24
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Such was the partisan climate in and outside of Congress on the eve of the
Embargo, the Jeffersonians" most nefarious policy. As Federalists were slowly emerging
from their season of quiescence, sectional and political harmony reached the breaking
point. The early session of Congress had resulted in no military or political response to
the Chesapeake incident; but nonimportation, which had been postponed because of the
Monroe-Pinkney negotiations, was still scheduled to go into effect on 14 December.
Since negotiations had failed, nonimportation was imminent even though the zeal that
followed the Chesapeake attack had diminished. Merchants now wanted to delay the
law's commencement a little longer. Josiah Quincy presented twenty-two memorials
signed by at least nine hundred Boston merchants on the day nonimportation began. The
petitioners asked Congress to modify, suspend, or repeal the law. Consideration of the
petition was opposed primarily by Southern congressmen who argued that it should not
even be acknowledged because Congress could not consider repealing nonimportation
based on complaints from only one section of the Union; even though they had
themselves vehemently opposed and limited nonimportation a year earlier. Quincy
defended the merchants' constitutional right to protest and the House's obligation to hear
them, especially when a law directed at foreign nations would result in a "real and great
evil" to their livelihoods. The motion to consider the petition was supported by Bay State
delegates from both parties, whose votes contributed to a 79 to 38 triumph. 25
Unfortunately, the petitioners' wishes were not granted. As with the St. Domingo
Non-Intercourse Act, those most affected by the federal laws were powerless to change
them. The Newburyport Herald focused on the treatment Jeffersonians gave the Boston
25
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petition. Southerners, the article noted, who objected to even considering the petition had
carped condescendingly that the Boston merchants should be "patriotic and not
complain." Dismissing entreaties from the nation's citizens on the basis that they
represented only one section of the country was certainly antithetical to sectional accord.
If the government sincerely hoped to promote "the necessity of union," they were going
about it the wrong way. Harmony was hardly promoted when congressmen refused "to
hear and consider the petitions" of Massachusetts' citizens on the basis of geography. 26
It is worth noting here that Josiah Quincy's biographer Robert McCaughy
compliments Quincy for being an "economic internationalist," but then characterizes him
as an elitist who harassed political opponents to escape the boredom of the Washington
wastelands. This is not the impression one derives from Quincy's congressional record
or private correspondence. If Quincy believed that he did not "need to mirror the views
of those who elected him," he more than compensated for such arrogance by presenting
several petitions and defending the rights and interests of his constituents. Contrary to
this portrayal, however, Quincy also demonstrated ease, if not a concurrence, with the
secessionist sentiments of other Massachusetts Federalists such as Timothy Pickering.
Thus, even though McCaughy endeavors to avoid the anti-Federalist biases of
conventional interpretations, he falls into some of the same traps. His work fails to
capture Quincy's political dexterity or his important role in the national legislature. 27
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Josiah Quincy*s good friend and distant relative John Quincy Adams was. by
1808, his polar opposite. Adams presented the Bostonians' petition to delay or modify
nonimportation to the Senate. He had previously disclosed the opinion that the
administration should abandon nonimportation "and repeal it at once.'* However, when
the time came to bring the matter before the Senate, Adams admitted that he "barely
presented the petition from Boston** and made no further "motion for its reference."" It
was only through the initiative of other senators, who thought nonimportation should be
repealed, that the petition was retrieved and taken up in committee. Adams decided
beforehand that although he supported the repeal of nonimportation, he would not
champion the Boston petition or "countenance any thing that should attempt to weaken
the Government by opposition.*'28 Whether Adams was influenced by civic humanism,
classical republicanism, or raw ambition, his attitude was indicative of a deep internal
conflict. As impressive as Adams' nationalism and independence are to historians, his
apathetic response to petitioners from Massachusetts was derelict. Adams considered
himself a "man of my whole country," but he had become a senator whose nationalism
excluded citizens from his home state. 29 Thus, his value as their spokesman seemed
compromised; and his willingness to care for his constituents' interests questionable.
To the nation's astonishment, by the time nonimportation went into effect, it had
become the least of their worries. On 18 December, Jefferson informed Congress that the
danger to American vessels, seamen, and merchandise from the warring European
" John Quincy Adams, Memoirs ofJohn Quincy Adams ed. Charles Francis Adams (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippmcott & Co., 1874), 1: 488-489.
" 9
See Robert R. Thompson "John Quincy Adams, Apostate: From 'Outrageous Federalist* to "Republican
Exile.' 1801-1809" Journal of the Early Republic 11 (Summer, 1991): 167; McCaughey, 35.
173
nations had reached a critical level. Along with his message, Jefferson enclosed a copy
of Napoleon's decree that all English ports were in a state of blockade. Although
Napoleon's final word on the treatment of neutral vessels was pending, his Berlin Decree,
initially issued in November 1806, outlined the possibility that neutral vessels "bound to
or from England even those without English merchandise on board'* were in jeopardy of
being captured. French leaders had only to voice complaints to the administration to
disarm merchants and end the Haitian trade in 1805. With anti-British sentiment still
running high, Napoleon's paper blockade gave Jefferson an opportunity he found
irresistible.
The policy that Jefferson expected to be his masterstroke began on 22 December
1807 when Congress, under an injunction of secrecy, read his correspondence and
quickly passed an embargo on all shipping. By the time the president's letter was
considered in the House, the Senate had already passed an embargo bill by a vote of 22 to
7. The Senators from Massachusetts cast their votes on opposite sides, with John Quincy
Adams supporting the Embargo, and Timothy Pickering in opposition. 30 Earlier, during
the session in which the Chesapeake was discussed, Adams had decided to regularly
attend Senate sessions but "restrain rather than indulge the propensities to debate." By 3
November, he was dining with the President and enjoyed the conversation and the
characters of those present, especially of James Madison, enough to call the occasion one
of the most '"agreeable dinners I have had at Mr. Jefferson's." 31 Casting his vote with
Jeffersonians in support of the Embargo confirmed that Adams' recreancy was complete.
30
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Back home. Federalists realized they were not getting the desired return on their
investment in Adams.
As the proceedings in the Senate played out before him, Timothy Pickering
lamented the fact that the Senate could not stop a bill even though most of them could see
that the Embargo was based on evidence that even John Quincy Adams had called
"inadequate to warrant such a measure." Although Adams admittedly "acquiesced" and
supported the Embargo to comply with Jefferson's message, Pickering would never
comply with such an extreme measure to please the president. He regretted that the
"dead majority** in the Senate had embargoed all of the country's shipping in secret, and
did so on the merits of "two or three beggarly scraps of papers.*' Pickering hoped that the
vigorous debates in the House, and the growing number of opposition "proselytes," might
lead to lengthier debates when the bill returned to the Senate. 32
During the House debates, Josiah Quincy proposed an amendment that would
exempt fishing vessels from the Embargo. His amendment was supported by
Massachusetts* delegates from both parties, but was voted down 45 to 82. When the
measure passed, the only exceptions mentioned pertained to vessels cleared under
presidential authority. The Massachusetts delegation split along party lines, with every
Federalist voting in opposition. Most like Pickering were disappointed but hardly
surprised by the outcome. 33 Embargo supporters had already shown a reluctance to take
the necessary time to consider how the embargo would affect their constituents or states
32
Pickering to Thomas FitzSimons, Esq. 4 December 1807: Pickering to Timothy Williams 21 December
1807: Pickering Papers. Compare letter of 21 December to diary entry for 18 December 1807 in Adams.
Memoirs 1: 490-492.
33
Annals of Congress, 10th Cong.. 1
st
sess., 1218, 2815-2817: U.S. Statutes at Large 2 (1845): 451-454.
175
before they passed what everyone knew would be a controversial law. Pickering decided
that it was futile to pose further objections or attempt to stall the bill with requests for
more information from the administration. 3
"
1
Historians have heavily debated why the President waited two months after
calling Congress into session, and six months after the Leopard attacked the Chesapeake,
to call for an embargo. The most widely accepted interpretation holds that Jefferson did
not declare war immediately after the Chesapeake attack because he was anticipating an
apology from Great Britain, or a diplomatic solution. When neither materialized and the
conduct of the belligerents indicated imminent danger and the possible destruction of
American commerce, the Embargo was enacted to give the nation time to gather millions
of dollars in property from the oceans before a declaration of war was issued. Then, after
passing the embargo, the President's anti-commercial, anti-war pacifism kicked in, and
commercial coercion became the Embargo's raison d'etre.
Of course, this interpretation portrays Jefferson as sympathetic toward commerce
and national defense, but from 1805 through the Embargo, Jefferson imposed more
measures that further crippled or prohibited commerce. For this reason, recent works
challenging this interpretation have come forth; and some historians now concede that the
embargo was the culmination of Jefferson's belief in commercial coercion and economic
restraint.
36
Federalists in Congress were the hapless, firsthand witnesses of Jefferson's
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escalating attacks on commerce. Attempts to force Democrats to face the implications of
the Chesapeake attack had failed; the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty was rejected; and the
administration's reduction of the Army and Navy left everyone wondering how the nation
would fight the inevitable war. 37 Moreover, even after historians take a circuitous
interpretational journey to explain Jefferson's recoil from war during the Chesapeake
summer, they still reach the conclusion that commercial coercion and passive resistance
had been indelible parts of the President's political and economic ideology all along.
Be that as it may. immediately after its passage congressmen attempted to adjust
that law to accommodate their constituents" needs. One representative wanted to amend
the bond for vessels under five tons because South Carolina's planters could not transport
as little as 600 bales of cotton to Charleston without paying a bond. When Josiah Quincy
objected to making amendments without more information, a Jeffersonian scolded him
for his persistent protests, and suggested to that since his attempts to frustrate or amend
the administration's commercial policies had failed, he should just stop posing
objections. But soon. Republicans realized that Quincy was not the only insurgent
waiting to speak out. New York representative Barent Gardenier interjected a line of
dissent more caustic and disruptive than anything Quincy had said. "The more we
legislate, the worse we legislate to the destruction of the country." Gardenier could not
fathom why the Embargo had passed in the first place. This led to loud rumbles that the
Martin's Press, Inc.. 1993). 164-165; Merrill D. Peterson Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. A
Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 882-886:
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177
Democrats were displaying their usual obsequiousness to Napoleon, at which time
several congressmen rose and clapped or attempted to shout down the tirade. 38
A barrage of complaints rose above the House floor, mostly from or about
Gardenier. In addition to condemning the Embargo for bringing distress on certain
portions of the nation, someone made the charge that the law's only real objective was to
destroy commerce. Gardenier continued, "Instead of ameliorating, we go on to make
worse and worse the condition of our beloved country." The Embargo, he let fly, was
proof that the Jeffersonians were incapable of taking care of the nation "unless everybody
is destroyed.'" Restricting commerce would never prepare the nation for war when
merchants were being treated as if they were the nation's enemies. When the House was
finally called back to order, Gardenier' s harangue was censured by Jeffersonians
including Massachusetts representative Ezekiel Bacon who distanced himself from the
outburst by condemning it as "melancholy madness."39 George W. Campbell, the House
Majority leader from Tennessee took the New Yorker's charges personally and met the
audacious Gardenier in a duel, in which the New Yorker received a near fatal wound and
spent several weeks recovering before he was able to return to Congress. 40
Though the Embargo had all the earmarks of being the fatal error Federalists had
been waiting for Jeffersonians to commit, they had also learned from their mistakes and
began to publicly attack the administration and its policy. The foreseeable economic
impact in Massachusetts compelled both parties to parlay the fallout into political
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success. Articles in Jeffersonian papers attempted to exculpate their party for passing the
Embargo by placing blame on the Federalists. As Democrats explained it, the Embargo
was necessary due to "the British Faction in Boston having encouraged the depredation
of our commerce, and the capture of our seamen." It was because of these Federalists
that the administration found it necessary, they argued, "to lay an embargo to prevent a
continuance of the outrage." Therefore, "If the produce of the farmer is lower, this
faction must answer for it. If bankruptcies take place in our seaports, this faction must
answer for them."
41
This was an astonishing charge since Jeffersonians had been
excluding Federalists from any participation in the foreign policy debate for some time.
Furthermore, even though the Jeffersonians clearly anticipated the economic
consequences of the Embargo, they rushed the bill through Congress and avoided debate
in spite of the Federalists' objections. These arguments were obviously intended to stoke
the long-established suspicions and jealousies western Bay Staters directed at the politics
in Boston.
In time, even those who may have believed this ad hominem justification came to
reject the Jeffersonians* commercial philosophy. The fishing industry in Massachusetts
was one of the earliest and hardest hit by the Embargo, but much of the rest of the state's
diverse economy had grown up around the maritime industry. By the 1790s, seaport
cities such as Salem and Newburyport served as the commercial nexus for their counties,
and the outlying communities emerged, thrived, and expanded because of commerce.
Towns from Maine to Gloucester were either shipbuilding or trading centers, and
41 Quoted in Thorp Lanier Wolford, "Democratic-Republican Reaction in Massachusetts to the Embargo of
1 807" New England Quarterly 15 (Mar., 1942): 44-45.
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sometimes both. Businessmen had opened the Massachusetts coast to the New England
interior by building the Essex-Merrimack toll bridge in 1791 and the Middlesex Canal by
1803. Transportation between major seaports was improved with the construction of the
Neponset, Salem, Newburyport, and Essex turnpikes. These and other building projects
were funded by the state's maritime industry, not its agricultural sector. Those in line to
suffer as a consequence of the Embargo included sailors, fishermen, shipbuilders,
mechanics, investment bankers, insurance underwriters, the artisans who made sails and
other ship equipment, blacksmiths, carpenters, the lumberyards that furnished wood for
shipbuilding, shopkeepers, and even farmers. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for
the Bay State's economy to survive the Embargo. 42
During the years that merchants complained about British spoliations, especially
1806 through 1807, exports only declined from $21,199,243 to $20,112,125. This year,
merchants who suffered losses because of seizures and condemnations had seen a $1
million decrease. After Congress passed the Embargo, Massachusetts" total exports
dropped from $20,112,125 to $5,128,322, a decline of nearly $15 million dollars between
December 1807 and September 1808. 43 The Jeffersonians* commercial philosophy was
proving costlier to merchants than foreign encroachments.
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In many areas enforcement of the Embargo was also discriminatory and some
Democratic towns were issued more bonds than decidedly Federalist locales. Leonard
W. Levy describes the different treatment in towns that resisted the Embargo and those
that quietly submitted. Jefferson, he argues, attempted to "break the spirit" of certain
communities by withholding permits. For example, officials denied schooners
permission to deliver shipments of provisions and lumber to rebellious areas on the
Penobscot River in Maine. On more than one occasion, the Embargo was used to "attaint
and blockade a whole locality*' when its inhabitants protested or came under suspicion of
"intent to evade*' the law.
44
Boston Federalists pronounced the policy "crooked and
partial,'''' and were horrified to see Jefferson's gunboats firing on coasting vessels; some
that had already received clearances.
4 "1
Jeffersonians fared better. Marblehead, a decidedly Jeffersonian town, issued a
number of bonds for voyages to Saint Domingue during the Embargo. Incidentally,
vessels were still required to post bond against trading with the rebels of Haiti. Jacob
Crowninshield's family was accused of profiting during the Embargo. The rumor was
that authorities had been deliberately incurious about Crowninshield vessels loaded with
approximately $300,000 worth of property. No one was ever able to corroborate these
allegations, but the Salem family's wealth had somehow increased by some $270,000 by
the end of the Embargo. By all outward appearances, however, the Crowninshields
adhered strictly to the Embargo laws. Furthermore, the family sympathized with those in
u
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financial need because of the Embargo and established soup kitchens for the distressed
and poor of Salem. Conversely, the smaller merchants of Salem suffered severely during
the Embargo, and the town never fully recovered. One reason is that Salem was largely
Federalist and was thought to be the nerve center for the "Essex Junto," Jefferson's
nemesis, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 4 In Newburyport, another
Federalist town, citizens were furious over the preferential treatment given to
Jeffersonian merchants. One inhabitant vowed that he would "consume only the produce
of the New England States rather than to purchase a barrel of Flour of any known
supporter of Mr. Jefferson's administration."
47
Politically skewed enforcement was one of several valid complaints Federalists
had against the Embargo. Scholars tend to portray the Federalists' opposition to the act
as capricious and unjustifiable, but this was not the case. Federalists' objections to the
Embargo included the fact that the act had no terminal dates, which meant its prohibitions
were perpetual. Another grievance was that while Great Britain and France were the
countries targeted for punishment, t markets having little or nothing to do with the
problem, such as those in Asia and the Near East, were also closed to merchants.
Federalists also questioned the actual purpose of the Embargo, because if the law was
enacted to give the nation time to prepare for war, why was there no military preparation?
Finally, Federalists were concerned with whether the Constitution gave Congress the
power to place a total and perpetual prohibition on commerce.
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Though the first year of the Embargo, 1808, was an election year, Jeffersonians
did little to strengthen their party's image. When smuggling occurred in all parts of the
United States, Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, told Jefferson about a "system
adopted in Massachusetts" that used lawsuits to intimidate officials so that merchants
could evade the Embargo without reprisals. To counteract growing defiance of the
Embargo, Gallatin drafted harsher penalties for violations.48 On 9 January, Congress
passed a supplemental act that added smaller vessels to those already covered in the
original legislation, including coastal and fishing vessels. Coasting vessels were required
to obtain clearances and pay bonds double the value of the vessel and cargo. Fishing
vessels had to pay four times the value of vessel and cargo. To recover vessels seized in
violation, an offender might pay up to $20,000 in fines for each offense. Informants were
awarded half of the fine imposed on violators.49 The average fishermen or costal trader
could hardly afford the bonds needed to conduct their business legally.
Another supplemental act, passed on 12 March, clamped down on every method
of transport out of the United States. Section four of the act attached wagons, sleighs,
and other ground transport vehicles to the list of vessels that traders could forfeit under
the Embargo. Overland smugglers risked losing apparel, horses, mules, or oxen and
faced fines up to $10,000 for each offense. Ships posting bond were now given a four-
month deadline to complete their voyages and return to the port issuing their clearance.
Failure to meet the deadline meant the forfeiture of the bond, which could only be
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reclaimed in court. The captains and mates of fishing and whaling ships were forced to
declare an oath that they had not sold any fish during their voyage, or they were fined
$100 each. The overland provisions were created to end trading with Canada and other
foreign territories bordering the American frontier.'10
Indeed, the aggressive provisions of the supplemental acts evoked more anxiety
than the original Embargo. During the debates over the March supplement, Edward St.
Loe Livermore, the freshman Federalist from the Essex North District, decided to call for
the repeal of the Embargo. The purpose of the supplement, Livermore insisted, was to
end the few remaining avenues of trade previously "saved from the fangs of the
embargo." Since the original pretext of the law was to protect maritime vessels from
capture on the seas, how were those ends being met by seizing sleighs, horses, and mules,
he asked. Livermore did not understand how halting the paltry frontier trade could have
an impact on Great Britain or France. Bay State Jeffersonian Orchard Cook was not
necessarily anti-Embargo, but complained that the Embargo was already "intolerably
oppressive'' to fisheries, and attempted to amend the fifth section of the March act; but
each of his motions was defeated.'
11
As other congressmen began voicing objections to the supplements, leading
Jeffersonians attempted to impose a de facto gag on further discussion of the Embargo.
Representative Matthew Lyons, who had come to Kentucky from Ireland by way of
Vermont, confirmed what Federalists had been saying all along: the Embargo had been ill
50
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conceived and rushed through Congress. Americans were watching Jeffersonians bungle
their way through an increasingly oppressive and "anti-Republican" law. At this point,
the Speaker of the House, Joseph Vamum, a Massachusetts Republican, accused Lyons
of being out of order. Vamum said that since the Embargo had already been passed and
signed into law, it could no longer be a topic for debate. Other congressmen, most likely
Embargo supporters, attempted to call Lyons to order when he replied that Varnum's
ruling was arbitrary. The Embargo was mentioned "at the end of the title" of the
supplemental bill, Lyons pointed out, so despite "the speaker's decision, it is in order to
speak of the Embargo.'02
Intellectual dishonesty or arrogance had led Jeffersonians to conclude that
congressmen were required to supplement the original embargo with new restrictions
without examining the intent of the original law. Like Gardenier, Lyons criticized
Embargo supporters for causing matters in the country to deteriorate. "Every addition
you make to it [the Embargo] renders it more abominable - worse and worse." Yet, even
in the face of mounting resistance, the supplemental act passed. As he had promised,
Livermore took the earliest opportunity to call for a repeal. He explained that the
financial costs were staggering, and thousands of Americans had been impoverished by
the type of law nations did not customarily enact during a time of peace. In fact, he
interjected, "Nations at war embargo each other as much as they can, as is now practiced
in Europe, but to destroy our own commerce in order to injure our neighbor is certainly a
novel invention." Livermore presented viable alternatives to trading with France, Great
Britain, or their colonies. Markets in Asia, Africa, Brazil, the East and West Indies, and
52
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the Baltic should be open to American merchants. Livermore recommended that even the
Haitian trade, which had been relinquished "out of great respect to the French
Government," could be resumed. The proposal for non-intercourse with the belligerents
to replace a sweeping restriction of trade merited consideration. Had Jeffersonians been
interested in bipartisan support or ameliorating the financial hardships caused by the
Embargo, they would have taken Livermore \s proposals under advisement. However,
Democratic-Republicans could find nothing to salvage in his recommendation.
Livermore" s motion was unceremoniously defeated by sixty votes. 53
This was unfortunate. For whether Republicans wanted to admit it or not,
Federalists had managed to keep trade alive and enter treaties with both France and
England during the early phase of the war in Europe. The belligerents had not changed,
but the biases and ideological constraints of the governing party in the Washington had.
The Jeffersonians' strata of supplemental acts, as one newspaper editorialist showed,
were preposterous. A Salem Gazette article said, "One would have thought that Congress
with their 4 embargo laws had done enough toward the annihilation of commerce. . .But it
appears Mr. Jefferson is not content with the crippled and embarrassing state" of
commerce and wants to destroy it altogether, the paper concluded/4
During his failed efforts to repeal the Embargo, Livermore made a realistic case
for modification of the act: "Human laws may be obeyed until a large proportion of the
people find them too grievous to be borne," but instead of pondering wise counsel,
Jeffersonians responded to growing defiance with more restrictions. An April law gave
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collectors the authority to search and seize any vessels they suspected of violating the
Embargo.'"
0
Increasingly stringent enforcement and the collectors" virtually unchecked
authority to seize and search property generated more resentment and more smuggling.
Massachusetts" courts tried more than 140 infringement cases, yet financial
necessities seemed to outweigh the fear of penalties, and violations continued. Various
locations outside of the United States became depots for smugglers. Impressed seaman
Jacob Nagle describes an area on the Amelia Islands that became a popular entrepot for
smugglers. Accordingly, "the English came. . .for cotton, smuggled over in schooner
from the main [land]. . .[and] there was several ships waiting for cargoes besides
ourselves. In about three weeks we received cotton as fast as we could stow it away." In
addition, some ships simply did not return to the United States once they were cleared;
the maritime trade to Halifax and Nova Scotia remained a constant route for violations;
and in Massachusetts, mobs strongarmed collectors to abet smugglers that were clearing
out or returning to various ports in the state.
36
Although defenses of the Embargo were passionate, over time they became
hollow and sanctimonious. A Jeffersonian in Congress argued loftily that their party was
"invoked to rescue commerce from inevitable destruction."* He then announced, "The
finger of Providence appeal's to have prepared a crisis for the operation of a measure the
best calculated of all others to re-establish the relations of reciprocal justice and
admonish despots that there is a just and controlling power that assigns to iniquity and
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oppression their limits."" Understandably, no one believed that it was God*s will that
they or their families go hungry or bankrupt so that the Jeffersonians could test their
pacific policies. "[PJerhaps'* said the Salem Gazette, "the immediate representatives of
the people are themselves kept in ignorance, and can assign no other reason for their
conduct, than that they were called upon by the Grand Lama of their political Idolatry, to
adopt the measures which his inscrutable wisdom had devised... cruel political
fanaticism, which would sacrifice a nation, rather than question the infallibility of their
idol.'*" Federalists came to believe that with such men holding the reins of government,
the only way to defeat the Embargo was to challenge its constitutionality.
The case that furnished the opportunity was United States v. The William, which
was tried in September 1808 at the district court in Salem. The William was a brigantine
seized by the customs collector of Marblehead and Lynn for allegedly transferring cargo
to other ships for eventual trade with a foreign nation. Federalist attorneys defended the
brig by arguing that the Embargo was unconstitutional, chiefly because the law had no
termination date. Another issue was whether Congress' authority to regulate commerce
could also include prohibiting it. Judge Davis, a Federalist, shocked his party by ruling
that the Embargo, even without a terminal date, was constitutional because the law
merely placed partial restrictions on commerce. Joseph Story, who worked with the
prosecution, said years later that the ruling really stretched the Constitution. Some
scholars agree, and argue that many federal court rulings were influenced by the political
climate and Jefferson's heavy hand toward the judiciary. Another intriguing aspect of the
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decision is that while Davis ruled in favor of the Embargo, he decided that the case
against the William was not supported by the evidence and restored the ship to its owners.
Federalists, understandably, questioned the ruling, but never brought an appeal before the
Supreme Court.59
Losing the William case did not dampen the Federalists' opposition to the
Embargo. Protests actually approached new levels of bitterness. Federalists continued to
raise several points about the real purpose of the Embargo. Jeffersonians, they asserted,
let their passions influence their decisions, so "they are no longer worthy to be trusted
with the interests and honor of a nation." A committee representing Newburyport sent a
petition directly to Jefferson, asking for a partial suspension or repeal of the Embargo.
Jefferson responded that the law had been passed to force Britain and France to make
policy changes toward American trade, so any changes were out of the question.
Anyway, he had no power to change the law; only Congress could repeal or suspend the
Embargo. 60 As everyone was aware, Jefferson controlled the majority in Congress; and
so long as he remained obstinate, no relief was in sight. Federalists urged the
Massachusetts electorate to decide if they wanted to "see a southern aristocracy, hostile to
the commerce and prosperity of your commonwealth" at the head of the government.
They also needed to do something about their representatives in Congress. 61
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Federalists were not alone in their resentment of the Embargo. Vice President
George Clinton became disgruntled and criticized the administration's inadequate
military preparation. The Virginians in power, he wrote his nephew, were only interested
in a force "sufficient to keep their slaves in awe & prevent their cutting their masters
throats." A rift developed between the Democratic factions in New York who supported
the administration and those who saw them as a threat to New York's commerce. " Nor
did every southerner support the embargo. Timothy Pickering praised Thomas Sumter of
South Carolina for taking a stand against the Embargo. Sumter left the Senate before the
final vote, but "had voted against the bill in its prior stages, and was totally opposed to
it." Pickering said that Sumter had a good reason for rejecting the Embargo: "not one
tenth part of this year's crops, in South-Carolina, had yet gone to market.'''' He praised
Sumter for being "a cool, judicious man, of more independence and worth than any one
of his party in the Senate."
63
Pickering, on the other hand, became one of the most enthusiastic opponents of
the Embargo, but is criticized so often for embodying radical Federalism that his
prescience and acuity are consistently overlooked. One scholar even found fault with
Pickering for listening to the complaints of his constituents.
4
This stems largely from
Pickering's flirtation with secession and the creation of a northern confederacy. A man
of conviction and action, Pickering remains many historians' favorite scoundrel and
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whipping boy.63 Never a friend of Democratic politics or the South" s slave culture.
Pickering thought it best that the northern states leave the Union. For Pickering and other
Federalists, the creation of separate confederacies was "the only means of maintaining
our ancient institutions in morals and religion" and equal rights. His reasons for
separation from the South included Jefferson's removal of Federalist judges and revision
of the judiciary, the Louisiana Purchase, and especially the three-fifths clause of the
Constitution, which gave southern states an unfair advantage in congressional
representation. The three-fifths clause, he confessed, was reason enough to secede. 66
Historians who criticize Pickering for his radicalism overlook the parochialism that
antedated the American Revolution, as well as the fact that his father was a loyalist and
an abolitionist. In either case, Pickering was little different from most of his
contemporaries.
Like others of his generation, Pickering was a colonial turned revolutionary, for
whom the Union was not an experiment but a pact the colonies entered to protect the
rights and freedoms he had fought the Revolution to obtain. Though the Revolution had
itself been a bloody secession, Pickering has been vilified more than any other Federalist
because he put a bold separatist plan into action in 1804. Although never having enough
support to succeed, he was never alone in his disdain for the slavery related clauses of the
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Constitution. Many in Massachusetts objected to the ratification of the Constitution, in
part, because of its slavery related concessions. In fact, when the state did ratify in
February 1788, the vote was 187 to 168, indicating that approval was far from
unanimous. Pickering, like many other Federalists, never expanded his perception of
justice and freedom to accept the South' s constitutional advantage. 67 If Pickering was
anything, he was consistent in his unyielding devotion to Massachusetts. He also had an
uncanny ability for calculating the consequences of the Jeffersonians' political faux pas.
In 1806, Pickering had been correct in his assumptions about the administration's
handling of encroachments on the nation's commerce when he cautioned Jefferson that
ending the Haitian trade would be the first of many acts to sacrifice commerce. Since
then, nonimportation passed, the Chesapeake was attacked, and an embargo suspended
commerce altogether. Based on the pacific policies of the past. Pickering thought that the
Embargo was a bluff that would eventually lead to war. "But admitting our government
to have no intention to make war; and thus they even deprecate it in their hearts; there is
danger of their producing a general exasperation; of their advancing to a point from
which British pride will not and American pride cannot retreat." Pickering may have
been a radical secessionist, but he also understood international politics and knew the
Jeffersonians better than they knew themselves.
He and others were barraged with letters complaining of the hardships caused by
the Embargo. "I do not think Congress have ever passed an act which has caused so
67
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much uneasiness and irritation.*' one writer confided. The people of Ashbumham had
been divided between the parties, but none of them were "bearing the act with calmness
and dignity.** Although the law would eventually affect the wealthier merchants, in 1808
the effects were felt predominately by the middle and lower classes. As one
correspondent told Pickering, "those of small property - such are likely to be ruined*' by
the Embargo. 69 As a result of this and other letters he received, Pickering called for
nullification and condemned the Embargo in a series of highly publicized letters to
Governor Sullivan. Other Federalists, after selecting candidates for state offices at a
Salem caucus, passed a resolution denouncing the suffering of fishermen, seamen, and
poor laborers due to the Democratic-Republicans' restrictive system. 70
William Ely, a Federalist from the Hampshire South District, voiced sentiments
similar to Pickering's protests in a letter published in the Hampshire Gazette. Ely
questioned the President's motives for the Embargo and criticized Jeffersonians in
Congress for voting down all objections and proposals without explanation. The
Embargo, he explained, was an experiment to "change the whole country, and especially
the commercialists to the northward, into agriculturalists and manufacturers, and like the
Chinese, to suffer foreign nations to come and take off our surplus produce." The
agricultural barons of the South were mining Massachusetts to remake it to their liking.
John Cusing to Pickering 2 September 1808: and Israel Thorndike to Pickering. 2 February 1809.
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At this point, "Nothing but an audible voice from the people," Ely declared, could force
the government to repeal the Embargo. 71
Federalists had been charging the Jeffersonians with anti-commercial sentiments
long before the Embargo, but the omission of a terminal date seemed to substantiate
accusations that the measure was Jefferson's final attempt to destroy commerce. This
time, previously undecided voters, and disenchanted Jeffersonians had no choice but to
believe the worst about the administration. "Southern leaders who have no affection for
commerce" wanted to extend the Embargo until they succeeded in "putting a stop... to the
coasting 'trade altogether/"72 It did not help matters when members of Congress, as
Leverett Saltsonstall, an up and coming Salem Federalist wrote, "openly declare[d] it as
their opinion that it would be for the benefit of the country if the embargo should be
perpetual."
73
New spapers focused on slavery and commerce as competing interests. Most saw
commerce losing the battle. In a "Supposed Conversation" between congressmen,
Federalists suggested that Virginia's Anglophobia and hatred for New England stemmed
from the fact that "the Brittons [sic] earned off some of their slaves" after the American
Revolution. Thus, along with their efforts to safeguard slavery, the article reports that
Jefferson's "administration have determined to cripple and crush commerce because they
consider the New-England states as growing dangerously rich and powerful by it."74 As
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if hostility toward commercial economies was not enough, some in Congress were
counting on the Embargo to turn seamen into farmers. If seamen were suffering because
of the Embargo, "it is their own fault there is land enough, let them take to the spade."
Worst of all, southerners' condemnation of commerce was behind the Embargo since,
'"without which the nation would "not be getting into eternal quarrels with foreign
nations.
7 '^
Thus, apprehensions over southern influence in the national government were
realized. In the absence of information to the contrary, the destruction of commerce
appeared to have been part of the Jeffersonians' strategy all along. The President said all
of the right things about safeguarding commerce; but as far as anyone could see, nothing
in his actions or policies bode well for its future. Thus, when rumors surfaced that
southerners might secede from the Union, Federalists responded, "in the name of God let
them go - we can do without them [!]"76
Another staple in the Federalists' protest repertoire was the administration's
affinity for France. This assertion was well founded. Jeffersonians had not shown the
patriotism they were now demanding from Federalists when the country was involved in
hostilities with France in the 1790s, and the Embargo worked well with Napoleon's
continental system. Both were directed at Great Britain, and both attempted to starve her
into surrendering. The Federalists' accusations received more traction after Napoleon
issued his Bayonne Decree on 17 April 1808. Napoleon issued the decree to seize
7
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American ships to aid the Embargo against Great Britain, but this was a violation of the
1800 treaty. The assumption was that the Embargo stopped American commerce, so any
ships on the seas must be British and subject to confiscation. 77
The response to the Bayonne Decree belied the administration's claim that both
belligerents were targeted by the Embargo. In 1808, the broadside American Commerce
in Flames! detailed the administration's discreditable history with France. If "such
outrages," as outlined in the Bayonne Decree, "had been committee by British cruisers,
the whole nation would have been roused to arms." It was not the Embargo, but "Mr.
Jefferson's submission [to France], which does not avert but invites Insult... Perish
Commerce and abandon the Ocean, says Bonaparte, and it is echoed by the philosophic
Jefferson." France's mistreatment of American property had been consistently "glossed
over and excused." The President issued no decree ejecting French vessels out of
American waters. Even if he had, the administration had no propensity for military
action. As for the protection of commerce, the Embargo hardly qualified. Instead of
bottling up the maritime industry on false pretenses, the government could at least let
78
merchants sail and be responsible for their own safety.
The idea to arm merchant vessels was not new. The Adams administration armed
merchant vessels to help to protect commerce in the Caribbean during the Quasi War. At
that time, merchant and navy vessels received additional assistance from the British.
Since then, Jeffersonians had compounded the nation's problems by diminishing the navy
77
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and failing at diplomacy. Without a treaty with either Great Britain or France, the United
States was backed into a corner. The retired John Adams, who understood the crisis,
explained in one of many epistles to Josiah Quincy, "If you continue the embargo the
times will be hard. If you institute a total non-intercourse, the times will not be more
cheerful. If you repeal the embargo, circumstances will occur of more animation, but
perhaps not more profit or more comfort. If you arm our merchantmen that will be war.*"
Adams argued that if the nation had a navy, things might not go so badly, but it no longer
had a naval force adequate to wage war with either belligerent. 79 Adams concluded that
the Untied States could "not probably, be in a worse [situation] whatever may happen.'*
Even in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Jeffersonians refused
to take responsibility for the results of their policies. William Bentley expressed this
frame of mind when he learned that Federalists had arranged to riot and hang Jefferson in
effigy. "Republicans," he lamented, "suffered much from the... pains taken to
make... [them] accountable for the Embargo, the loss of Free trade, and for war.'"
Perhaps denial helped Bentley and other Republicans maintain their loyalty to the
administration and its policies. Diehard Democrats even blocked an attempt to send a
petition to Washington, calling for the repeal of the Embargo. 80
"A Fellow Sufferer' combined many of the Federalists" objections in a pamphlet
that excoriated Jeffersonian diplomacy. Jefferson was demanding that Britain stop
conscripting its own citizens if it wanted to sustain a commercial relationship with the
United States. The British had every right to impress its citizens, Federalists argued, and
79
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even if trade with Britain had to be interrupted, trade with the rest of the world need not
be. France, on the other hand, issued "decree upon decree" against American commerce,
"plundered, sunk. ..seized, confiscated, and condemned our vessels," and the
administration demanded no concessions from Napoleon, nor did it seriously consider
war. (This, by the way, was the same argument southern Jeffersonians made when they
opposed nonimportation in 1806.) The Jeffersonians made their affinity for France
obvious because "her ships of war are welcomed to our pons, while her enemy's (Great
Britain) are interdicted; [and] at her insistence, we abandoned the lucrative trade of St.
Domingo and on a principle unwarrantable and unknown, our government punishes our
citizens at home for acts committed within what France calls her jurisdiction." No matter
how convoluted defenses of the Embargo had become, the policy emanated from a "deep
rooted hostility" to commerce. While Jefferson and Madison said they supported "the
Extension of Commerce," Federalists were convinced that their strategies were bringing
O 1
about "its ultimate destruction."
During the Embargo the Federalists' political philosophy did not change. They
believed that the show of strength was a bulwark against infringement on the nation's
rights. Unlike his son, John Adams wrote that he was "fully convinced that the embargo
must be removed." Adams said he never believed in embargoes, nonimportation, or non-
intercourse, and only tolerated them before and during the American Revolution because
of their unifying effect. Not so, however, with Jefferson's policy, which would never
coerce or intimidate Great Britain. Adams predicted that "if the shackles continue on our
81 [John Park], An address to the Citizens ofMassachusetts on the Causes and Remedy of Our National
Distresses by A Fellow Sufferer (Boston. 1808). 4-11 (Italics theirs).
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commerce, they will produce an animosity and a rancour [sic] which will give much
uneasiness to Mr. Jefferson's successor and be very, prejudicial to the public
service...The Federal Party will increase daily. That you will say will be a blessing, but
it may be obtained at too dear a rate."82
Some historians defend the Embargo by arguing that Massachusetts Federalists
exaggerated the hardships and costs for political gains. Others say that the citizens of
Massachusetts were among the most impatient Americans while the Embargo was in
force. The idea behind this is that the Embargo would have worked had the Federalists of
Massachusetts not whipped people into rebellion. Otherwise, the measure had
widespread acceptance, they claim. 83 Leverett Saltonstall had no reason to exaggerate in
his diary when he wrote, "Our country never saw a more gloomy moment. Commerce is
totally suspended and we know not how long it will continue so." Based on changes in
the state's voting records, he was not alone when he added, Every days [sic] events
convince me more and more of the correctness of Federal principles and that the country
must be saved by them if it is to be saved." Reports of financial distress or rioting were
reported from all over the state including Maine. 84 And of all those affected. African
Americans were hardest hit by the Embargo. Many found employment in the foreign and
coasting trades at an early age and remained at sea years longer than the average seamen.
It was because of their support of an independent Haiti, the end of the slave trade, and
their advocacy of the maritime interests, in which African-American men found a level of
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equality and steady employment, that African American voters supported the Federalist
Party. " They were a class of people to whom Jeffersonian liberalism was never
extended.
The 1808 congressional elections assumed greater importance to the
Massachusetts electorate. Even before the November elections, unforeseen occurrences
altered the composition of the Bay State Delegation to Congress, and weakened support
for the Embargo. The first was the sudden illness and untimely death of Jacob
Crowninshield. With the notable exception of his vote against the Saint Domingue
Nonintercourse Act, Crowninshield had been faithful to the party ideals and was one of
Jefferson's confidants. On 18 January 1808, Crowninshield collapsed in Congress,
possibly from an aneurysm. The former seaman and ship captain clung to life for a few
months. During that time, his colleagues in the House, even Federalists, took turns sitting
with him. One of these, Samuel Taggart, thought he saw signs of improvement and was
hopeful that Crowninshield would recover. Unfortunately, that was not the case. On 15
April, Crowninshield expired. He was only 38. The now vacant Essex South seat went
to one of Crowninshield' s old friends, Joseph Story.
Joseph Story was a dark horse, whose Jeffersonianism had always been lukewarm.
One problem Democratic-Republicans had with him was that Story practiced law, a
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profession they found repugnant. Crowninshield' s supporters in Salem eyed Story's
candidacy suspiciously during his run against Benjamin Crowninshield, the late
congressman's brother. Story won the Democratic caucus, but as it turned out, his
election was really a boon for the opposition. Story had never been as committed to the
Jeffersonian cause as Jacob Crowninshield had been, and in amidst mounting pressure,
the Embargo required steadfastness and fidelity. During his brief tenure in Congress,
Story wavered over commercial coercion. He admitted that he would not have voted to
pass the Embargo, but added that since it was the law of the land it deserved a chance.
Fluctuating loyalties notwithstanding, Jeffersonians were also annoyed at his influence
over other Bay State Democrats, notably Ezekiel Bacon, who had hitherto supported
Jefferson's policies. In the end, Jeffersonians never forgave Story for not being as loyal
as Crowninshield and did not reelect him to Congress when he completed his term. 87
The second development that altered the political dynamics in Congress was the
recall of John Quincy Adams. Adams' June recall, which meant the Jeffersonians' loss
of a prestigious ally in the Senate, was not without good reason. Since 1806, by his own
admission, Adams' sentiments were no longer with the Federalist Party. He decided to
support measures such as nonimportation and the Embargo even though they went
against his better judgment. Rumors also circulated that Adams' defection to Jefferson's
party guaranteed the senator an embassy post in Madison's administration. The
Massachusetts Legislature elected James Lloyd to take his seat six months before the
scheduled election. Adams resigned after hearing the news and was satisfied that while
"the course I pursued has drawn upon me much obloquy," he left with "a good
81 Gerald T. Dunne, "Joseph Story: The Germinal Years," Harvard Law Review 75 (Feb., 1962): 727, 737-
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conscience, and a firm belief that I have rendered essential service to my country."
Federalists disagreed. Just as Story's colleagues berated him for helping to defeat the
Embargo, Federalists said the same of Adams for supporting it. "Of what consequence is
it... that a man smiles in your face, holds out his hand, and declares himself the advocate
of those political principles to which you are also attached, when you see him acting with
your adversaries upon other principles?"
The loss of Crowninshield and Adams upset the political balance, but Federalists
still had a long way to go. Samuel Taggart recognized that "it is the congressional
elections which must determine the point and... if the present embargo system continues
and there is no prospect of anything else at present, the people must feel more severely
than they do now."90 In 1808, Federalists campaigned as the "peace party." Timothy
Pickering, Josiah Quincy, and the other congressmen were heralded as exemplars of
Federalism. They boldly challenged the Jeffersonians' sycophancy to France and
deplored the "blind confidence" placed in Jefferson's commercial philosophy. Pickering
had exposed the real motives behind commercial coercion; and "Mr. Gardenier was shot
for echoing his sentiments in Congress" they added. Ultimately, the greatest appeal of
any Federalist candidate was that he would add to the voices calling for the repeal of the
Embargo in Congress.91
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Voters took Jefferson's response that it was up to the legislature to change or end
the law to heart, and Serendipity smiled at last on the Federalists. In addition to the
congressional seats they already held, the party won the Plymouth. Essex South, Bristol,
and Cumberland. Maine Districts, bringing the number of Bay State Federalists in the
House to ten out of seventeen. In addition to the incumbents, Federalists Leban Weaton
and Ezekiel Whitman of the Bristol and Cumberland, Maine districts respectively, were
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives; and a Federalist was elected to fill Jacob
Crowninshield's Essex South seat for the first time in six years. Jeffersonians found
Joseph Story" s inconsistencies too unsettling, and the Democratic caucus rejected him for
Dr. Daniel Kilham. After Kilham lost to Federalist Benjamin Pickman. William Bentley
complained that the "principle cause of our suffering is from the young lawyer Story
whose duplicity has been very injurious to us."92
Others also held Story responsible for losing an election in which he was not a
candidate. However, Essex South Federalists ran a campaign that gave voters two simple
choices. "Choose Dr. Kilham for your Representative and you in effect choose the
Embargo, and will have it. Choose Mr. Pickman, and you at least give a vote against the
Embargo." Selecting a candidate was analogous to deciding between Washington and
commerce or Jefferson and the end of commerce. This was a marked improvement over
1806, when Federalists chose a candidate only days before the election. In contrast,
Jeffersonians ran Kilham' s campaign on a platform that Federalists advocated war with
y:
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France and no Embargo, while their candidate represented "Free-Trade-or an Embargo
and Peace."93
Voters rejected the conflicting image of free trade and an embargo; and for the
first time in years, Federalists outnumbered Jeffersonians in the state's delegation to the
U.S. House of Representatives. Even though the number dropped by one in June 1809,
when the Plymouth District election was contested, Federalist William Baylies lost his
seat to Republican Charles Turner, but Federalists still held the majority of the state's
congressional seats.
Another result of the 1808 election that bode well for Federalists was that it forced
the Jeffersonians' cohesiveness over the Embargo to unravel. Some Bay State Democrats
were showing signs of heresy. Orchard Cook of Maine had been gratifying to Federalists
for some time. Although he held the party line on key issues. Cook often showed
reluctance toward commercial coercion. If Story eroded the philosophy of passive
resistance by suggesting a large navy, as historians argue, Cook had only been hanging
on to his party's ideal by a thread since at least 1805. Samuel Taggart observed that of
all the Democratic-Republicans representing Massachusetts, "Cook...except [for] the
name and nominal attachment to Thomas Jefferson, is little distinguishable from
federalists."
94 Along with Cook, Ezekiel Bacon and Joseph Story vied for some type of
relief for Embargo victims, and were working toward repeal of the law. Because of the
turnabout, the President reviled Story for being a Svengali who enthralled Bacon and led
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him down the path of anti-Embargo treachery. Neither man ever regained Jefferson's
favor.
95
Bay State Federalists were ecstatic about the results of the congressional elections,
yet they had failed to capture the governorship or the presidency. Delegates to the
Federalists" presidential nominating committee flirted with the idea of supporting the
Vice President George Clinton, a Democratic-Republican who, as mentioned above,
participated in a mutiny against the administration. The plan to support Clinton was
abandoned because it would have made Federalists look disingenuous and opportunistic.
Massachusetts sent electors to cast their votes for the Federalist candidates, Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney and Rufus King. But as many expected, the New York defections
did not adversely affect James Madison's bid for the Presidency. He held on to his
party's nomination and garnered enough electoral votes to keep a Virginian in the White
House. The results were the same in the Massachusetts' gubernatorial election. The
moderate incumbent James Sullivan defeated the Peace Party candidate Christopher Gore
by 2,374 votes. Sullivan, always an alarmist, generously issued sailing permits to avoid
problems and had apparently grown lukewarm over the policy. 96
Though Federalists had not recaptured the federal or state executive seats, their
success in the congressional elections revealed growing dissatisfaction with the Embargo.
Historians still overlook the implication of this success. A recent work argues that even
if "Jeffersonian Republicanism was simply not in the best interest of New England,"
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Federalists had no justification for their "verbal support of Britain'* before 1812.
"Radical and well-educated men forecasting degradation and doom at France's hands
make a sorry spectacle. If the Federalists had really believed in the American Union they
helped create, they would have rid themselves of the despair and offered constructive
criticisms of Republican programs.
"
t)7
Scholars who espouse such stridently negative
depictions of Federalists hold Jefferson's opposition to the post-New Deal standards of
nationalism they themselves are accustomed to. Most are more concerned with
exonerating Thomas Jefferson and chiseling another character line into the marble man
facade they have erected, than giving Federalists an objective hearing. .
This type of historiographical animus underscores the need to examine the conduct
of both parties in order to avoid meretricious arguments. Jeffersonians demonstrated
repeatedly that they were not receptive to bipartisan solutions to foreign policy and the
problems affecting the nation's commerce. Viable alternatives that might have
ameliorated the tensions of the Embargo, and should have sparked a serious dialogue,
were brusquely dismissed. Nor were Democrats interested in logically reassessing their
own policies, even though their mismanagement of foreign relations and mishandling of
the American economy reduced untold numbers of previously independent workers to
poverty, and forced many to rely on charity.
Historians who cast aspersions on Federalists often do so to detach Jefferson and
his party from unflattering historical developments. What we should all ask is how the
Jeffersonians or the historians who defend them could imagine that Federalist would sit
idly by while they rushed ragtag legislation through Congress and systematically
y
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modified the pretext for the Embargo by expanding its restrictions to include the
confiscation of horses and mules. Is it reasonable to expect that patriotic, even provincial
politicians who received distress letters from constituents should tamely submit to
patchwork addenda that added more and more Americans to the ranks of the
unemployed? The fact that the Embargo required so many supplements substantiated the
charge that it was based on poor conceptualization and a flimsy pretext. As was evident
on several occasions. Federalist challenges to the Jeffersonians ill-conceived measures
met pugilistic hostility. Federalists might have been the purveyors of "degradation and
gloom," but historians should not impugn them, when it was the Democratic-Republicans
who fulfilled the prophecies.
By the end of 1808, Massachusetts nervously anticipated the machinations of yet
another Virginian in the White House. The Embargo was still intact; but resistance was
mounting, even among Jeffersonians. The Federalists' political organization, campaign
literature, pamphlets, letters, and other published materials had had some success. Voters
sent more Federalists to Washington than they had in some time. With each attempt to
tighten the prohibitions on commerce, the Federalists' popularity increased. Violations
were escalating in town after town, and congressional Federalists, such as Timothy-
Pickering, attended town meetings to show solidarity and rally support behind resistance
to the Embargo. 98 Jeffersonians had none but themselves to blame for the Federalists'
growing appeal. Their almost fanatical devotion to the policy precluded rational debate
and sensible compromise. Moreover, the Embargo had no terminal date, and they would
not even consider proposals to alleviate problems caused by the law. By doing nothing to
98
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allay the country's apprehensions, and everything to foster discontent, Jefferson and his
party left Federalists and the voters of Massachusetts with few alternatives.
208
CHAPTER 5
"O GRAB ME!*'
On 23 December 1808, the people of Newburyport, Massachusetts gathered for a
solemn event. At sunrise, noon, and four in the evening, bells tolled, flags were lowered
to half-mast, guns were fired, and cannons were discharged. A parade of seamen wearing
armbands marched through the streets to a slow, steady drumbeat. On a float following
closely behind the sailors was a dismantled ship with the phrases "Death to Commerce"
and "0-grab-me" inscribed on its bow. Once the procession reached the customhouse, it
stopped: and there where a flag illustrating a terrapin (turtle) with its head retracted had
been hoist, a sailor delivered an address from aboard the broken vessel, so stirring it
reportedly ''reached the heart. " Spectators, moved by its symbolic significance, honored
the pageant with thunderous applause. 1
The occasion for this gloomy ceremony was the first anniversary of Thomas
Jefferson's Embargo. On that day, which was designated for mourning, towns
throughout the state, including the Maine districts, staged similar events. 2 Each
procession was funereal for commerce, Bay Staters mourned, was dead. 3 "O-Grab-me,"
the inversion of the word embargo, characterized the government's restrictive policies,
.ind served as a metaphor for Jeffersonian hegemony in the national government. What
1
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the mock funerals revealed is that after a year of commercial restrictions, the Zeitgeist in
Massachusetts had deteriorated from apprehension to active opposition.
Commonwealth voters were convinced that backing Jefferson in 1804 had been a
terrible mistake, one they attempted to correct. Voters in 1808 elected more Federalists
than Democrats to the U.S. Congress for the first time in years, but any serious changes
in the nation's domestic and foreign policies required a Federalist President and
administration. This, they could not accomplish. Although party leaders, including
Senator James Lloyd and Representative Edward St. Loe Livermore, participated in an
organized effort to elect Federalist candidate Charles C. Pinckney for president,
Federalists failed to affect the outcome of the election. 4 James Madison, Jefferson's
Secretary of State, close friend, and confidant, would become the fourth President of the
United States, and for four more years, the future of commerce and Massachusetts'
economy would rest with a Virginian. Withdrawing from the political stage in dispirited
indignation under these circumstances was not an option; Federalists had to intensify
their resistance to the administration's policies.
The period after the election of 1808 is therefore a critical juncture in the history
of Massachusetts Federalism. A transformation in the party's political identity, already
under way since the commercial crisis began in 1805-1806, crystallized between 1808
and 1809. Explaining these changes, James Banner argues that frustration over losing the
national election, along with the continuance of the Embargo, forced moderate
Federalists to yield control of the party to its more radical and divisive members; David
4 James Banner, To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in
Massachusetts, 1789-1815 (New York, NY, 1970), 296-299.
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Fischer explains that a false radicalism emerged in anti-Embargo protests that exceeded
the Federalists' true political objectives. Other historians attribute changes in Federalism
to the party's departure from the Hamiltonian vision for domestic manufacturing and see
retrograde conservatism behind their calls for free trade, which were really veneers for
maintaining the status quo.
To fully understand why Massachusetts Federalists yielded to the fiercely
parochial and sectional voices within the party, the following discussion examines the
period after the election of 1808 and sees it as a transforming event in Federalist politics.
James Banner touches upon crucial changes when he explains that the federal
government seemed "distant, alien, determined upon obedience, and heedless of the
public will" to Massachusetts Federalists by 18 14. 6 I argue that this outlook had
developed much earlier. By the end of 1808, Federalists along with a growing number of
Bay Staters saw themselves fighting a multidimensional attack that threatened their
economic autonomy and political rights. Federalists came to believe that Jeffersonians
were marginalizing Massachusetts and in the process, excising the influence and the
voices of its citizens from the national government. A combination of frustration and
particularism intensified anti-Embargo protests, and even forced Bay State Democrats to
reassess their strategy in the face of rising regionalism and antipathy to their southern
dominated party.
s
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Repealing the Embargo became a sectional imperative, not only because of the
Federalists' diminished influence in national government, but also because Bay State
Jeffersonians pinned their fortunes on James Madison's election victory and
mischaracterized the level of opposition in their state. Failure to advocate repeal by the
end of 1808, and the adoption of extreme enforcement measures, radicalized the
opposition and further alienated Bay Staters from the federal government. The
Democrats* Laodicean, or lukewarm attitudes toward Massachusetts' economic survival,
and their collusion with the Virginia dynasty, helped to transform Federalists into the
spokesmen of untold numbers of people who came to consider themselves
disenfranchised by a government that instead of granting their requests for protection, cut
off their livelihoods.
7
Democrats made a serious mistake when they embraced their third consecutive
presidential victory as an overwhelming endorsement of the Embargo, because reality
differed. It was certainly true that the Federalist Party had ceased to function as a
national political entity, and would therefore never reclaim the presidency; but the
Embargo rankled Americans from Maine to Georgia. Madison won the election, but the
Democrats' pertinacious attachment to the Embargo had been costly. Insouciance over
the socioeconomic effects of their policies, coterminous with a relentless drive to punish
Federalists, would damage the Jeffersonians' prestige, deepen sectional fissures, and
force the state to contemplate disunion.
The breadth of disapprobation over the Embargo becomes evident when we
compare the distribution of electoral votes between 1804 and 1808. In 1804, Thomas
7
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Jefferson won every New England state except Connecticut, and although Delaware
supported the Federalist candidates and Maryland "s votes were divided, the Sage of
o
Monticello took every vote in the South, Mid-Atlantic, and western states. On the other
hand, in 1808 the only New England state to cast any electoral votes for James Madison
was Vermont. Massachusetts (which still included Maine), New Hampshire,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island, supported Federalists for president and vice president.
Like Jefferson, Madison carried the western states Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio; but
again Delaware supported the Federalist ticket and Maryland's votes were divided. Most
notable is New York, where the Democrats splintered over the Embargo and scattered the
state's electoral votes among Madison, Clinton, Pinckney, and James Monroe. 9
Astonishingly, Madison did not even receive unanimous support in the South.
North Carolina's votes divided between the Democratic and Federalist candidates. This
is noteworthy, for while North Carolina still had a significant Federalist base in 1808,
Federalism had become anathema in most political circles and was hastening toward
extinction throughout the South. Even with poor organization and dwindling numbers,
North Carolina's Federalists were able to convert three of their fourteen electoral votes
into support for the Federalist ticket. More significant as James Broussard explains,
because maritime restrictions had no affect on yeoman farmers in the agrarian South, they
* Peter S. Onuf and Lenoard J. Sadosky, Jeffersonian America (Maiden: Blackwell Publishers. 2002). 28.
9
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had no interest in the Embargo either way. Plantation owners who were concerned with
the sale of cash crops and surplus produce generally supported Jefferson's agrarian
philosophies and decided to endure. Many who lacked the patience to persevere,
although their congressional representatives argued otherwise, violated the Embargo, and
profited from smuggling just as much, if not more, than New Englanders." Madison was
inheriting a sectionally polarized nation, a circumstance that he and his party helped to
create.
Federalists in the Massachusetts General Court regarded Madison's election as
proof that New Englanders were hostile toward the Embargo and alienated from the rest
of the nation. " The political climate worsened because of the Democrats' specious
defense of the policy. Contrary to their assertions, the Embargo differed greatly from pre
or even post-Revolution policies; but they stretched their imaginations and rhetoric to
strike comparisons. Unlike commercial restrictions that preceded it, the Embargo had no
sunset provision, indiscriminately interdicted all foreign trade, and kept the coasting trade
bogged down in excessive bonds, oath swearing, time limits, and sometimes gunboat fire.
Most Federalists concluded that the administration and Congress had intended a
permanent Embargo from the beginning. Josiah Quincy's suspicion that the Embargo
would be perpetual was reinforced every time the Democratic majority in Congress
10 Onuf and Sadosky, Jeffersonian America. 28. 29; and James H. Broussard "The Embargo election.
1808.'" The Southern Federalists, 1800-1816 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978). 95-
109.
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Conflict (Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1989), 21; Broussard. Southern Federalists, 95.96, 102-
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postponed consideration of repeal, but eagerly and hastily passed laws that stiffened fines
and methods of enforcement. His conclusion that the White House was "touched with
madness" was growing ubiquitous in Massachusetts. 1 '
In addition to worries that the Embargo would be permanent, diplomatic failures
heightened the tensions and broadened perceptions that the policy had failed. The
Embargo enforced Napoleon's Continental System by depriving Great Britain of
American and colonial goods, but under the terms of France's Milan and Bayonne
Decrees. For their part, the French confiscated American ships or set them ablaze on the
pretense of enforcing the Embargo, while targeting legitimate trade and travel. 14 While
Jefferson could overlook Bonaparte's waywardness, he had to deal with the political
crisis festering in the United States. Recognizing early in 1808 that the Embargo
threatened his party's control of the national government, the President had Secretary of
State Madison instruct the U.S. ministers in England and France to offer an olive branch:
the United States would become the ally of whichever nation dropped its "obnoxious
decrees" first.
15
John Armstrong, the U.S. Minister to France, originally supported the Embargo
but was so disturbed over Napoleon's attacks on American ships he sent the Emperor
13
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several messages voicing disapproval. Napoleon disliked Armstrong and never
responded to any of his correspondence. After several frustrated attempts to
communicate the administration's wishes, Armstrong reversed his position on the
Embargo and became an advocate for repeal. 16 William Pinkney, the diplomat in Great
Britain, fared no better. Throughout the summer of 1808, British Foreign Secretary
George Canning toyed with Pinkney and wasted his time, first hounding him to write
down the administration's offer and then aloofly dropping hints that Great Britain was
not interested. The experience led Pinkney, who previously opposed the Embargo, to
endorse commercial coercion. 17
If either nation wanted the U.S. as an ally, this was the time. Madison made it
clear that the administration was appealing directly to each nation's desire to "produce
collisions between the United States and its adversary." 18 So, why pass up the
opportunity? The same overture to either nation might have worked earlier in Jefferson's
presidency; but by 1808. neither nation had much respect for his administration. During
the crisis over the Haitian trade in 1805-1806, at France's behest, Congress made it
illegal for merchants to carry defensive weapons and then prohibited the Haitian trade
altogether. The French seized some 390 American vessels between 1803 and 1807, and
had nothing to fear from the U.S. government. 19 Napoleon understood, quite correctly as
16
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it turned out, that the administration's Anglophobia overshadowed anything he could do
to American merchants or their property.
If the U.S. entered the war with Jeffersonians at the helm, it would be against
Britain, no matter how badly France behaved. Jefferson, who reviled the relationship
Federalists maintained with Britain after the Revolution, rejected the Monroe-Pinkey
Treaty with demands too excessive for a nation at war, behaved boorishly toward British
envoys, but behaved timorously during the Chesapeake attack." Before the Embargo,
Britain contributed to the friction by seizing over 500 American ships and impressing
U.S. citizens into the Royal Navy; and they believed that Jeffersonians put policies in
place to help France.
21
Diplomacy failed in both cases because of the administration's partiality toward
France. Armstrong tolerated unwarranted hostility from a leader the U.S. bent over
backward to accommodate, and Pinkney suffered abuse and condescension for attempting
to negotiate without addressing the Francophilia in Jeffersonian policies. When the
committee resolutions. John G. Jackson of Virginia, an Embargo supporter, enumerated French offenses
against the United States beginning with the Saint Dommgue (Haitian) Nonintercourse Act. "How is it
when we cross over the water and look at France? We find by the proclamation of General Ferrand, an
attempt made to regulate our trade to St. Domingo inconsistent with our rights. The Berlin decree,
declaring the British islands in a state of blockade, although ineffectual because she had not the power of
executing it, was not less outrageous than many of the acts to which I have referred of the British
Government. The Milan decree, which may be considered as a supplement to the British orders...
A
decree is also said to have passed at Bayonne, by which France attempts to execute the embargo laws ...is
of the same character with the others." Several motivations lay behind the Saint Domingue
Nonintercourse Act of 1806, not the least being the protection of slavery, but it was also accepted as part
of the administration's collusion with France and of commercial coercion in lieu of armed conflict. - See
Annals 10th Cong.. 2 nd sess., 79, 637. For an example of the administration's response to French
depredations, see Madison to Armstrong 21 and 22 July 1808. and extracts of Armstrong's
correspondence from 12 November 1807. through 6 August 1808. State Papers and Publick Documents,
3: 238-258.
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administration tried to make a deal, it appeared puerile and vacillating. -" Neither nation
changed its policies; and to many Americans this meant that the Embargo had failed to
accomplish its key objectives, was only hurting U.S. merchants, and should therefore be
repealed.
Domestically and diplomatically, events unfolded just as Federalists predicted -
the administration had painted itself into a corner. The combination of British and
French seizures cost American merchants nearly $14 million ($3.5 million per year)
between 1803 and 1807, but Massachusetts' exports rose from $16.8 to $21.1 million
during that same period. In one year, however, the Embargo resulted in a $15 million
decline in Massachusetts' export revenue. Considering the fact that insured merchants
could recoup some of their losses from one of several legitimate underwriters in
Massachusetts before the Embargo, the deficit was even higher. 23
The Hampshire Gazette was not embellishing when it reported that "Commerce,
ships, seamen, [are] all wiped from the face of our country - not by England, or even
France, but by our own rulers - those who got into power under assurances of protecting
the interest of trade and commerce, and the rights and privileges of seamen."24 Based on
its economic effects, the Embargo and its stringent enforcement seemed to channel the
government's anger toward its own citizens. No wonder Timothy Pickering found it
22
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inconceivable '"that Mr. Jefferson should so obstinately persevere in the odious measure
of the embargo, which he cannot but see has impaired his popularity and hazards its
destruction."
25 As the unpopular law continued, opponents suspected that the Embargo
would never be revoked unless they intensified their efforts.
This is what happened between April and September 1808. In an organized
petition campaign, Federalists, representing at least seventy towns and several counties
sent memorials to Congress demanding repeal of the Embargo. 26 By November, the
petitions essentially went unanswered: and Essex County Federalists went so far as to
pass a resolution repudiating the federal government. Jefferson, they complained, was
unaccommodating and Congress refused to take their "earnest supplications" seriously.
Such apathy compelled the Essexmen to "rely for relief on the wisdom and patriotism of
our state government whom the people have placed as centinels [sic] to guard our rights
and privileges from whatever quarter they may be invaded."27 This and similar petitions
that poured into the General Court sent a clear, but disturbing message that a growing
number of Bay Staters were losing respect for their federal government.
In striking contrast, the General Court was immediately attentive to the
petitioners' pleas.
28 On 15 November 1808, the legislature, with a newly elected
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Federalist majority, passed a resolution instructing the state's congressional delegation to
"use their most strenuous exertions to procure an immediate repeal" of the Embargo.
Believing it wrong for the state legislature to voice disapproval of federal statutes, state
representative Benjamin Crowninshield drafted a body of counter-resolutions touting the
Democrats' loyalty to the government and the Embargo. They were defeated. 29 At any
rate, Democrats could not embarrass Federalists for opposing the Embargo since they
now represented a mushrooming sentiment in Massachusetts.
When the Tenth Congress convened for its final session in November 1808,
Massachusetts* senators James Lloyd and Timothy Pickering would have no problems
cooperating with the General Court. Pickering even tried to read the resolution in the
Senate; but Joseph Anderson of Tennessee objected, and the reading was indefinitely
postponed.
30 When Federalist James Hillhouse from Connecticut entered a motion for
repeal, Lloyd requested a detailed account of the number of vessels that had sailed under
executive permit between December 1807 and September 1808. To substantiate their call
for repeal, Federalists planned to show that the belligerents' regulations had not
endangered international trade as Democrats purported. Jeffersonians wasted no time
preparing counterarguments, and had two hundred copies of memorials that Congress
Massachusetts General Court, Commonwealth ofMassachusetts. In the House of Representatives, Nov.
15, 1808: The Committee Appointed to Consider "Whether it will be expedientfor this legislature to
adopt any measures with a view to procure a repeal of the laws of the United States, interdicting to the
citizens allforeign commerce. ..ask leave to report the following resolutions: --Resolved, that the Senators
of this Commonwealth in Congress be instructed, and the representatives thereof requested to use their
most strenuous exertions to procure an immediate repeal of the. ..Embargo... " (Boston: n.p., 1808).[AAS
Broadsides]; Massachusetts General Court. Mr. Crowninshield 's Resolutions in the House of
Representatives, November 16'1 ' 1808 (n.p., 1809), 1, 5. 6, 7, 9.
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received from merchants in Boston, Salem, New York, and other seaport cities printed
and distributed in preparation for their defense of the Embargo. 31
Debates over the Hillhouse motion began on the 21 st . Federalists argued that
prolonging the Embargo would close countless foreign markets to U.S. merchants; and in
response to claims that removing the Embargo would lead to war with France, they
replied that Napoleon was already doing everything he could to drag the U.S. into the
war. "What more" could Bonaparte do besides "burn our ships and sequester our
property?" Hillhouse asked. If removing the prohibitions on commerce meant war with
France, "let it come." According to Hillhouse, unless the real purpose of the Embargo
was to destroy commerce so that agriculturalists and manufacturers could realize their
economic ambitions, it had failed anyway. If conflict with France did follow repeal,
added Lloyd, the U.S. would be going to war against a nation already waging war against
it.
John Pope of Kentucky ridiculed Federalists for displaying such bravado after
their humiliation in the presidential election. Furthermore, if the Embargo incited revolt
against the federal government, perhaps "foreign commerce should cease."33 Pope was
not the first Jeffersonian to utter anti-commercial sentiments. Indeed, remarks such as
these provoked sectional hostility and increased opposition to the Embargo. It was bad
enough, as the Columbian Centinel reported, that "Southern leaders who have no
affection for commerce" were devastating both the foreign and domestic trades; but
31
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Congress, which the General Court called a "theatre of base contention and sanguinary
threats,'' had come to reflect the same sectional divisions that were revealed in the
presidential election.
34
Although historians have berated Federalists for fanning the flames of
sectionalism, the anti-commercial and sectional acrimony in their rhetoric indicates that
southern Jeffersonians did most of the work themselves. 35 For some time, Federalists
drew attention to the provocative and derisive language that southerners such as John
Randolph and John Eppes of Virginia, and David Williams of South Carolina, hurled at
New Englanders in Congress. 36 Newspapers were not above exaggerating the
Jeffersonians' biases; but southerners had often expressed sentiments inferring that
disgruntled seamen should stop whining and "take to the spade," or that commerce was
the source of the nation's "eternal quarrels with foreign nations" and should be
abolished.
37 From the president on down, Jeffersonians in general were ideologically
opposed to commercial economies, especially when northern prosperity grew
independent of southern agriculture, as it did with the carrying trade. Both commercial
34
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and sectional hostility could be easily extrapolated from Jeffersonian thought and
rhetoric.
A few historians suggest that the Federalists' anti-commercial charges were a
conservative response to economic progress. Louis Sears, in the 1920s, praised
manufacturing as a positive consequence of Jefferson's Embargo; and more recently
Robert East and Lawrence Peskin, among others, advanced this interpretation, adding the
suppression of manufacturing to the litany of criticisms heaped on Federalists for
rejecting the Jeffersonian political economy. 38 They consider the Federalists' antagonism
to a manufacturing based economy to be the driving force behind their opposition to the
Embargo. Hillhouse's insinuation that the Embargo was a plot to benefit the agriculture
and manufacturing interests reveals the Federalists' awareness of the economic issues at
stake. However, the idea that resistance to the Embargo "reflected a steady current of
conservative opposition to change," as Peskin argues, distorts the intellectual foundation
of the Federalists' protests.
39
In the first place, if Jeffersonians used commercial coercion as a vehicle to
establish domestic manufacturing, Federalists were justifiably suspicious of the Embargo
because that was not its stated purpose. Although Democrats admitted that the
suspension of commerce furnished an opportunity to establish manufacturing, John Pope
and William Crawford of Georgia, for example, denied charges that this was an intention
8
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of the Embargo. The idea that opposition to the Embargo represented conservative
resistance to change also ignores the fact that nothing within or without Massachusetts
Federalism was as it had been before the Embargo. 41 Only recently had many of the
party's leaders learned from their political rivals, the benefits of democratizing and
organizing their political base. Federalists adapted to the changing political climate by
becoming adept at holding mass meetings and caucuses, opening soup houses, as well as
sponsoring fish fries, barbeques, and dinners to attract supporters. Party leaders even
arranged their first national presidential nominating convention in 1808.42 Change was
obviously endemic.
Actually, the Federalists' unwillingness to capitulate over restrictions on maritime
trade is more closely related to sectional and economic conservation than conservatism.
Following the Revolution, the Boston Glass House, Beverly Cotton Manufactory, and the
Shoe factory in Lynn were among many factories established in Massachusetts. 43 Yet,
under Washington and Adams Federalists did refuse to lay protective tariffs on British
40
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imports, which stifled the growth of manufacturers. In the 1790s, the Jay Treaty
facilitated the influx of British manufactured goods, which further decelerated the
progress of domestic manufacturing and helped maritime commerce became the leading
industry in Massachusetts. This development was advantageous: the state's earnings
from commerce sometimes equaled the entire federal revenue; and before the Embargo,
Massachusetts could claim 37 percent of the national tonnage, 88 percent of the nation's
fishing fleet, and the lion*s share of the coasting trade. Entire communities, public
works, and even manufacturers thrived because of commerce. 44 Most Bay Staters were
simply not ready to relinquish a booming economy.
Right or wrong, Federalists had come to believe that New England's maritime
economies had developed organically: but overall, there does not appeal- to be an
agreement among Federalists that manufacturing was undesirable. Their protest literature
inextricably linked commerce to agriculture and manufacturers. Federalists predicted
calamity for every economic interest, and what they feared most was that the Embargo
would destroy a stable economy to benefit the agrarian South, as they saw it, "at the point
of a bayonet."45 There was much to protest. Maritime merchants were not the only ones
suffering because of the Embargo. Those without capital to reinvest in other industries
were among the most vulnerable. As James Duncan Phillips explains, shipbuilders, chain-
44
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smiths, and anchor shops, were among many smaller manufacturers that faced permanent
economic ruin. The Embargo ravaged all of the state's industries and thousands
experienced irrevocable losses. Even the Beverly Cotton Manufactory, founded by the
Beverly based Cabot family (who happened to be Federalists), was forced out of business
during the Embargo. 46
Abandoning his philosophy that husbandmen were the "chosen people of God," as
he wrote in his Notes on the State of Virginia, domestic manufacturing had actually
become essential to Jefferson's vision of an economy divorced from its traditional
dependency on British goods.47 A few Federalists certainly had to realize that once the
United States solved its differences with Great Britain, southerners would resume the
direct trade in agricultural goods to foreign markets and could count on a burgeoning
domestic trade with northern factories. By 1808, Thomas Jefferson definitely understood
the connection between manufacturing, agriculture, and continental expansion.48 With
Britain's manufacturing monopoly broken, southern agriculturalists would reap the
greatest benefits of domestic manufacturing. Large-scale factories would need raw
materials; and as Jefferson surmised, "agriculture will still afford surplus produce enough
to employ a due proportion of navigation."49 The foreign and domestic markets for raw
46
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materials would trigger the spread of the agrarian South, slavery, and southern dominance
in the national government.'^
0 Nor was Jefferson above using legislation to achieve
economic reform. Shortly after leaving office, he suggested that the spread of
manufacturing was a valid "reason to check imports." 51
The connection between manufacturing and the spread of slavery is something
Federalists feared. Although it is not readily apparent that their thinking had taken them
that far in 1808-1809, domination by the slave states had always been a part of their
objections to the three-fifths clause. Federalists were afraid that New England would be
reduced to fiscal and cultural subordination to the slave South. Instead of simply
opposing economic reform because they harbored a conservative antagonism to change,
the Federalists' opposition to Jeffersonian commercial policies was actually part of a
larger resistance to what they perceived to be the machinations of southern autocrats and
their northern allies; politicians who invested their political and financial futures in the
Embargo at Massachusetts' expense. 2
This defensive mindset made the Federalists sensitive to assaults on their
commercial culture in Congress. Unlike many northern Democrats, Federalists would
not let insults go unanswered, which appealed to Bay Staters because as many felt,
someone needed to respond to the verbal assaults and unfair legislation that attacked their
state and region. When Senate Democrats attempted to postpone consideration of the
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Hillhouse motion, Federalists argued that repeal had already been delayed '"with as much
civility as possible," and nothing since the Constitution had been ratified was as
important as the future of commerce. The Embargo failed to achieve its objectives
because neither belligerent repealed the laws that violated America's neutral trade. More
important was the divisive effect the law had on the nation. For this reason alone, it
should be repealed; or at the very least, as Lloyd proposed, Congress should reopen
commerce with other nations and impose nonintercourse with France and Great Britain. 53
Democratic-Republicans read dozens of memorials to show that the Embargo was
the best way to protect merchants' property, and to show that it was what they had asked
for. Virginian Andrew More insisted that the Embargo had not had a fair experiment,
and William Crawford of Georgia refused to accept reports of widespread discontent.
Crawford said that critics of the government, like the Essex memorialists, who brought
disgrace on country, had succumbed to British influence ("'the Federalist party" in
Jeffersonian parlance), which duped otherwise loyal Americans into turning against their
government. This explained why the most recent petitions from New England, and
Boston in particular, contradicted earlier cries for help.
54
Federalists saw no inconsistencies in the Boston merchants' behavior. According
to Lloyd, they originally asked the government to do something to protect them from
British seizures and impressments, so the merchants had no special ties to Britain. It was
when France's destruction of American vessels went unanswered that the merchants
turned against the Embargo. France deserved the same "promptitude and amplitude of
33
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redress" demanded from Great Britain, but no apologies were forthcoming. Everyone,
not just merchants, questioned the administration for demanding neither apology nor
redress from France after that nation wantonly seized, burned, and destroyed American
property.'"
0
Since foreign relations had not improved, merchants would rather risk
uncertain dangers at sea than go bankrupt sitting at home.
William B. Giles from Virginia huffed that the Senate had already been overly
accommodating to northern merchants, who were ingrates, breaking the law and making
accusations about its unconstitutionality and congressional abuses of power. The real
problem, as he saw it, was that a few sanctimonious New Englanders, who had forced the
Constitution on the South, were now trying to "absolve themselves from its sacred
obligations." Lloyd called these assertions "hogwash" and pointed out that the northern
states had not needed help with "internal enemies nor enemies on their frontiers, against
whom they cannot protect themselves" when the Constitution was ratified. The North
entered the Union at a disadvantage because of the three-fifths clause, and the way
Jeffersonians had begun to interpret the Constitution it was completely inimical to New
England. 36
Using the administration's records, Timothy Pickering estimated that of the over
140 vessels that sailed out of Boston, Salem, and Beverly, discounting ships not yet
accounted for, 80 percent had returned unharmed. What this demonstrated is that neither
the French decrees nor the British Orders in Council had increased the dangers of
engaging in foreign trade. Reiterating the argument he made in his infamous epistle to
55
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Governor Sullivan, Pickering reasoned that insurance prices would have soared if the risk
of property loss had increased; yet the fact that the rates had not gone up confirmed
underwriters" confidence in international voyages.
57
The Jeffersonians were not convinced. Giles insisted that the Embargo would work
were it not for malcontents in New England who had been spurred on by Federalists.
Pickering, sensing that Giles' charge was largely directed at him, said no one should be
surprised that protests emanated out of Massachusetts; for it was the birthplace of the
revolution, where Americans first revolted against England for the same reasons they
were resisting the Embargo - both cut "off our trade with all parts of the world." Joseph
Anderson attacked Pickering outright for single-handedly eviscerating the Embargo
before it could have a fair trial. Pickering's letter encouraged the "immoral, dissolute,
and disorderly" to violate the Embargo to the point that its "effects were. . .destroyed." 58
Fixation on the Federalists diverted attention away from the fact that the Embargo
created conditions conducive to violations. To be sure, Federalists spearheaded the
opposition and undermined the Embargo however they could; but the market forces at
play were beyond their control. By inducing inflation, the Embargo had itself contributed
to smuggling. The prices of West Indian flour, salt, tobacco, and other commodities, rose
to astonishing heights, and once profits exceeded penalties, desperate men decided that
smuggling was worth the risk. Ships from Cape Cod engaged heavily in the illegal West
Indian trade, and smuggling to Canada through Passamaquoddy Bay and Vermont's Lake
57
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Champlain constantly vexed the administration. Along with the frequent and gross
defiance of the Embargo in New England, ports in Pennsylvania, New York. Baltimore,
and southern states became the scene of riots and mob action. Treasury Secretary
Gallatin suggested using the military to enforce the Embargo. Yet, this proved an
inadequate solution because Jeffersonians had downsized the military, and it simply did
not have the manpower or equipment to patrol every port.'19
Another reason for intensified resistance to the Embargo was its effect on
people's lives. When the Embargo began in December 1807, Massachusetts' business
community anticipated only a few months of hardship; but as early as January 1808,
laborers, shopkeepers, mechanics, and merchants saw dramatic decreases in their
incomes. In the next few months, business owners began asking for rent reductions and
landlords had difficulty leasing vacant properties. New Englanders with enough capital,
such as Nathaniel Saltonstall, Jr., scion of a prominent family located in Haverhill and
Salem, migrated southward to find work or establish new businesses, and traveled home
to visit their families and friends during the summer. For others, like former shipmaster
John Greene, of David Greene & Son in Boston, fortunes were lost. Diminished
prospects forced Greene to trek to Washington for a military appointment. By the end of
the year, many found themselves in the same predicament as George Davis of Salem,
who could no longer afford to pay for his own room and board. 60
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Clearly, as the Embargo progressed, incentives to engage in smuggling and mob
action soared. By January 1809, only the most irresponsible or callous politician could
ignore the economic costs. After a year of the Embargo and the problems it caused,
people expected repeal. To their disappointment, except for recycling old arguments, as
did the writer "Hancock" who placed responsibility for the crisis on Federalists and "a
fleet of crazy merchant vessels," Republicans refused to budge. 61 Nothing, it seemed,
could compel the majority in Congress to reexamine the policy or reassess its
socioeconomic impact. As John Adams put it, Jeffersonians had "taken an untenable
position. . .which they are loath to yield."62 The December defeat of the Hillhouse motion
- in a 25 to 6 vote - sent Bay Staters the message that their predicament meant little and
their pleas nothing to the Senate majority.63
When the time came to consider repeal in the House, those who expected
Massachusetts Federalists and Democrats to form a bipartisan coalition to cooperate with
the General Court were in for a rude awakening. The state's Jeffersonian delegates
published a lengthy rebuttal flatly rejecting the General Court's resolutions. They
chastised the state legislature for being uninformed and nonplussed when it came to
foreign affairs, even though the Court had provided a comprehensive analysis of
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everything from the French Decrees and British Orders in Council, to impressments and
the Chesapeake affair in its response to the Crowninshield resolutions. In fact the
congressmen refuted the Court's arguments in a point-by-point response, and insisted that
neither the Chesapeake incident nor impressments had anything to do with the Embargo.
The British Orders in Council, they declared, were the only obstacles to commerce; and if
Britain revoked their laws, trade could resume.
64
The congressmen were also annoyed because, as they saw it, the General Court
misrepresented the will of the people and had neither the right nor the authority to advise
the state's congressional delegates. They found the Court's attempt to influence them
humiliating. Setting aside the fact that Massachusetts had not cast a single electoral vote
for the Democratic ticket in the presidential election, the respondents hailed Madison's
election as a pro-Embargo mandate and one of the primary reasons to discount any calls
for repeal. Presenting a united front, every Bay State Jeffersonian except Joseph Story
and John Chandler, who were not available, endorsed the rebuttal.
At the time that they rejected the Court's resolution, Dean and Dsley had already
lost their congressional seats to Federalists in the 1808 election, and Green was not a
candidate for reelection. Ezekiel Bacon replaced Joseph Barker when he resigned from
his seat in the House in November 1807, so Barker was no longer a member of Congress.
Of the two Democratic congressmen who did not sign the rebuttal, Story and Chandler,
neither ran for reelection. Thus, when the Democrats received the General Court's
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resolutions in late November 1808, they were well aware that their party had lost seats to
Federalists, that many of them would not be returning to Washington, and that the
majority of those reelected won their district races by slim margins.66 Endorsing this
document was the last chance many would have to publicly strike a blow against
Federalism; but as their conduct in Congress would soon reveal, allusions to a pro-
Embargo mandate cloaked mounting anxiety. Following their narrow election victories,
Democrats needed to support repeal or lose what support they still had in the state. 67
As soon as the House was called to order, it became evident that Democrats were
not as confidently disposed to continue their support for the Embargo as their response to
the General Court indicated. When Vermont Federalist Martin Chittenden motioned for
repeal on 10 November, and Federalists recommended that the House investigate the
constitutionality of existing enforcement laws, several Jeffersonians agreed. Orchard
Cook and Richard Cutts urged "immediate consideration of the subject, because of its
importance to the mercantile interest in their state." Hence, their reply to the Court and
their constituents was entirely disingenuous. Within the first week of the session,
signatories of the bold reprimand to the General Court were openly supporting repeal.
On the 16th Cook submitted his own repeal motion with provisions for
nonintercourse and arming merchant vessels to protect Americans from "French and
British cruisers, who may molest them. . ." as they trade with other nations. The next day,
66
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Massachusetts Federalist Edward St. Loe Livermore, who had unsuccessfully motioned
for repeal during the previous session of Congress, presented petitions from several Bay
State towns signed by about five thousand residents "praying for a repeal of the embargo
laws."
69
Yet, even though it seemed that Massachusetts Federalists and Democrats were
finally on the same page, they were not necessarily on the same side.
When the House Foreign Relations Committee finished its deliberations over anti-
Embargo petitions and Jefferson's latest message to Congress, it issued a report urging
the continuance of the Embargo. The report rejected both nonintercourse and the
proposal to arm merchant vessels. Cook's measure, the committee decided, meant
certain war with both France and Britain. Nonintercourse, which might lead to war with
at least one of these nations, was unacceptable because the belligerents, especially Great
Britain, would profit directly or indirectly. However, fissures in the majority began to
surface when Gurdon Mumford, a New York Democrat, said he doubted that war would
follow nonintercourse; but if war did ensue, it would have national support if Congress
lifted the Embargo. Instead of fearing the unknown or being concerned with whether
France or Britain might profit, he continued, Congress should be concentrating on
relieving the suffering inside of the United States. Mumford, bringing out the fact that
the President had sent fifty vessels to Cuba and all fifty had returned fully loaded and
unmolested, argued that it was safe to reopen ports not compromised by the European
conflicts, including Haiti, which had once accounted for half of the revenue the U.S.
earned from the French West Indies. 70
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Massachusetts Democrats needed damage control, which is what they had in mind
when they began to plot their retreat from the Embargo in behind-the-scenes
correspondence with John Quincy Adams in December. Adams, having lost confidence
in commercial coercion, suggested replacing the Embargo with nonintercourse. He
figured the administration would be vindicated when merchants broke the law and
exposed themselves to foreign attacks. 71 Cook, Bacon, Story, and Bidwell put the
administration and their party's southern leadership on notice that they would not support
the Embargo after Madison's inauguration in March. 72 Based on the defection of
Democratic-Republicans from New York, New Jersey, and Maryland, the Embargo could
possibly have been repealed as early as January. However, the southern wing of the
Democratic-Republican Party was not ready to let go of the Embargo, and those from
Massachusetts compromised the success of repeal by indicating they would hold out until
March.
Federalists sustained their opposition, and Josiah Quincy assailed southerners for
promoting a peipetual embargo. The South sacrificed only surplus, while New
Englanders were losing everything and had to choose between bankruptcy and violation
of a law that restricted their rights to earn a living. Quincy said no one could find the
page in the Constitution that gave Congress authority to lay an Embargo, because the
judiciary granted that power. A law as catastrophic as the Embargo should have "no
flaw" in its foundation or rely on exceptionally broad interpretations of the Constitution;
71
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Massachusetts, Quincy quipped, was the "cradle of liberty'" but "an Embargo liberty was
never cradled in Massachusetts."
73
Foreign Relations Committee member Ezekiel Bacon, one of the Massachusetts
Republicans defeating the Embargo from within the party, was not going to let some
cheeky Federalist steal their thunder.
74
Contrary to all indications, Bacon claimed that he
personally witnessed "much occupation and pretty general employment of some sort or
other" in Massachusetts. Trouble emerged only when Federalists stirred it up. Unable to
locate a nexus between the Embargo and earlier policies, Bacon challenged Quincy "and
his friends" to come up with a solution or stop criticizing the measures his party adopted,
discounting the fact that Federalists had been calling for repeal, relaxation of the law, or
nonintercourse for some time.
7 "^
Meanwhile, the Senate was preparing another enforcement supplement, forcing
Democrats to stall until the bill reached the House. Sessions became so monotonous the
stenographer sometimes recorded only the length of time that this or that speaker
addressed the House. Soon, it became apparent that there would be no final vote on
repeal before the new enforcement bill passed through the Senate. William B. Giles had
introduced his bill just six days after the Hillhouse motion was defeated. Giles, who was
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, turned to Gallatin for suggestions
on how to better enforce the Embargo. Gallatin proposed measures so imperious even he
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feared they would alienate most of the country. Making few changes to Gallatin's
original proposals, the bill outlined the most stringent enforcement measures to date.
77
One of the problems the administration wanted to address was the courts' inability
or unwillingness to uphold the Embargo. In Massachusetts, violation cases involving
property (i.e., vessels and cargo seized by customs agents) were adjudicated by judges,
while juries decided proceedings against individual merchants and shipowners.
Acquittals outpaced convictions in both venues, but overall, judges enforced the Embargo
more often than juries. Furthermore, nothing prevented merchants from suing customs
officials in civil suits.
78
Legal intimidation of collectors began in Massachusetts, where,
on several occasions, the government had to find replacements for beleaguered collectors,
which was difficult in towns where armed mobs repeatedly harassed government agents.
Collectors who performed their duties, like Joseph Otis of Barnstable, who was the
defendant in at least three court cases, were in a quandary because even district attorneys
could not be trusted to argue cases in their behalf.
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Under the proposed enforcement laws, damages that occurred while vessels were
in violation of the Embargo were inadmissible in court. Furthermore, if collectors were
taken to court, their expenses, up to triple the amount of court costs, were levied against
merchants if a trial was decided in the custom officers' favor. To help agents execute
their duties, the President would now have the authority to unilaterally deploy state
militias to suppress mobs and rioters. The president could skip the step of declaring an
area in a state of insurrection and relying on a governor to deploy state militia to suppress
80
violators, as he had to do in the Lake Champlain region in 1808. In that case, the
militia arrived too late to catch the smugglers. Thus, under the new law, the President's
expanded powers allowed him to override governors who opposed the Embargo and
unilaterally deploy state militia for enforcement.
The other problem was the widespread smuggling. Jefferson was shocked at the
growth of "fraud & open opposition by force" to the Embargo. 81 Congress raised the
bonds on coasting vessels to six times the value of ship and cargo. Violators lost their
vessels, were subject to fines quadruple the value of their cargo, and forfeited bonds,
which could cost them tens of thousands. The time coastal vessels had to complete their
voyages was greatly reduced in order to keep them from meeting with foreign vessels
waiting just outside American waters, or traveling to black market emporiums in the
Caribbean. The administration also hoped to gather more intelligence on potential
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smugglers by increasing informants' fees to half the amount of the government's fines,
which could bring in thousands of dollars. 82
These were among the most contentious provisions; but overall, the Enforcement
Act, skated on the edges of the Constitution. Lloyd referred to the commerce clause of
the Constitution to show that Congress alone had the power to regulate international and
interstate commerce - not intrastate trade. Under the provisions of the enforcement bill, a
Massachusetts ship owner had to post a $15,000 bond before he could carry lumber to
Maine. Trade between ports in Boston and Portland did not fall under any category of
commerce placed under congressional authority. Congress had clearly overreached, and
Q -J
Lloyd doubted that a judge could be found to prosecute lawbreakers.
Pickering asked the Senate to consider if better or even perfect enforcement of the
Embargo would be good for the country or "promote the public welfare." Far from being
"a wild and intemperate performance filled with slanderous reproaches," as described by
a recent biographer, Pickering's speech appealed to sound judgment. 84 The President's
records showed that commerce would not be "swept from the ocean" if the Embargo
were lifted. Senators needed to consider "the situation as it really is," devoid of imagined
dangers. This was a sensible suggestion, but Jeffersonians were not open to other
options. Speaking for the majority, Giles" glib response was that he wished he could do
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something; but New England's problems were '"among the least" of those facing the
nation, and the bill passed the Senate 20 to 7. 85
Federalists were stymied. As Pickering noted, all of their "just and reasonable
claims" had been "defeated." Passage of the bill was a fait accompli. When the bill
reached the House. Thomas Newton of Virginia attempted to move it out of the
Committee of the Whole so that "amendments wished by its friends" could be made
without disruption. Frazzled by these tactics. James Sloan of New Jersey, a Democrat
serving his last term in Congress, made a prophetic albeit cynical comment about the
approaching debates. "If a majority of the House is determined to keep the people in
their present state of suffering suspense until spring, the least they can do during the
dreary scenes of winter, will be to continue diverting them with eloquent speeches, of all
sorts and sizes, from fifteen minutes to four hours long."87
As predicted, protracted speeches prevented further consideration of repeal, that is,
until Democrats decided to end Americans' participation in Britain's trade licensing
system and call all vessels back to the United States. Ezekiel Bacon, who swore that the
Embargo was not a financial burden, was the first to dissent. Waiting for every vessel to
come home meant extending the Embargo "for a longer period than he wished to
contemplate." Joseph Story concurred. It would take at least eighteen months for ships
beyond the Cape of Good Hope to return, and the public would think the Embargo was
going to last at least that much longer. As Federalists had been doing for years, Story
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called on Congress to ''vindicate our rights with honorable and open warfare." He had no
problems ending the license trade, but could not sanction another year and a half of the
Embargo. Other Democrats agreed, and Sloan said he was so sick of the policy he would
reject any legislation connected with it. 88
Despondent over internecine squabbling, John Eppes of Virginia attacked
Federalists, particularly Pickering, for disseminating false information about the
economic consequences and duration of the Embargo. Josiah Quincy replied that if the
Embargo did have a sunset provision, not even Democrats would renew it for another
year; but because the law was without a terminal date, neither Pickering nor any other
Federalist had peddled false information. The biggest problem the nation faced was that
House Democrats were spineless sycophants. Several of them wanted repeal, but not one
would oppose the President or the Senate leadership. What they would do, Quincy
correctly predicted, was support the enforcement bill instead.
89
After Quincy' s tirade, John G. Jackson of Virginia, demanded that Quincy name
the men to whom he was referring. Not about to be sucked into an inane duel with
southerners eager to silence him, Quincy said that the congressmen know who they are.
The problem, he continued, is that Democratic-Republicans could not stand "to hear the
truth elucidated." Jackson objected again; Quincy's disorder had gone on too long. Yet,
to everyone's surprise, Speaker Joseph Varnum, a powerful Democrat from
Massachusetts" Middlesex District, instructed Jackson "to put down in writing the words
to which he objected.'* Jackson begged off, and Varnum ruled that everyone had taken
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latitude; but "excluding personal matter," Quincy was certainly "in order' and could
resume his response to Eppes.
90
Clearly, some Massachusetts* Jeffersonians were beginning to realize that it
would be wise for them to openly disavow their party's overt sectionalism and behave as
if they had constituents back home. As Federalists had done for some time. Democrats
began to defend their state. Varnum, for one, responded to accusations that evasions
were exclusive to Massachusetts, pointing out that people from every part of the Union
were violating the Embargo. Hardliner Ezekiel Bacon continually interjected partial
repeal into the debates, in an attempt to quell the mounting opposition back home. When
the time came for a final vote, however, regardless of their willingness to repeal the
Embargo entirely or in part, most Bay State Democrats voted with the majority. Every
Federalist opposed the bill; but while Orchard Cook, John Chandler, and Daniel flsley did
not support the measure, neither did they cast votes against it, and between 5 and 6
January 1809, the Enforcement Act passed by 39 votes. 91
When the Enforcement or Force Act went into effect on 9 January 1809, Bay
Staters reacted immediately. In one community after another, citizens rejected federal
authority. Newburyport passed a resolution warning that anyone aiding enforcement of
the Embargo was in violation of the Constitution. Over 200 townsmen formed an armed
coalition they dubbed the "Silver Greys,'" and vowed to oppose enforcement agents and
any merchants attempting to sail under government permit. Newburyporters were no
strangers to local resistance. They had already assembled several armed mobs to prevent
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customs agents from enforcing the Embargo, so the Enforcement Act exacerbated an
already volatile situation. In his study of Newburyport, Benjamin W. Labaree explains
that after a year of failed petitions and indifference from Congress and the Executive, the
town's "patience snapped." Previously, petitioners just wanted the federal government to
repeal the Embargo; now they saw themselves combating a hostile administration waging
war against their community. The only constitutional authority remaining was the
Massachusetts General Court.
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Beneath the illustration of a coffin, the Hampshire Gazette denounced the
Enforcement Act as the end of civil liberties. The paper assured readers that only the
"rising Sun of Federalism" could restore Americans' constitutional and natural rights.
Protestors in Hampshire County gathered at the Northampton Courthouse to draft
resolutions similar to the Newburyport declarations. What the county found most
objectionable was that Congress had given the President power to deploy militias
independent of state authority. With unanimous support, the county passed resolutions
condemning the Enforcement Act, renouncing the federal government, and throwing the
county's full support behind the state legislature. 94
In one case after another, the state government was turned to as the last resort.
Across Massachusetts, towns and counties petitioned the General Court to nullify the
Embargo. Even in the Maine districts, where voters clung to Jeffersonianism more
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tenaciously than their downstate neighbors, communities abrogated federal authority.
The residents of Bath passed a declaration citing the administration's "oppression and
arbitrary laws" as the source of their "suffering and calamity."' Portland repudiated the
Embargo as unconstitutional and condemned the Enforcement Act as legalized
oppression. The town also called for the creation of a "Committee ofPublic Safety" to
protect the city's merchants from the callous treatment they suffered at the hands of
government agents. In addition, several municipalities unseated Democratic selectmen
and other officials. 95 In the event that the state legislature was not successful, dissidents
were preparing to combat the U.S. military, militia, and even neighbors who supported
the Embargo.
The word disunion began to appear in print more frequently. Because of the
Embargo and its harsh supplements, newspapers suggested that the "dissolution of the
Union" was imminent. An editorial in the Boston Repertoiy reserved disunion as a last
resort, but then warned politicians who continued to deny the hardships suffered as a
consequence of the Embargo, and the hostility it raised in Massachusetts, that they were
making the same "fatal mistake" the British made before the Revolution. If the Embargo
was not repealed and the federal government continued to ignore the petitions and
resolutions emanating out of the state, it bore sole responsibility for the consequences. 96
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Most of these convulsions were due, in no small part, to Democrats'
miscalculations. By making secret deals to leave the Embargo in place until March, they
increased the ranks of bitter, malcontented citizens, who already felt isolated and
betrayed. Had Massachusetts held a congressional election in early 1809, Federalists
would most likely have been the only ones representing the state in Washington. "In the
present Congress, this state is represented by six federalists and eleven Tories. In the
Congress elected, we have ten federalists, but seven Tories. We believe sincerely a
general election at this time, would not leave a spot [of Jeffersonianism] in the character
of our state/* reported the Newburyport Herald. Massachusetts' "apostate
representatives," as Harrison Gray Otis called them, contributed to the chaos that was
97
erupting.
These developments had a chilling effect on Bay State Democratic-Republicans.
From his seat in the House of Representatives, Samuel Taggart provides vivid
descriptions of how the upheaval back home affected their deportment in Congress.
There was "considerable shrinking and shivering" by Bacon, who was uncontrollable and
had annoyed so many other Democrats, Taggart thought they might denounce him.
Taggart' s favorite Jeffersonian, Orchard Cook, vacillated over the best position to take,
while supporting the Embargo made Joseph Barker so sick, he was seldom in attendance.
Daniel Ilsley was taken aback by the commotion; and Joseph Varnum, who had refused
Newbunporr Herald, 27 January 1809; Harrison G. Otis to Josiah Quincy 15 December 1808, Quincy
Papers. MHS.
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to side with Southern Democrats against Josiah Quincy during an earlier debate, might
just have been as "full of fear and trembling'* as Taggart describes.98
The situation grew even more critical when the General Court declared the
Enforcement Act "unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional" and therefore, "not legally
binding on the citizens" of Massachusetts. At the beginning of February, Lieutenant
Governor Levi Lincoln, acting under the administration's orders, activated the militia to
enforce the Embargo. Governor Sullivan had recently died, so Lincoln had the authority.
However, instead of using the legal rosters, he hand selected officers he considered loyal
to the administration. The state legislature criticized Lincoln's conduct and declared that
the Enforcement Act violated the Massachusetts Constitution by giving the federal
government power over the state militia. Only the governor had that authority." The
Court also resolved to establish a confederation of New England states; and Harrison
Gray Otis and Timothy Bigelow, leading officers of the state Senate and House,
respectively, were instructed to gather representatives from other commercial states to a
convention, which Otis had suggested in 1808, should be held in Hartford,
Connecticut. 100
Congress needed to act quickly to avoid a proliferation of nullification resolutions
and armed conflict between the U.S. military and paramilitary groups. News of
impending repeal began to circulate even before the congressional debates, which began
less than a month after the Enforcement Act had gone into effect. William B. Giles, the
9
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Embargo's staunchest proponent in the Senate, submitted a motion for partial repeal on 8
February that proposed lifting the Embargo and replacing it with nonintercourse, as
Federalists frequently recommended. When Giles laid out his motion in its entirety, he
distanced it from anything Federalists had in mind when he appended a referendum for an
Anglo-American war. 101
Federalists objected, as Lloyd reasoned, because repeal should encourage the
preservation of peace and let the belligerents know the U.S. would pursue a more
"rigorous course of conduct" if they refused to rescind their orders and decrees. Instead,
Giles had outlined the exact scenario that would spark conflict with Great Britain, and
made war the inevitable consequence of repeal. Even though the threat of an Anglo-
American war stood prominently in their writings and speeches, Jeffersonians slashed
military appropriations, reduced the naval fleet, and had one very little to strengthen
coastal fortifications since the crisis begun. After slashing the peacetime army from
5,400 to 3,300 men in 1802, Congress increased its numbers to 10,000 in 1808; but there
were never more half that many enrollees. It was hazardous, as Lloyd noted, to instigate
a war that gave the nation no "rational prospect of success." But despite the
consequences, the Senate passed the bill.
102
In the House of Representatives, neither Federalists nor Democrats were eager to
promote partial repeal as a prerequisite to war. Vamum was convinced that the
belligerents would drive the U.S. into war no matter how hard Congress tried to avoid it;
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but he suggested that full repeal precede nonintercourse, which should be considered
separately. Orchard Cook, who supported repeal, entered an amendment to arm merchant
vessels. Never in agreement with his party's war strategy, Cook"s ideas usually
dovetailed with the Federalists' defense policies. If Congress hoped to save the Union
and "reunite a divided people," he recommended that commercial vessels be armed by
May. This is what Cook had been advocating since problems surfaced in 1805. and he
was beginning to convince other Democrats that this was the course of wisdom. This
time, his motion failed by only five votes (50 to 45). 103
Federalists wanted repeal without caveats, most feeling that the Embargo would
be unenforceable after Madison's inauguration anyway. Quincy pressed disunion,
motioning that the General Court's nullification resolutions be printed and distributed.
Virginian Thomas Newton objected because the Court had itself issued a proclamation
that no state had the right to declare federal laws unconstitutional when the Virginia and
Kentucky Resolutions challenged the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. If Quincy'
s
motion passed, he threatened to juxtapose the resolutions so that the Massachusetts
Legislature would be "castigating" itself. Ezekiel Bacon, brandishing his protean
loyalties, helped defeat the motion "without the least fear of being accused of disrespect
for the state that he represented" because the Court reflected the sentiments of only a few
people.
104
Newton's argument about the Court's inconsistency speaks to changes in the
Federalists' political philosophy. Federalists had come to regard the Constitution as a
103
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treaty between independent sovereign republics or states, which have the right to
"interpose" themselves between the people and the central government. Under this
theory, if a state deemed any law a violation of that compact, it had authority to nullify
that law, which could not be considered treason. The General Court, despite the
hypocrisy, devised a theoretical justification for nullification in anticipation of the
military clash under way. At the same time, of course, protesters were forming military
groups to take on the government if need be. 15
As the House prepared to vote on nonintercourse, lingering apprehensions
deterred some Democrats. Orchard Cook, who called the bill the better "choice of evils,"
did not cast a vote, and both John Chandler and Joseph Story left Washington before the
final vote was taken. Sloan articulated the disappointment that gripped his party,
admitting that he would support a bill he disliked because he was sick of the Embargo.
Once the cursed law finally expired he hoped "it would be dead, dead, dead" never to be
resurrected. On the other hand, Federalists were not overburdened with guilt, and all in
attendance voted against the bill. Nonintercourse passed the House 81 to 40.
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Congress had acted just in time to suppress further movements toward
nullification and disunion; and as soon as the Embargo was lifted, the people of
Massachusetts exerted themselves vigorously to recover from over a year of commercial
restrictions. Thousands employed in the shipping industry had been thrown out of work,
and it would not be easy to reconstruct their lives; but nonintercourse was better than a
total Embargo. The crisis was over for now; and less than a week after the Embargo was
105
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lifted, scores of brigs, schooners, and other seaworthy vessels cleared for voyages to
Indonesia, the Baltic, China, the Mediterranean, the Azores and West Indian islands.
1 07
Portugal, and other ports.
Removal of the Embargo coincided with Jefferson's retirement. For the most
part, the people of Massachusetts were happy that both were out of their lives, and the
feeling was mutual. For the rest of his retirement, Jefferson defended the Embargo,
vilified Massachusetts Federalists, and reviled many of the state's Democrats for
undermining the Embargo. Over time, as Merrill Peterson observes, "Jefferson
transferred the blame of failure from himself and his policy to the party that opposed
both."
108 Never abandoning the economic and political philosophies that gave birth to his
restrictive system, Jefferson, in his final Annual Message, had even planned to extol the
growth of manufacturers as an excuse for the destruction of maritime commerce.
Gallatin asked Jefferson to reconsider. As written, the original draft substantiated every
accusation Federalists had been making against his commercial policies; and the speech
was sure to win them new converts. Jefferson edited the speech, but briefly mentioned
that the suspension of foreign commerce promoted the redistribution of capital in
'"manufactures and improvements," which he saw as permanent. 109
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Curiously, historians who credit Democrats with lifting the Embargo generally
criticize Federalists for their contributions to the same effort. Joseph Story and Ezekiel
Bacon are admired for their vigorous backroom maneuverings; and Story, whom
Jefferson called a "pseudo-Republican," was more than happy to take credit for
engineering repeal. 110 Even though Democrats could have and should have supported
repeal much earlier to avoid the ugliness of nullification, threats of disunion, and civil
unrest, it is Federalists who are condemned for sabotaging Jefferson's peaceful
alternative to war. Historians consistently depict New England Federalists as unreliable
and insular obstructionists with a dim view of humanity. Yet. we must remember that
this interpretation was first advanced by Jeffersonians, and then perpetuated by historians
such as Henry Adams who had personal axes to grind. 1 1
1
Bay Staters who understood what was at stake did not share historians' prejudices
or credit Jeffersonians for ending the Embargo. One historian claims that Federalists,
"having been so long an opposition party** did not celebrate repeal of the Embargo, but
looked for something else to protest; however, this is inaccurate. 112 Throughout their
struggle for repeal, likeminded Bay Staters frequently showed appreciation for the
Federalists' efforts. In public celebrations, crowds revered Timothy Pickering, James
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Lloyd. Josiah Quincy, HaiTison Gray Otis, and others for helping to defeat the Embargo.
Writers immortalized them in poetry and song; towns held dinners and receptions in their
honor; and local officials heralded "the minority in Congress" for their "'manly eloquence
and sound reasoning in defense of correct principles.** In most cases, the honorees were
on hand to celebrate with their supporters. 113
Of course, this in no way suggests that anti-Embargo sentiment was unanimous in
Massachusetts. Even during the Embargo, Federalists gained only a 2 percent majority
over Jeffersonians in the General Court; and for opposing policy and raising the specter
of disunion, Jeffersonian newspapers condemned Federalists as traitors. The National
Aegis assured subscribers that despite the riots in Newburyport and Bath, Maine, there
would never be a civil war because Federalists could not incite statewide resistance. 114
Prominent Federalists such as John Quincy Adams and William Gray, a Salem merchant
and possibly the wealthiest man in America at the time, openly deserted the party over
their support of the Embargo. 11 "^ Just as Federalists praised the likes of Pickering &
Quincy, "A Republican of Massachusetts" and others cheered the loyalties of Adams and
Gray and hailed the wisdom of the Embargo. 116
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Amidst such taut partisan tension, it is important to consider whether Federalists
could have orchestrated a successful disunion movement in 1808. Most historians
recognize the seriousness of the threat and admit that disunion was more likely to occur
in 1808-1809 than at any other time in Federalists' history. Was the Federalists' disunion
threat a "game"' played for political advantage, as one historian argues, or was disunion
more of a threat than a plan, as another asserts?
1 17
The fact that no state convention was called to vote on secession and that no other
New England state joined the call for a confederacy, does not mean that the disunionism
of 1809 should be dismissed. Nor is it consistent with the Federalists* history to imply
that their radical regionalism was a political charade. Had Congress failed to show signs
that it would repeal the Embargo, many of the leading Federalists were audacious enough
to put a plan into action. Pickering, Otis, Bigelow, and Federalists from other New
England states, such as James Hillhouse, were already predisposed to creating a northern
confederacy. Pickering engineered a secession plot in 1804, and Josiah Quincy began
waving the flag of disunion as soon as the commercial crisis began; but more than
brinkmanship in Congress was needed before secession could be carried out. This is one
reason that anti-Embargo petitioners and the General Court pursued a course of
moderation in 1808. Nullifying the Enforcement Act did not nullify the Embargo, and
interposition was not comparable to secession.
118
Yet, the Embargo crisis presented a unique opportunity for the success of a
session plot. Federalists would never again have the support or the conditions under
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which to set disunion in motion. In the absence of repeal, the sailors who marched in
anti-Embargo parades, citizens who acquitted violators, formed mobs to upset collectors,
and signed resolutions calling for the nullification of the Embargo, admired politicians
who were passionate about Massachusetts. After more than a year of frustration, they
would most likely need little prodding to agree to disunion. If called upon, Pickering
would have certainly resurrected his strategy for the creation of a northern confederacy.
Of course, nothing guaranteed success, and since repeal preempted the need for drastic
measures, we will never be able to answer the question with certainty. Disunion was
more of a threat, but not because Federalists lacked sincerity.
What we do know is that the situation called for the provincialism of outre
Federalists like Pickering and Quincy. After the Enforcement Act was passed, indecision
was politically dangerous. One Boston Repertory writer cautioned, "Were even our state
government to unite with that of the nation, in an attempt to carry the embargo laws into
effect, the attempt would be in vain." 119 What remained for Federalists was to capitalize
on their newfound popularity. With the Embargo lifted, they rightly feared that many
recent supporters would return to the Democratic-Republicans, who would once again
dominate local and state politics. 120
The transformation in Federalist political thought originated in their struggle to
preserve regional identity and economic stability. What scholars generally criticize as
radicalism or extremism was an increased sense of urgency prompted by a sectionally
elected president and the ami New England bias in Democratic-Republican policies.
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Arguing that either economic conservatism or pseudo extremism undergirded the
Federalists' anti-Embargo protests trivializes the importance of their regional
consciousness and adaptation to new situations. Previously mired in social criticisms and
elitism, Federalists redefined acceptable citizenship and public deportment; and their
theory of interposition, for better or worse, altered perceptions of republican government.
A new Democratic president was now in power, and Federalists needed to contend with
nonintercourse and the war in Europe. Foremost in their minds, as the General Court
announced, was insuring that the New England states "speak with one voice" to let the
southern states know that they were united against further attacks on commerce, unequal
representation in Congress, and future attempts to diminish the regions' status in the
Union. 121 Federalism was a sectional party containing men with national aspirations, so
their battle would be uphill.
121
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CHAPTER 6
"SINCERE NEUTRALITY:"" THE WAR OF 1812 AND THE DUSK OF
FEDERALISM
On Saturday, 4 March 1809, James Madison appeared before the "six years'
class" of the U.S. Senate to deliver his first inaugural address and take the oath of office.
Like his predecessor Thomas Jefferson, Madison painted an idyllic portrait of the United
States. He envisioned a country with a thriving economy balancing agriculture and
commerce with manufacturing, adept at maintaining internal harmony as well as peace
with the rest of the world. The newly elected president also invoked Providence, asking,
"that Almighty Being whose power regulates the destiny of nations" to guide his
administration as he relied on the "intelligence and virtue" of the American people and
the wisdom of their representatives to offset his personal "deficiencies." 1
The timing of his inauguration was fortuitous, for Madison could acclimate
himself to the presidency at the same time that partial repeal of the Embargo had begun to
diffuse Federalist disunionist clamor. But events would soon reveal that Madison's first
days in office were the quiet before the storm. Foreign diplomacy was still in a
shambles; and in spite of the President's inspiring address and the optimism of
Federalists such as Timothy Pickering, who thought the new Executive "possessed of
1
Annals of Congress, 10
1
Congress 2
nd
sess., 462-466. For Jefferson's inaugural addresses see, State
Papers and Publick Documents of the United States 3 vols. (Boston: T.B. Wait & Sons, 1814-1815). 1: 9-
13, 253-259; and Thomas Jefferson, The President's Speech Register Office March 14 (Salem, MA,
1801). 11, 13.
257
more profound knowledge for a useful citizen and magistrate than Jefferson," resentment
over the Embargo continued to simmer in Massachusetts. 2
To Pickering and other Federalist leaders, Madison represented a new beginning
and potentially, a change in the direction in foreign and domestic policy. Sadly, this was
not to be the case. During his first term in office, the nation would have to weather
scandals, enter an extemporized war, and watch partisan rancor give way to civil violence
before this chapter in American history came to a close. The following discussion
chronicles the developments leading to the War of 1812, and looks closely at the causes
of Federalist antiwar protests, their failure to recapture national power, and the party's
demise after the Hartford Convention. As we shall see, Federalists succumbed to forces
beyond their control, and many problems within the party that they never resolved. Still,
it will become apparent that, while the party became defunct, the Federalists' political
agenda would influence national politics for the next half-century.
As soon as the long and contentious Embargo was lifted in March 1809, the
problems plaguing international commerce resumed because neither the Caribbean nor
Atlantic trade routes offered Americans safe passage." Reports of seizures by the
belligerents began to stream in as regularly as announcements of vessel returns and
departures.
4
Merchants were free to access hundreds of ports, including many in
Portugal, Asia, Indonesia, and the West Indies, but once again, continued harassment by
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the English and French diverted the nation's attention back to foreign diplomacy.
3
Success in foreign relations became imperative, particularly because the Nonintercourse
Act. which partially repealed the Embargo, was implemented as a temporary solution:
and from the beginning, both Jeffersonians and Federalists had problems with the law.
Jeffersonians supported the measure to silence protestors and avoid a further erosion of
their political base in New England. Although they were the ones who originally
proposed nonintercourse. Federalists rejected the act because, as worded, it was a
precursor to war.
To Madison, recovering from Embargo-related losses and regional animosities
would require silencing the government's critics; and to everyone's surprise, he seemed
to have accomplished this by his second month in office. In April, it appeared that the
restrictive system had finally worked. David M. Erskine. the British minister in
Washington, contacted the new Secretary of State, Robert Smith of Maryland, with news
that the British government was willing to pay reparations for the 1807 attack on the
frigate Chesapeake, draft a new treaty with the United States, rescind its Orders in
Council, and reopen the British-American trade starting in June 1809. Erskine confirmed
that the impartiality of the Nonintercourse Act was responsible for the change in British
diplomacy. Unlike the Embargo, nonintercourse had ''produced a state of equality in the
relations of the two belligerent powers with respect to the United States."6
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After accepting Erskine's proposal, Madison issued a proclamation announcing
the resumption of trade with Great Britain on the 101 of June. When the recently
assembled Eleventh Congress received Madison's message in May, the Erskine
agreement was approved on both sides of the aisle and celebrated in the partisan press. 7
Some lamented the end of nonintercourse as a threat to the state's nascent manufacturing
industry; but in general, Democratic-Republicans vaunted the deal as a victory for their
restrictive system.
8
Federalists also took credit for the accord, claiming that the support their party
received in the congressional and state elections of 1 808 initiated the settlement. Due to
their pressure and growing influence, the new president, they deduced, realized that the
nation would no longer tolerate commercial restrictions or pro-French policies. Unlike
Jefferson, Madison was forced to work with the British in order to "save the remains of
his sinking party." To make sure that the federal government would never again impose
a perpetual embargo, in June, the Federalist majority in the General Court asked the
state's delegates in Congress to propose a constitutional amendment that would place
time limits on any legislation involving commercial restrictions. However, Timothy
Pickering informed Governor Gore that they would postpone taking such action because
the Democratic-Republican majority would simply defeat the amendment, which
7
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amounted to an acknowledgement that the Embargo had been unwarranted and
"unreasonably continued." 10
The complacency of both parties was further indulged when on 10 June hundreds
of vessels left the U.S. for British ports. But the gloating ended once the administration
discovered that Erskine had failed to follow the instructions he received from British
Foreign Secretary George Canning. His official orders, outlining the conditions under
which Great Britain would repeal of its Orders in Council, called for the U.S. to leave
nonintercourse in operation against France; respect the Rule of 1756 barring neutrals
from trading in areas prohibited to them in peacetime; and abide by an arrangement for
Britain to intercept American ships attempting to trade with France." It was not until
July that Erskine revealed all of his instructions to Secretary of State Smith; and when he
saw the range of Britain's demands. Smith admitted to Erskine that relating his
instructions in extensor would have made it "impossible for the President to have
perceived in its conditions, or in its spirit, that conciliatory disposition. . .which, it was
hoped, had really existed.*
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Erskine claimed that he had fully divulged his government's terms at an unofficial
meeting with Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin, and based on that meeting, he felt
confident that the U.S. would accept each of the terms. Gallatin, however, denied
making any such inferences, adding that he would never have conceded to the Rule of
1756 under any circumstances because it would hamstring the West Indian trade. Britain,
he said, had to address and settle "all the points in dispute, and particularly that of
impressments "or there could never be an amicable settlement. 13 The dejected Erskine,
now discredited on both sides of the Atlantic, could only maintain that there had been no
"misunderstanding" with Gallatin at the time. 14
Erskine later confessed to Smith in August that he had not officially divulged the
extent of Canning's dispatch because he knew the terms would not win the necessary
concessions from the United States. 15 When news of the failed agreement surfaced, both
parties were curious about the administration's failure to verify Erskine' s instructions, but
Federalists initially defended Madison's decision to proceed without them. They argued
that the President had acted hastily because of the anti-British majority in Congress, and
were satisfied that Madison had chosen to use "this method to raise the embargo [and]
open a door for trade" to avoid the obstructionists in his party. Expecting Erskine'
s
13
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replacement, Francis James Jackson to settle matters. Federalists decided to wait before
passing further judgment. 16
Indeed. Madison seems to have been in a conciliatory frame of mind. But
everything changed when Jackson arrived in the U.S. It was impossible for Jackson to
negotiate an amicable treaty because he arrived on the scene expecting to receive offers
from the United States without presenting his government's terms. From the beginning.
Jackson and the Secretary of State clashed over every aspect of their negotiations, and
expressed mutual distrust when they expended a great deal of time and energy over
whether their correspondence should be written or verbal. Smith reiterated the
President's willingness to negotiate, but soon found it impossible to deal with Jackson,
which led Madison to break off the negotiations. 17 Afterward, Jackson asked to be
transferred to New York because he feared for his family's safety. British officers, he
complained, were already being insulted in the streets; and newspapers were stirring up
even more anti-British furor in the Capitol region. 18
By November, newspapers around the nation began publishing the series of letters
exchanged between Smith and Jackson. As late as November, Madisonians expected
Jackson to broker an agreement with the U.S. under terms identical to those made by
Erskine; but once the negotiations failed, they castigated Jackson for insulting the United
lft
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States. Of course, it was irrational to assume that the British government would accept
the same deal from Jackson that had forced them to recall his predecessor, but logic never
seemed to inform Democratic-Republican dealings with the British. According to an
Independent Chronicle article, "It matters not whether Erskine exceeded his instructions
or not, if he did it proves he was not instructed to do justice... what he agreed to...we
have a strict right to demand." 20
Federalists also thought that accommodation was possible, but they did not
anticipate a settlement under Erskine' s terms. Madison's termination of the Jackson-
Smith negotiations, as far as Federalists were concerned, disgraced the federal
government. But Federalists also stretched things when they alleged that Jackson had
been determined to reach "an accommodation and sacrifice every punctilio, except where
the... dignity of his government was concerned." This was not true. Nor was it the case
that the administration knew of Erskine' s official orders before Madison's announcement
and had orchestrated the entire affair to dupe Britain into accepting an agreement that was
not in its best interests, as Federalists alleged.
21 Even after the letters were published,
Democratic-Republicans continued to criticize Jackson, while Federalists persisted in
their attacks of the administration for breaking off negotiations, snidely offering a reward
to anyone who could locate Jackson's insult. 22
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There was, in fact, some truth in both interpretations of the Jackson-Smith fiasco.
Jackson opened negotiations with a chip on his shoulder and played a foolhardy game of
cat-and-mouse, considering what was at stake. But even though he had no talent for
finesse. Jackson cannot be held solely responsible for botching the parley. From the
outset, even though he already knew the answer, Smith fastidiously focused on getting an
explanation for why Britain would not honor Erskine's agreement. He also ignored
Jackson's offer of reparations for the Chesapeake, and refused to discuss a compromise
over the Rule of 1756 or British enforcement of nonintercourse against France, which
though out of the question, needed to be addressed. 23
Ultimately, diplomacy failed because of both men. Jackson contributed to the
breakdown in communications by resorting to doublespeak and abrasiveness; and Smith
became inflexible and demanded that Britain, in the middle of a war with France, drop its
Orders in Council and stand idly by in the event that American ships transported
provisions to the enemy and its allies. On this point, the administration's response
smacked of favoritism toward France because the U.S. uttered few complaints when
France deigned to enforce the Embargo under the Bayonne Decree of April 1808, and
indiscriminately seized and destroyed American vessels. 24
The failed Erskine agreement and the Jackson controversy had left Madison in a
quandary by the end of 1809. Reinstating the Embargo would be political suicide, and
the Nonintercourse Act was due to expire at the end of the first official session of the
23
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Eleventh Congress in May 1810.° Without commercial weapons, the United States
would be in the same position as in 1805: The belligerents would continue preying on
American ships and impressing seamen while merchants complained that the government
was incapable of protecting them, would not allow them to protect themselves, and could
not figure out how to solve the problem without disrupting and eventually obliterating
commerce. This would lead to greater victories for the opposition party.
Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina finally proposed a solution in May 1810. His
plan, which became known as Macon's Bill Number Two, proposed repealing
nonintercourse, barring armed French and British vessels from American pons, and
raised restrictions against France and Great Britain until one of those nations rescinded its
anti-American regulations. Within three months after either nation took the bait and
repealed laws that interfered with American commerce, the United States would impose
26
trade restrictions against the other nation." The law essentially promised to reward a
foreign nation for ending its attacks on the country's neutral trade by repudiating
neutrality itself.
After August 1810, any pretense of impartiality was dropped. The administration
received correspondence from France's foreign minister, the Duke of Cadore, stating that
Napoleon would annul his Continental Decrees after 1 November, once Britain revoked
25 A special session of Congress was held from 22 May to 28 June 1809 and is counted as the first.
However the first official session of the Eleventh Congress began on 27 November 1809 and ended on 1
May 1810, and so technically, because of the extra session, the Nonintercourse Act ended at the end of
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its Orders in Council, or the U.S. "shall cause their rights to be respected by the
English."
27 Madison accepted the letter as proof that France was cooperating with the
United States and that the Milan and Berlin Decrees had been revoked. But the letter said
nothing that differed from what French officials had been saying all along. Since the
1790s, France had been attempting to lure the U.S. into its conflict with Great Britain;
and despite the vagueness of the Cadore letter, in November 1810 Madison proclaimed
the repeal of Bonaparte's decrees to the nation.
28 Under Macon" s Bill Number Two,
Great Britain had three months to repeal its Orders in Council before the U.S. openly
waged commercial warfare against it exclusively. 29 Through Macon's Bill, Napoleon
finally saw a way to end American neutrality and instigate a long-awaited Anglo-
American conflict.
Madison's impulsive acceptance of the Cadore Letter, only a few months after the
Erskine fiasco, forces us to examine why he would allow foreign policy to hinge on a
vague and uncorroborated communique. Roger H. Brown concludes that Madison threw
caution to the wind because the letter liberated the United States from the country's
"ruinous and degrading submission to British power." Historians Donald Hickey and
J.C.A. Stagg, among others maintain that accepting the letter at face value gave the
President an edge with which to reopen negotiations with Great Britain.' In fact, during
27
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the Erskine upheaval, the French government stated unequivocally that Napoleon would
revoke his decrees only after Britain repealed its orders in council, or the United States by
its "firmness... bring on these happy results." And throughout most of 1810, Cadore
reiterated his government's position in several official letters.
31
Thus, knowing that the
Cadore Letter merely restated this position, even if Madison was grasping at straws to
end his diplomatic woes, the rationale for his decisions must lay elsewhere.
In practical terms, accepting the Cadore Letter would end the diplomatic
stalemate and produce a desirable outcome, whether or not France was serious about
revoking its decrees. If Napoleon were earnest, Britain might also revoke its Orders in
Council: and if the British refused to comply, even Massachusetts Federalists would be
hard pressed to object to a war with England. On the other hand, if the French did not
honor the Cadore letter and the situation remained status quo. Great Britain would still be
held responsible for everything and an Anglo-American war would be justified.
Democrats were already putting a special spin on the Jackson debacle to throw public
support behind a war with Britain. Short of an outright attack on American soil, the
United States would never enter the war against France. With or without Napoleon's
cooperation, the administration was positioning to enter a war against Great Britain.
Accepting the Cadore Letter did not, as Clifford Egan suggests, make Napoleon
appear to be a shrewder politician than James Madison.
32
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could not take Madison any further than he was willing to go on his own. Neither the
French nor the War Hawks in his party could move Madison to do anything he had not
already determined to do. Furthermore. Napoleon's tactics never changed. French
spoliations increased after Jefferson's election for the same reason the Emperor attempted
to goad American officials with taunts that the Americans behaved like colonials when
they allowed the British to inspect American ships and participate in the license trade.
Bonaparte wanted to bring the U.S. into the war and had promised not to respect the
American commerce until the nation refused to cooperate with the British. 33 By the end
of 1810, France's lobby for U.S. entry into the war had apparently succeeded. All
Bonaparte had to do was appeal to the ruling party's prejudices, and Madison would
eventually find a way to direct most of the nation's hostility against Great Britain.
Federalists publicized the outrageous differences between the administration's
treatment of Britain after the failed Erskine agreement, and the President's response to
France during the controversy over Cadore's letter. 34 Britain renounced Erskine, but also
enacted legislation to protect American vessels that set sail before his agreement was
rescinded. On the other hand, no outrage erupted when France escalated its attacks on
American commerce after the Cadore Letter. With the help of its allies, France seized
American vessels on the open sea, and many others were captured after they docked in
33
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ports under French control. Diplomatic vessels were sometimes delayed when entering
or exiting French waters.
When U.S. officials confronted the French in March 1811, they claimed that the
attacks were retaliation for America's seizure of French vessels, but in May, French
officials explained that, unbeknownst to the administration, Napoleon had issued a decree
at Rambouillet, two months earlier, which subjected American ships to seizure and sale.
By September, the U.S. was pressing Napoleon to relinquish money he had received for
the sale of American ships and cargo, but his excuse for refusing their requests and
continuing the mistreatment of American seamen was that "the principles of reprisal"
governed and validated his actions. Each step along the way, Cadore assured the
administration that despite everything that Napoleon had done, "His majesty loves the
Americans."35
Any lingering hopes that Madison would handle foreign affairs differently from
Jefferson were dashed to pieces. "A Former Madisonian" juxtaposed Jackson's alleged
insults against the language France used in its correspondence. The writer concluded that
the same "French influence with which the Jefferson cabinet was so manifestly
disgraced" was responsible for the events that were now plaguing commerce and foreign
diplomacy. 36 Federalist Samuel Taggaii told his Hampshire District constituents, "France
burns our ships, confiscates our property, and imprisons our seamen," but the government
vents its wrath against Great Britain. He, along with others, was highly skeptical that the
35 Armstrong to Smith 28 January 1810. 16 April 1810. 24 May 1810, 10 September 1810: Armstrong to
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hostile stance the administration took with the British would force them to '"accede to
such terms" that the United States was "pleased to dictate."37
In addition to wasting the Federalists' optimism. Madison's blind acceptance of
Cadore's letter began to erode unity within the Democratic-Republican Party. Because of
France's duplicity. Secretary of State Smith became increasingly hostile to the President,
and French ambassador Armstrong resigned his post. To counteract growing intramural
dissent, the Democratic majority in Congress classified information that contradicted the
President's proclamation concerning the repeal of the French decrees, and the fact that
French spoliations escalated after the proclamation. 38
With French privateers still attacking and seizing American ships, it seemed
unlikely that Napoleon had really revoked his orders, which was the conclusion drawn by
the new British minister Augustus J. Foster.
19
Furthermore, when the administration
found out that France was itself carrying on an extensive trade with English pons under
the British license system, it barely blinked at the Emperor's hypocrisy.
40
These
developments, along with the Federalists' mounting criticisms and the fragmentation of
support among Democratic-Republicans jeopardized Madison's chances for reelection in
1812.
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In spite of the turmoil in Madison's party, however, Federalists were unable to
capitalize on the president's gaffes or exploit his vulnerabilities.
41
They had their own
problems. The fact that Democratic-Republicans railed against Federalists without letup
after they contributed to the failure of Jefferson's Embargo was no small factor. At the
same time that Federalists were commemorating the triumphs of Josiah Quincy, Timothy
Pickering, Edward St. Loe Livermore, and Samuel Taggart, Democrats were passing
resolutions calling for their removal from office. Federalists also lost the governorship in
1810, when their long-time antagonist, Democratic-Republican Elbridge Gerry won the
gubernatorial election. In an attempt to help his party win seats and form a majority in
the General Court in future elections, Gerry realigned the districts. Due to Gerry's
realignment, Federalists lost the slight majority they had in the state legislature, managing
to hold on to the state Senate for a year, but losing the state House of Representatives.
42
The controversial move, dubbed gerrymandering, was not reversed until after Federalists
regained power in 1812. 43 Federalists also lost the Plymouth District seat in 1809 when
the Democratic-Republican majority in the U.S. House overturned the results of a runoff
election ordered by Governor Gore and ousted Federalist William Baylies to give the seat
to Democratic-Republican Charles Turner.
44
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Timothy Pickering's defeat in 1811 was a particularly hard pill to swallow.
Pickering, the most vociferous champion of the Federalist cause, was actually more
influential through his published polemics than his votes in the Senate. He had been so
persuasive that anti-Embargo protests were dubbed "Pickering's panic."45 But unlike
congressmen, who were elected by popular vote, senators were chosen by the state
legislature. For his indefatigable opposition to the Embargo, Pickering came under attack
for everything from his military record to treason. Considered one of the Democrats'
worse nightmares, Pickering could not afford the misstep he committed when he read a
classified document in front of galley spectators. The senator was attempting to support
an argument against U.S. occupation of West Florida, when vengeful colleagues in the
Senate seized upon his blunder and censured Massachusetts" most effective agitator for
leaking classified information. Because of the gerrymandered districts, Democratic-
Republicans captured the state senate in 1811 and controlled both houses of the General
Court. Efforts to remove Pickering, which had failed in 1810 when Federalists still
controlled the state senate, could finally succeed. In a vote of 301 to 180, the legislature
elected Democratic-Republican Joseph Varnum to replace Pickering in the Twelfth
Congress. Pickering was out.46 Federalists appeared to be losing the few advantages
they had gained during the Embargo. 47
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In Congress, Federalists continued to argue that the President's proclamation
should not be accepted as proof that France had repealed its decrees. Already it was
becoming clear that France had not acted in good faith; so when the time came to pass
nonimportation against Britain, even a few Democrats wavered, refusing to promote anti-
British policies without confirmation that France had stopped attacking and confiscating
American property. Livermore said that it was "contrary to reason as well as precedent"
to accept Madison's flimsy assurances pertaining to France, and Quincy, who thought
Madison had been deceived, suggested that Congress repeal all commercial restrictions
and defend commerce against both nations because the United States owed "nothing to
France... [or] Great Britain."
48
When nonimportation was debated in the House, it caused so much commotion
the final vote ended what New Yorker Peter B. Porter called a "disreputable** scene.
Things got so unruly the House recorder added a special note explaining that much of
what had transpired had to be omitted. Without the full body of congressmen, or
Massachusetts' Federalists in attendance, the nonimportation bill passed the House in a
65 to 12 vote. Senate Federalists proposed an amendment to reinstate nonintercourse
against France if in fact Napoleon had not revoked his decrees, but they were defeated
and nonimportation passed without this stipulation in a 20 to 7 vote.
49
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houses, nonimportation was signed into law on the final day of the Eleventh Congress, 3
March 1811. 50
It was natural for the President to ignore his political adversaries, but he also
shrugged off his cabinet's advice. As a consequence, Democratic newspapers began to
question Madison's decisions, and a schism developed involving Secretary of State
Smith, who differed with Madison over his response to the Cadore Letter, and former
Minister to France, John Armstrong, who had opposed the policy toward France for some
time. Together, they conspired with the President's enemies within the party, notably the
New York faction, to take the White House in 1812. Smith was discharged because he
publicly criticized the president, and Madison convinced James Monroe to fill the
vacancy. For now, replacing Smith and Armstrong along with a bit of shrewd political
finagling on his part put Madison back in the party's good graces. 51
By the beginning of 1812, Federalists recognized not only that a war was
imminent, but also that they were powerless to stop it. The most common interpretation
of the events leading to the War of 1812 argues that Federalists doubted that Democratic-
Republicans would wage war against Great Britain. 32 Yet, overall, the Federalist position
was more complex, as was revealed in an 1811 broadside, in which they announced,
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"War is coming upon you! because your rulers love Frenchmen... because they would
rather war than have their opponents come to power... because they care not for the
destruction of commerce and navigation... [and] because the North would bear the brunt
of the calamity." They urged voters to return Federalist majorities to state and federal
government so that "Massachusetts may yet be saved."53
Many Federalists had been predicting an Anglo-American war since Jefferson's
election, and concluded that the most recent diplomatic failures had been staged to
initiate it. John Lowell, orator and caucus organizer from Newburyport, wrote a
pamphlet that charged Madison and Napoleon with planning the Erskine catastrophe to
turn public opinion against Britain. To divert attention away from their conspiracy,
Lowell continued, Madison's propaganda machine insisted that Jackson had insulted
Smith, when the opposite was true. 54
A few Federalists did believe that Democratic-Republicans had no intention of
fighting a war. Most prominent was Josiah Quincy, who fervently maintained that
Democrats used the threat of war to divert attention away from their ultimate goal, the
destruction of commerce. Quincy drew on Jefferson's record to substantiate his position,
and he was not alone. One of the reasons that Smith, Armstrong, and other Democrats
turned against Madison is that they doubted his willingness to wage war. 55 But as the
53
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minority party in both federal and state governments. Federalists could not afford
divisions over such vital issues.
The assortment of beliefs driving Federalist votes in Congress exposed a
fundamental flaw in the party leadership. Federalists sometimes lacked unity of thought
and purpose, and too often, party discipline. They continued to support defense bills,
convey philosophical uniformity, and vote as a block on most issues, but too often,
individuals would strike out on their own. This happened when Quincy called for
Jefferson's impeachment on corruption charges. He went forward, spurning "the
disagreement of his political friends," and was defeated in a humiliating vote of 117 to 1.
Similarly, Barent Gardenier of New York spearheaded a congressional investigation of
Albert Gallatin without the full support of his party and lost his motion in a 17 to 106
vote.
56
Instances such as these exposed weaknesses that the other party could easily
exploit.
It behooved Federalists in Congress to prepare a strategy anticipating either a
declaration of war or a return to the restrictive system, but they remained fragmented.
John Adams raised this point when he praised Quincy* s maritime protection speech, and
confessed to being "puzzled and confounded... that not one member from New England
has been found to second or support you." He was equally astonished that none of the
Federalists from New York or Pennsylvanian had "said a word to assist you.'°7 Without
party unity Federalists had to rely, not on their own devices, but on Democratic-
Republican failures for continued success. In the short-term, the opposition's blunders
56
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helped them gain congressional and state offices, but the inconsistencies and disorder
within the party did not bode well for Federalists with national ambitions.
As events began to unfold in 1812, Federalists did not need to wait long for the
outside help they needed. Madison realized for some time that war was the only w ay to
unite his party and hold on to the presidency in 1812; but he needed to silence Federalists
who if unchecked, might successfully undermine plans for the war, drive Democratic-
Republicans out of Congress, and threaten the presidency in the upcoming elections. A
solution for this problem surfaced in March 1812, when Madison divulged news of a
scandal that has come to be known as the Henry Plot. Based on the report of an Irishman
named John Henry, who had migrated, to the United States and later to Canada, Madison
announced that he could show that Federalists were guilty of conspiring with Great
Britain to undermine the government and destroy the Union during the Embargo.38
Henry was actually more of a mercenary than a government operative. During a
business trip to New England in 1808, he witnessed the anti-Embargo protests and sent
reports to British officials in Canada, who paid him about $900. Not satisfied with his
payment, in February 1812, Henry sold the information to Madison for $50,000. The
president never questioned Henry or his intelligence before presenting the documents a
month later as evidence that a British "secret agent was employed in certain states, more
especially at the seat of Government in Massachusetts'" to foment disunion and form a
New England - British alliance. 59
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Usually, discussions of the Henry Plot highlight the Democrats" observations that
Federalists in Congress "began to kick and squirm" and display other signs of
mortification when the plot was exposed.60 Even if some were uncomfortable, most
Federalists expressed relief that a conspiracy of that sort, if it existed, had been exposed:
in the meantime, they also stressed the fact that Henry's reports produced nothing to
prove his case. Even so, after interviewing Henry" s accomplice, a French con man
named Paul Emile Soubiran, who called himself Count Edward De Crillon, the House
Foreign Relations Committee determined that Great Britain had indeed attempted to
incite disunion and civil war. 61 Thus, although Henry's documents lacked credibility and
never mentioned individual Federalists by name, along with the testimony of a phony
count who helped Henry bilk the United States out of $50,000, they were enough for the
committee to endorse the charges. 62
Marblehead merchant and U.S. congressman William Reed was sure that the
administration hatched the fake plot as an excuse to continue its '"ruinous commercial
restrictions."
63
Madison had several copies of the papers sent to Governor Gerry, to
"make whatever use of the episode he chose in the forthcoming state elections." Not
coincidentally, pamphlets emphasizing Federalist and British treachery also began to
Peace Nor War, 171, 172.
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circulate. To counteract the negative publicity arising from the roorback, Federalists
drafted and distributed thousands of copies of a statement entitled the "Boston
Resolutions."64 Largely the work of Harrison Gray Otis, Edward St. Loe Livermore, and
William Sullivan, vice president of Boston's Washington Benevolent Society, the
resolutions voiced displeasure over the government's eagerness to spread unfounded
accusations. The Boston Resolutions enumerated the party's position on pertinent
political issues, and with slight variations, became part of the 1812 election campaigns.65
Anti-British sentiment was obviously not as pervasive as some historians depict
or Madison would not have needed to play the conspiracy card, engage con men, and
waste public funds to silence his critics and raise support for the war.66 The revelation of
a bogus plot did not destroy the Federalists" resolve; but for all of its foibles and blatant
absurdities, Madison's exposure of the scandal came at an opportune time and would
have been a political masterstroke - had it worked. With partisan newspapers controlling
the flow of information, southerners and Americans on the frontiers of the sprawling
republic were already coming to see New Englanders, primarily those in Massachusetts,
as anti-American disunionists.
67
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and Federalists was a potentially effective way to galvanize the nation against the
President's enemies, abroad and at home.
Unfortunately, the Henry Plot quickly lost its momentum. The public was
outraged when it learned that Madison squandered S50.000. the entire annual intelligence
budget, for useless information. Plus, when a real scandal involving an American agent
named George Mathews surfaced, the fake Plot faded into the background. Mathews, a
U.S. operative, was caught organizing a revolution in Spanish territory. To avoid further
complications in foreign relations, the President had to disavow Mathews, which
alienated many of his southern supporters who approved any method that would result in
the annexation of Spanish Florida. The combination of real and phony intrigues made
Madison appear dishonest to the general public, and less attractive as a presidential
candidate to leaders of the Democratic-Republican Party. 68
At the same time that Madison's support began to crumble, so did diplomatic
relations. In May 1812, British Minister Augustus J. Foster demanded proof that
Napoleon had repealed his decrees, insisting that it was "impossible for Great Britain to
rescind her Orders in Council whilst the French decrees are officially declared to remain
in force... without something more explicit on the part of America." Because no such
evidence existed, none would be forthcoming. Madison had already decided to declare
war on Great Britain, so he instructed Monroe to notify Foster that the United States
would not discuss the matter any further. 69 Also complicating negotiations with the
68
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British was the addition of impressments and Indian uprisings on the frontier to the
United States' list of demands. Foster could never address these issues satisfactorily in
the time allowed since much of Monroe's correspondence was written after the President
sent his war message to Congress. 70
With scandals and internecine dissent threatening his reelection, Madison
proceeded with the only strategy that could consolidate his party and secure his
nomination and reelection. In April, he recommended that Congress pass an embargo
that would give merchants time to recover ships and cargo before a declaration of war
was issued.
71
Because of what another embargo would do to New England's shipping,
Madison's message ignited conflict. Josiah Quincy objected to even a limited embargo,
believing that there would be no war; only extended commercial restrictions intended to
finally destroy commerce. Even if there was a war, an embargo was "self-slaughter" and
hardly sufficient preparation for victory.
As had been the case since he entered Congress, Quincy was pan of a minority
that was routinely dismissed and overruled by the Democratic-Republican majorities in
the House and Senate. Even though they admitted that the Federalist minority had
behaved civilly during debates over the limited embargo, Democrats refused Quincy'
s
request to postpone the vote one day so that he could enter the debate, because as Hugh
Nelson of Virginia said, war was inevitable "and ought not to be delayed." Senate
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Democrats extended the restriction period to ninety days and the War Hawks were so
eager for war, they suspended the Senate rule that specified taking three votes on three
separate days. As expected. Federalists were outvoted and the Embargo of 1812 passed
both houses of Congress in a combined vote of 90 to 54.73
Then, on the first day of June, President Madison sent Congress a confidential
message recommending war against Great Britain. His reasons for war included Britain's
illegal blockades, impressment of American citizens, and their instigation of Indian wars
on the western frontier. At the very end of his message, the President noted that France
"'since the revocation of her decrees...has authorized illegal captures by its privateers and
public ships; and that other outrages have been practised [sic] on our vessels and our
citizens'*; but he purposefully declined taking "definitive measures" against France,
suggesting instead that Congress act against Great Britain alone. Over the Federalists'
objections, on the 17 th and 18 th
,
Congress complied with the President's message and
declared war with Great Britain. In party-line votes of 79 to 49 in the House and 19 to 13
in the Senate, Congress passed its first declaration of war, signed into effect by President
Madison on 18 June 1812. 74
Historians tend to overlook the bias that developed in U.S. foreign policy after
1800 as one of the causes of the war. The United States had legitimate grievances against
Great Britain but the case against France was equally compelling. Most instructive is the
fact that Britain offered to open its license trade to the United States, and repealed its
73
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Orders in Council before receiving news of the war declaration. Given these
developments, the decision to proceed with the war raises questions about other, less
prominent reasons for waging the War of 18 12. 75
It is impossible to isolate the War of 1812 from the Napoleonic Wars because
until then, the conflict in Europe fed the crisis. As Samuel Bemis explains, "without the
European war there would have been no Anglo-American war."76 On the heels of
Federalist victories in the 1812 election, Democratic-Republicans were pushed into a
corner over whether or not France had repealed its decrees. A coalition in the Thirteenth
Congress, headed by Federalist Daniel Webster of New Hampshire, a future senator and
Secretary of State from Massachusetts, launched an investigation of the administration's
excuses for going to war. A reexamination of Madison's diplomacy suggested that
neither the revocation of the French decrees nor impressment had been legitimate reasons
to go to war. The allegations divided Democratic-Republicans, causing some to side with
77
Federalists and defend the inquiry.
Secretary of State Monroe had to justify the case he made for war, especially
since documents such as the fraudulent St. Cloud Decree had surfaced; and his report
intentionally discounted the spoliations committed by France's allies under Napoleon's
decrees.
78
The St. Cloud Decree was an attempt by the French to show that an official
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bill, but it was exposed as a fraud that was created much later than its authors claimed.
Monroe stood behind his report and the declaration of war, but essentially confirmed
Federalist allegations that the administration based its arguments for war on evidence
contradicted by the facts. Even though Federalists proved their point, Democratic-
Republicans let the matter die in committee.
79
Francophile policies was also the theme of the Twelfth Congress' "Minority
Report on the War," which was a formal address Federalists drafted for their constituents.
The address criticized the nation's military unpreparedness, opposed the war as immoral,
and argued that while no compromise had been attempted with Britain, "robberies,
seizures, imprisonments... pillage, sinkings, [and] burnings" were still being committed
under French orders. 80 Samuel Taggart spoke for most Federalists when he described
war itself as "a great evil" that should only be entered into with exactitude, and not by
"enlarging upon and aggravating every subject of difference," which was the case in
1812.
81
Taggart was alluding to war aims that had little to do with the battle over
commerce, which was why an alliance of southern and western states with little regard
for New England's commercial interests led the push to war. Speaker of the House.
Henry Clay of Kentucky, argued that the war should have come after the Embargo; and
regardless of New England's recalcitrance, the southern and western states "were united
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for war." " Since the 1780s, Federalists had feared that westward expansion would upset
the balance of power in the Union and center power in the South and West; and their
apprehensions had been growing since Louisiana statehood guaranteed the expansion of
slavery and southern power. By 1812, commercial restrictions and war prompted
Federalists to conclude that "the safety of every state depends upon its proportion of
political power,'* which apparently, Massachusetts and the rest of New England no longer
had.
83
The war essentially ceased to be about commerce once Britain had repealed its
Orders in Council in 1812, and impressments had never been considered a justifiable
motive for war. Indeed, southerners argued in 1805-1806 that the nation should not
impose nonimportation on Britain or spark a war with that nation over impressments.
Especially when they blamed New England's greedy merchants and seamen, who were
hiring and selling "protection" papers to deserters, for provoking the impressment
problem.
84
At that time southerners worried about the economic losses they would suffer
if trade with Britain, the largest consumer of cotton, tobacco, and other agricultural
products, was interrupted. Waging a war that would ultimately benefit the region was a
82
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different matte; and eliminating British operatives on the frontiers, who had been
interfering with plans for westward expansion and threatening slavery, would do just that.
Since the American Revolution, conditions on the frontiers were intolerable to
southerners who, because of Indians and the British, lost slaves to kidnappings and
assistance given to runaways. Compounding the problem was the resentment they
already harbored toward England for not returning or compensating them for thousands
of slaves that had fled with the British military at the end of the Revolutionary War. In
the 1780s, slaveholders forced the Creek Indians, Britain's allies during the war, to sign
treaties agreeing to return their slaves. Those who did not or could not comply were
dragged through legal proceedings that ended only after the federal government satisfied
outstanding claims as part of a deal for Creek lands in 1821. Nor were the British off the
hook. Southerners doggedly pursued claims for reimbursement until 1826, when Great
Britain agreed to pay the claimants $1.2 million.
The War of 1812 combined concrete goals in the West with illusory objectives
respecting New England commerce. Although northern Federalists, such as James
Hillhouse of Connecticut, argued otherwise, by taking American slaves, and especially
for failing to evacuate frontier posts, the British were in violation of the 1783 Treaty of
Paris. Even though compensation to slaveholders would take time, the war settled long-
standing problems on the frontiers that impeded expansion and threatened slavery.
Furthermore, commercial restrictions were a time-honored way to stimulate domestic
85 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government's
Relations to Slavery (New York, 2001), 91-96.
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manufacturing, which along with the free navigation of western rivers, would create
domestic markets for southern and western grown agricultural products. Once the war
ended, reopened European markets could only augment American prosperity.
Jeffersonians originally promised northern commercial states the protection of
commerce, however, even if Britain had not violated the Treaty of Paris and war had
been averted, little would have changed for New Englanders. As long as the wars in
Europe continued, the sectionalism and agrarian bias in Jeffersonian political economy
made commercial restrictions unavoidable. The Jeffersonian vision of "a virtuous
agrarian-commercial republic,"' as described by Adam Rothman, explains the economic
and cultural forces driving Jeffersonian policies and the controversies they triggered in
Massachusetts.
This vision faded as Jeffersonians began to promote an agrarian-manufacturing
republic, in an attempt to minimize commerce by limiting it, as much as possible, to
domestic markets. This helps to clarify why Jefferson and his successors adopted a
course of isolationism, and why commerce suffered the fate it did after 1805. 88 The
economic culture forged by slavery had become incompatible with the pre-War of 1812
economies in New England, which developed a measure of independence from and
antipathy toward the slaveholding states. Not only was the South" s agricultural economy
threatened; as the future would show, the expansion of free labor economies in America
endangered southern power and the survival of slavery itself.
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All of this played a role in Federalists' opposition to the War of 1812. After
1800, the southern and western states had already elected presidents who. by Federalist
standards, had behaved malevolently toward New England. Between Jefferson's
Embargo of 1807 and the beginning of the war of 1812, Massachusetts' total exports had
already dropped from $21.1 million to $5.2 million. Upon learning of the ninety-day
Embargo of 1812, the commercial states rushed resolutions into Congress, begging that
body to postpone its enactment and find a way to avoid the war altogether. Josiah
Quincy introduced an antiwar memorial from the Massachusetts General Court, and
Leonard White and Leban Wheaton introduced similar petitions from the citizens of
Salem and New Bedford, respectively. 89 In response, Democratic-Republicans sent
resolutions to Congress expressing approval of the war, and those in the General Court
countered the Federalists' memorial with one of their own. 90
In this supercharged political climate the eruption of violence was inevitable. In
July, because of their antiwar comments, the staff of the Baltimore based newspaper
Federal Republican came under attack. City officials stood idly by as a small band of
miscreants grew into a murderous mob of about 2,500. Authorities made no effort to
prevent or end several nights of riotous violence that culminated in the vicious beating
and deaths of several Federalists associated with the paper. Bostonian Federalists
attempted to avenge the Baltimore riots by kicking the Plymouth District's Democratic-
Republican congressman Charles Turner, who had unceremoniously elbowed Federalist
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William Baylies out of Congress in 1809, through the streets. The violence in Baltimore
helped Federalists win elections in Maryland, New York, and, of course, New England in
the 1812 elections. 91
By the time war was declared, the army had been downsized, and the navy
reduced from thirteen to eight frigates. 92 Neglect of the military was an important reason
Federalists criticized Democratic-Republicans for provoking a war. Since the republic
was founded. Federalists supported a strong military; so those who voted for defensive
measures after war was declared, did so believing that "the nation ought to be protected
and defended by a Navy and by Fortifications,'" as one Federalist newspaper reported.93
And although he was "averse to all cooperation" with any measures that would help
Democratic-Republicans, Timothy Pickering understood that putting the country "in a
state of defense is and always has been a fundamental principle of the Federalists."94
Members of the Federalist Party, therefore, opposed the war for several reasons,
but by and large, because they believed it was the wrong war. A majority would concur
with the Berkshire Reporter correspondent who argued that war with France "would be
much more just and proper than a war with England."95 They had opposed commercial
restrictions since 1805, not only because of the effect they would have on commerce, but
also to avoid a war with Great Britain. Perhaps Federalists forgave Britain too
91
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generously, but that nation, in their eyes, had always been straightforward and legalistic,
while France had been duplicitous and backbiting. It is difficult to envision any leading
Federalist opposing a war against France, and some even suggested that declaring war
against both France and England was the only option open to a neutral nation. Others
called for arming merchant vessels if a diplomatic solution was unattainable. Yet,
whatever forms their protests took, the impetus of the Federalists" antiwar resistance was
neither inordinately moralistic nor rigorously pacifistic.
9
Once war was declared, public sentiment in Massachusetts began to again shift in
the Federalists' favor. Federalist "Peace Party" candidates won large majorities in both
houses of the General Court in 1812, despite the gerrymandered districts.
97
Federalist
Caleb Strong defeated Elbridge Gerry* s bid for reelection. And the most infamous
fomenter, Timothy Pickering, was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. The
victory was a sweet one for Federalists, yet most who came into office between 1812 and
1815, never adopted the uncompromising attitudes espoused by the radical wing of the
party. And it was the fiery oratory and blistering denunciations of the radicals that
facilitated the party's successes since 1808-1809.
Moderates were not happy with southern hegemony in the national government,
but they were disinclined to threaten disunion and wanted to escape the stigma of
disloyalty that had become attached to the party. By repudiating the violent rhetoric that
permeated Federalist protests, moderates, of whom Harrison Gray Otis is a prime
96
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example, might call for and participate in a convention of New England states, but
intended to work within the limits of the Constitution and restore Federalism as a national
political party. Once this was accomplished, moderates hoped to reclaim the presidency
and correct inequities in the Constitution, such as the three-fifths clause.98
Changes within the party contributed to Josiah Quincy*s decision not to seek
reelection to the Thirteenth Congress. He remained a staunch champion of
Massachusetts and New England's economic independence, but realized how hopeless
the situation was becoming for Federalists at the national level. After the presidential
election of 1808, it was evident that Federalism was largely confined to New England.
Therefore, with the increase of southern power after Louisiana statehood in 1812,
electing more Federalists to Massachusetts' congressional delegation just meant that there
would be more Bay State representatives to be marginalized, ridiculed, and outvoted by
the majority. It had also become increasingly apparent, as Quincy would later observe,
that Massachusetts and other northern states lacked the solidarity necessary to bring about
meaningful changes in national politics. A somewhat disheartened Quincy told
Pickering, "as I mean to keep my temper, I will keep myself on my farm. Should I say a
word on politics I know not where this letter would end."99
During the war, Governor Strong and the governors of Connecticut and Rhode
Island refused to muster the state militia to comply with administration conscription
quotas. But official statements against the war were more cautiously worded than anti-
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Embargo protests. Moderates in the General Court, led by Otis, focused more on the
constitutionality of their opposition to administration policies and the changes they
sought than on taking action if the federal failed to respond.
100
Massachusetts was
unwilling to contribute to the national war effort; and when the British seized eastern
Maine, the federal government declined to send aid to the rebellious state. British forces
occupied the Maine until the war was over, but gave residents the option of leaving or
vowing to keep the peace. Those who took an oath of allegiance to King George III were
awarded commercial privileges as British subjects. This was the case in Nantucket and
Cape Cod, where in the absence of government support, townspeople struck accords with
British forces.
101
By 1814, the British had been winning more battles than they lost, and after the
occupation of Washington D.C. and the invasion of New Orleans, some Federalists
considered striking a separate peace. Others hoped that the British would defeat U.S.
forces and seize New Orleans. If this should happen. Pickering, for one, anticipated "the
severance of the Union," whereby the "western states and territories will necessarily go
off* and leave the original thirteen states of the Union independent and intact. 102
Continental expansion, the inequities of slave representation, commercial restrictions, and
New England's shrinking influence could then be a thing of the past.
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Discussions about a New England confederation and a convention in Hartford,
Connecticut, had already begun to circulate during the bedlam of the Embargo, but the
plans went nowhere once commercial restrictions were lifted and the other New England
states seemed uninterested. This changed in December 1813, when an even more
debilitating embargo, intended to end a profitable smuggle business, disrupted all
commerce, including the coasting trade. Outraged over the enforcement of another
embargo by a government whose long arm did everything but protect them, the citizens
of South Hadley assembled for at a town meeting, which mushroomed into calls for a
convention of New England states. 103
Traditionally, the Federalists of western Massachusetts were resentful and
suspicious of the party leadership in Boston, and objected to their restrained tone after the
Embargo of 1813. Federalists in the interior had therefore become more extreme than
Bostonians in their opposition to the war, and intensified calls for Madison's resignation
or secession from the Union. None of the protests or resolutions sent to the federal
government had been successful, and the hesitancy of the Boston leadership to organize a
convention of New England states led to a power shift within the party. Memorials from
the west and central parts of the state streamed into the General Court, and the uproar
ended the moderates" dithering. With the state government in Federalist hands, even
those averse to extreme measures realized they had to act quickly to appease an
increasingly agitated, and radical public.
104
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The General Court gave the business of forming a convention to a committee
chaired by Otis. The committee proposed a conference of New England representatives
in the absence of the Democratic-Republican minority, whose members walked out in
protest and later published their opposition to the proposed convention. 103 The legislature
selected delegates, who according to Josiah Quincy, were "of known moderation of views
and tried discretion of conduct." Timothy Bigelow. perhaps the most radical of the
delegates, was. as a precaution, not given an important role in the convention. 106 New
England state legislatures, now willing to join Massachusetts to address their common
grievances, also selected delegates and the Hartford Convention was under way.
The Hartford Convention, among other things, called for the abolition of the
three-fifths clause of the Constitution, a regional check on legislation involving
commerce, the defense of New England, and minor changes in nominating procedures to
prevent the election of successive presidents from the same state. 107 Twelve men
representing Massachusetts, seven from Connecticut, four from Rhode Island, two from
New Hampshire, and one from Vermont attended the Convention, which began on 15
December 1814 and lasted until 5 January 1815. 108 Absent from the convention were the
so-called radicals: Josiah Quincy, Timothy Pickering, James Lloyd, John Lowell, and
others who were largely responsible for recapturing popular support for the party.
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Although they had a say in the content of the Convention's message, such men were
deemed too provocative to deliver it.
Working closely with the conventioneers, Timothy Pickering proposed a majority
of the measures adopted by the Convention, even though, as he expressed in a letter to
John Lowell, the Convention was coming too late to influence the course of the war or
the federal government. Along with Lowell, who found Otis "naturally timid, and
frequently wavering," and the Convention delegates unprepared "to act? Pickering and
other Federalists feared that the moderates would not present New England's demands as
forcefully as they should.
109 Quincy, who had battled the region's enemies toe-to-toe in
Congress, also despaired that the delegates to the Hartford Convention lacked the
intensity necessary to effect constitutional reform.
110
Reticence and moderation among Federalists had already delayed the Convention.
In addition, as Pickering had surmised during his early flirtation with disunion, to have
even a modicum of success a northern confederation had to include New York, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. As it was, the delegation that went to Washington barely
represented all of the New England states; and because of the low attendance and
disposition of the delegates, Madison's advisors eased his fears that New England would
secede. The President did take precautions, however, such as increasing the guard at the
y
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Springfield Armory, but refused to have any contact with the Hartford Convention
delegates while they were in Washington. 1 1
1
In general, Federalists accepted the Convention's final report, which had
accomplished little more than giving Democratic-Republicans more material with which
to berate Federalists. But it did not meet the expectations of many other Federalists, one
of whom commented that the delegates "certainly have not done as much as was expected
of them by the great Body of the people of the State," while another confessed to his
brother in Boston, that the convention had been "much more temperate than I expected."
The citizens of Newburyport, however, were outraged that no steps had been taken to
protect them from a federal government dominated by westerners and southerners. They
sent petitions to the General Court demanding that New England strike a separate peace
with Britain or take steps to secede from the Union, and simmered down only when the
war was over.
112
This points to the other problems facing the Hartford Convention. It
overlapped with the December treaty negotiations at Ghent and Andrew Jackson's
victory at New Orleans in January 1815, and Otis later admitted that the convention was
called to calm the state's radicals; so in the end, the Hartford Convention was
anticlimactic. Federalists had reduced their most charismatic colleagues into consultants;
and along with Jackson's victory and the cessation of hostilities, "the Hartford
111
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convention at this moment at Washington did not give much anticipation/* William
Bentley confirms.
1
1
When the war was over, Federalists continued to influence Massachusetts politics
and elect governors and representatives to the General Court and U.S. Congress, until the
party's dissolution in the 1820s. Even though they never reclaimed the presidency, all
was not lost. By 1815, Federalist protests had come full circle. For some time, they
focused on slave representation as the source of all their problems. Were it not for the
three-fifths clause of the Constitution, Democratic-Republicans would not have come
into power in the first place; New England would have avoided commercial restrictions;
and the nation would not have been drawn into a war it was ill-equipped to fight because
"the planters of the South own slaves but no ships!"
114
The party reaffirmed its calls for the repeal of the three-fifths clause, which
became one of the most significant and controversial features of Federalist politics. Best
articulated in the pamphlet Awake! O Spirit of the North (1812), Federalists took the
position that the '"slave country" added the three-fifths clause to the Constitution in 1787
to "gain and preserve an undue ascendancy in both branches of the national government."
In the midst of an unjust war and after years of "repeated injuries and. . .galling
oppressions," Boreas, god of the north wind from Greek mythology, was calling on the
North to excise the "rotten part" of the Constitution.
11 "^
113
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Because their fight against the three-fifths clause has antislavery implications,
scholars continue to debate the depth of the Federalists* antagonism toward slavery. A
popular interpretation sees Federalists as political opportunists who exploited latent
sectionalism and opposed the three-fifths clause to retain political power. Representing
this group are James Banner and historians who tend to agree with Samuel E. Morison
that the "Federal Party never upheld a moral or political opposition to slavery itself."'
Supporters of this view largely base their assessments on the absence of antislavery
humanitarianism in Federalist rhetoric. 1 16 Challenging this interpretation are Linda
Kerber, Paul Finkelman, and other scholars who argue that Federalists promoted the
abolition of slavery both privately and publicly. Not only do adherents to this
interpretation cite individual memberships in antislavery societies to support their
assertions, they also note the fact that African-American voters gravitated toward the
Federalist Party and supported Federalist candidates. 117
Perhaps too many studies rely on the disputations of Democratic-Republicans to
substantiate their arguments. For instance, one study says that Federalists abandoned
antislavery reform because they realized that free Negroes were "more of a political
threat" than slaves because they would give the South more votes than they already had
116 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Letters ofHarrison Cray Olis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
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through slave representation. But Federalists did come to rely on black voters, which
sparked criticism and racist comments in the partisan press. For example, when African-
Americans helped to elect Federalists in 1812, including Governor Caleb Strong, the
Democratic Eastern Argus complained, "5 Negroes are equal in taxation to 3 white men,
but in Massachusetts the vote of any old stupid Negro is equal to the election of a
Governor.
. .in the Commonwealth."' 1 19
Obviously, at least after 1800, Massachusetts Federalists valued black voters for
political reasons. However, because of the general anti-Federalist bent in scholarship, a
greater effort has been made to discredit Federalists as racist and opportunistic politicos
than to examine the complexities of antislavery sentiment within the party. 120 Complete
reliance on the commentary issued by the Federalists' political enemies can only produce
a skewed interpretation. Nor is it reasonable to evaluate antislavery sentiment on a
contrived standard of authenticity that only regards humanitarian efforts as legitimate.
By doing so, some historians have missed the significance of the Federalists' multi-
pronged response to slavery.
The political implications of the three-fifths clause were a principal aspect of the
Federalist opposition; but when we sift through the evidence, there is also much that
suggests that Federalists exhibited antislavery sentiment in other ways as well.
Politically, Federalists believed that repealing the three-fifths clause would restore a
balance of power in the national government; but on the other hand, some also objected
118
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to the three-fifths clause and slavery itself as immoral. When historians accuse
Federalists of exploiting public sentiment for political gain, they unintentionally admit
the presence of antislavery attitudes in Massachusetts. Much of this can be attributed to
sectional hostilities and revolutionary philosophy, although the early eighteenth century
abolitionist writings of Samuel Sewall, Elihu Coleman, Benjamin Rush, Theodore
Parsons, Warner Mifflin and others, as well as Revolutionary philosophies, were most
certainly a factor.
121
Critics never explain how the circulation of over a century's worth
of antislavery literature or the egalitarianism of the Revolution affected almost everyone
in Massachusetts except Federalists.
The more important question is whether antislavery sentiment has to follow a
specific format in order to be legitimate. While some Federalists were no doubt apathetic
and many others were racist, nineteenth century African-Americans provide a more
complicated picture of the Federalist Party. An oration before the Wilberforce
Philanthropic Association of New York praised the Federalist Party for supporting
abolition, but condemned the southern-based Democratic Republicans in Congress for
being "the very people who hold our African brethren in bondage." The Boston Sons of
Africa commended Massachusetts in general and the town of Salem in particular for
21
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"their partiality to freedom and likewise for their particular benevolence to the
Africans." 122
It would be unrealistic to suggest here that race relations were perfect or always
equitable in Massachusetts and other parts of New England. On the contrary, black
Americans constantly had to battle discrimination in the northern states. Whites in Salem
refused to send their children to school with Negro children, and in 1810, a stage
company in that town required a black minister to ride outside with the driver instead of
in the cab, which William Bentley reports, "he angrily refused." 123 Yet it is obvious that
African-Americans preferred the troubled freedom in Massachusetts to slavery, which
explains their oft expressed appreciation for the benevolence of individual New
Englanders and municipal governments that built schools, attended churches with black
ministers, called for the abolition of slavery, and safeguarded their right to vote. 124
Instead of suggesting that every Federalist was concerned about the plight of
slaves, we get a better understanding by recognizing that in some instances, opposition to
the three-fifths clause converged with antislavery sentiment. Leverett Saltonstall's
refusal to help a friend capture runaway slaves, as well as Pickering's pronouncement in
1785 that he hardly had "patience to write on a subject in which what is right is so
obvious, and so just, and what is wrong is so derogatory... so inhuman and so iniquitous
122
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in itself* when it came to barring slavery from newly formed states, illustrate the wide-
ranging views regarding race and slavery that can be found in Federalist thought and
action in the early republic.
125
Federalist newspapers often published works dramatizing the horrors of the slave
trade and the grueling lives and mistreatment of southern slaves, and condemned slavery
as immoral and unchristian. At the start of the crisis over slavery in Missouri, Josiah
Quincy, who never wavered in his opposition to the three-fifths clause, condemned
slavery as "a moral evil. . .in violation of the fundamental laws of nature."
126
This helps
us understand why in 1840, a political pundit attempted to disparage the defunct
Federalist Party, by calling Federalism "the father of Abolitionism," and harshly
criticizing individual Federalists for "tampering with the abolitionists of the North" when
calling for the repeal of slave representation.
127
Regardless of what Federalists said or did, however, the three -fifths clause was
intact when the War of 1812 ended. While everyone was celebrating the end of the war,
a Salem Federalist put things in perspective. "What luck attends our wicked rulers," he
noted. Madison and company led Americans into a devastating war, and just when the
situation seemed hopeless, "Peace comes to their aid. . .to close the war with Glory." 128
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Outside of New England, Democratic-Republicans were never held accountable for the
destruction of commerce or mismanagement of a war that resulted in humiliating defeats
including the capture and burning of the nation's capitol, and over 7,000 Americans dead
and wounded. 129 Nor did Democrats ever answer for the escalation of sectional hostilities
that were exacerbated by their prejudicial domestic and foreign policies. The British
were no longer a problem on the frontiers; the war in Europe was over; and further
complaints about the destruction of commerce were futile.
Democratic-Republicans also escaped criticism for embracing Federalist policies
during and after the war. Shaw Livermore agrees that "Madison's proposals" and the
measures Democratic eventually adopted "were good Federalist doctrine for which the
originators had been relentlessly attacked in recent years." Federalists themselves
complained that the opposition adopted the very policies that forced them out of office,
but to no avail.
130
Jeffersonians denied their own failures and blamed Federalist papers
for "stoking the animosity and hatred" of "merchants and tradesmen." It was not
politically feasible to admit that it was their policies that forced New Englanders to vilify
Jefferson and Madison for being "the enemies of commerce and. . .the cause of our
commercial embarrassments!" Beyond New England, the majority of Americans
accepted the Democratic-Republican interpretation of events; and in the southern and
129
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western states most people were satisfied with the results. They easily dismissed
Federalist for being "false. . .malignant and treacherous" during the nation's ordeals. 131
New England's commercial economy, as it existed before the war. and as
Federalists predicted, had been severely weakened, and an economy based on
manufacturing, which linked the region to southern agriculture, and westward expansion,
began to develop during the war. Shipping families invested in enterprises such as the
American cotton factory, the Boston & Springfield Manufacturing Company, as well as
paper mills and shoemaking factories. A few merchants like Patrick Jackson, who helped
establish the Boston Manufacturing Company at Waltham, abandoned commerce in toto
for manufacturing. Indeed, a crucial element in the moderation of Federalists at the
Hartford Convention, such as Harrison Gray Otis, was their interest in manufacturing
corporations that relied on interstate commerce for survival. During the war,
manufacturers developed overland trade routes to circumvent embargoes and British
blockades; and by the 1840s, Massachusetts had been substantially transformed into a
manufacturing state. 132
The Federalist Party reached the apex of its political resurgence between 1808 and
1814. But even though the party retained control in Massachusetts and other New
England states after the War of 1812, its moderate leadership lacked the audacity the
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party members had come to expect. What the most radical members of the party
understood, that the moderates failed to comprehend, was that southerners would never
make compromises that favored New England's interests over slavery. For all of their
cautious rhetoric and tiptoeing around the feelings of their political enemies, the
delegates of the Hartford Convention would spend the rest of their public careers
defending themselves against charges of sedition. 133 Those who hoped to rebuild a
national party were disappointed. There were still Federalists in the South, but the
minority address on the war revealed that their numbers were dwindling. Even before the
war, many were no longer calling themselves Federalists because the party was so
unpopular in the region. Another barrier to national unity was the call to repeal the three-
fifths clause. As James Broussard reminds us, "'southern Federalist leaders were still
southerners, and none of them took nearly so advanced a position on the slavery issue as
some of their northern colleagues."
134
Less than five years after the Treaty of Ghent officially ended Anglo-American
hostilities, controversies over the extension of slavery into Missouri demonstrated that the
Federalist cause was far from dead. Calls to repeal the three-fifths clause reverberated
with a new generation of politicians willing to assume the brinkmanship of Federalist
radicals. The new sectional fight only slightly refined the Federalists' rhetoric; and the
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old guard, including Josiah Quincy and Timothy Pickering, were valued for their
viewpoints. Quincy. who was one of the most vocal opponents of Louisiana statehood,
warned that the division of the Louisiana territory into new states was a scheme designed
to "shift the balance of power still farther to the South and West." In 1819, Quincy
joined forces with Daniel Webster and other Federalists to draft and send a memorial to
Congress, in which they argued that Congress had the constitutional authority to prohibit
slavery in any new states. Identifying its authors as part of "a Christian community"
compelled by the "'dictates of religion and humanity,'* the memorial concluded that
slavery should have been abolished after the Revolution, but since it had not, it was up to
Congress to keep it out of Missouri. 13:> Following an antislavery meeting that same year,
Elias Boudinot, a New Jersey Federalist and philanthropist, turned to Timothy Pickering
to organize citizens to oppose "the numerous and appalling evils that must result from
extending and perpetuating slavery among us.'' 136
In the 1840s, John Quincy Adams returned to his Federalist roots and outdid
Quincy and Pickering in the U.S. House of Representatives. As a congressman from
Massachusetts, former President Adams vexed southerners on a daily basis. Although he
never officially joined an abolitionist society, Adams became a fierce opponent of
slavery, and his speeches were read at abolitionist meetings for inspiration. Following a
failed attempt to censure Adams, a Kentucky congressman explained, "If he could be
removed from the councils of the nation, or silenced upon the exasperating subject... [of
Josiah Quincy, An Oration Delivered Before the Washington Benevolent society of
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slavery] none other, I believe, could be found hardy enough or bad enough to fill his
i »»137
place.
Thus, once the nation was forced to confront the issues Federalists wrestled with
after Jefferson's election, a coalition of states representing the New England, Mid-
Atlantic, and Northwest, closely resembling the confederation Pickering envisioned in
1804, created the Free Soil and then the Republican Party to champion northern interests
and check the spread of slavery. By the time civil war erupted in 1861, most of the
radicals were gone, except Josiah Quincy who lived long enough to see the northern
states unite against the slave power and slavery expansion.
In the 1850s and 60s, Quincy reentered public life, not because he was seeking the
limelight, but because he was in demand. He was sought and celebrated by abolitionists,
Free Soilers, and Republicans who craved his boldness and shared his passions. Quincy
welcomed the Civil War and advised Abraham Lincoln to end slavery once and for all.
When the ninety-three year old Quincy died in July 1864, he had seen Federalist wishes
for the northern states fulfilled.
138 He died contented in the knowledge that all of his
party's struggles had helped to transform the United States into the free republic they
always believed it should be.
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EPILOGUE: OLD ROMANS. 1815-1865
On a winter evening in 1821, Eliza Susan Quincy. the twenty-three year old
daughter of Josiah Quincy, picked up her diary to record her impressions of the day and
her experiences. As she begins to write her entry, Eliza describes the appearance of an
aging patriot and ex politician that she had seen earlier that day. "Col. Pickering" she
stalls, "looks like an old Roman." The seventy-six year old Federalist "has nothing of the
weakness of an old man about him," she continues. Eliza completes this entry by
insisting that old firebrand was still "as spirited. . .as a young man." 1 Given his life and
career, it is astonishing that Pickering showed no outward signs of his highly stressful
and controversial life. But neither his tumultuous career in national politics, nor the years
he spent combating Democratic-Republicans in Congress appear to have dampened his
spirits or dulled his countenance.
Still, after years of intrigue and opposition politics, Pickering and other
Federalists witnessed the failure of Jeffersonian political economy, along with their
inability to return Federalism to national prominence. The War of 1812 was over and the
Treaty of Ghent solved none of the issues for which Democratic-Republicans had
imposed the nonimportation, nonintercourse, embargoes, or ill-planned war on New
England. Of course, settling boundary lines, along with clearing the frontiers of hostile
Indian tribes and eliminating British posts on the frontier, was a grand accomplishment
for expansionists, but not for Federalists.
2
'
"Diary of Eliza Susan Quincy" (Extracts from Old Journals 16 September 1814 - 30 September 1821)
Quincy Family Papers, MHS.
2 Donald R. Hickey, The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989),
296; James Fulton Zimmerman. Impressment ofAmerican Seamen (New York: Longmans, Green, and
309
From 1800 onward, Federalists had been blessed with the gift of prophecy and
accurately predicted the onset and consequences of Democratic-Republican foreign and
domestic policy. Yet, as historian Donald Hickey writes, "It mattered not that the war
had vindicated so many Federalist policies... that Federalists had predicted the futility of
the conflict and that the treaty of Ghent had proven them right.'' What was important was
the illusion "the appearance of victory."'
Even though Massachusetts resisted wartime nationalism, like other Americans,
most of them could not help but enjoy the cessation of hostilities. Therefore, after 1815,
it meant little that Democratic-Republicans by advocating a standing army, federal tax
system, national bank, and manufacturing program, had abandoned the decentralizing
ideals that contributed to their ascent in 1800.
4 By this time, Pickering, Josiah Quincy,
James Lloyd, and other Federalists realized they were no longer in a position to effect
positive changes for their state and region in national politics. And even though northern
Democratic-Republicans formed a majority in the Fifteenth Congress, instead of siding
with Federalists, they earned the epithet "doughfaces" during the Missouri crisis for their
reluctance to challenge southerners in Congress.
3
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Historians have sketched rather morose portraits to explain the demise of the
Federalist Party. For example, Shaw Livermore argues that Federalists suffered "from a
curiously enervating melancholy," and David Fisher describes Fisher Ames and
Federalists of his generation as "unstable."
6
Historians such as Fisher, Livermore, and
others are correct to criticize the Federalists for failing to develop techniques and
organization skills that would have helped their party; and it is also true that internal
conflict consistently plagued the Federalist Party throughout its existence. But to
attribute the Federalist Party's demise to some universally embraced anti-Federalism or
widespread conversion from nationalism to individualism in American society misses the
significance of geopolitical transformations that sealed their fate after 1800.
From late 1790s onward, the Federalists fought unsuccessfully to maintain the
balance of power in the federal government. In Congress they lost battle after battle to
curtail the rise of southern power. In most instances, they were defeated because
northern Republicans and even a few Federalists, such as Harrison Gray Otis, were either
apathetic or sympathetic when it came to the spread of slavery. 7 Jefferson's sweep of
Federalists from public offices including judgeships and state agencies, along with the
constitutional mechanisms that tilted the balance of power toward the southern and
western states, contributed to the dissolution of the Federalist Party. Additionally, a
constant barrage of political propaganda that exploited fears of secret cabals such as the
ft
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"Essex Junto," to trivialize the voices of the Federalist minority in Congress, proved to be
an effective way to eliminate a threatening political adversary. 8
Many of the Federalists" problems began when they challenged the basis for
southern power. In 1797, Federalists supported the petitions of freed African-Americans
who asked Congress to help them maintain their freedom. Southerners treated the case as
they did every petition regarding slavery, but Thacher and others insisted that Congress
make amendments to fugitive slave laws. The House decided to return the slaves to
North Carolina for "justice."9 Nor did it help the situation when George Thacher
introduced a motion to check the spread of slavery into the Mississippi Territory in 1798,
which prompted Federalist John Rutledge of South Carolina to warn New England
Federalists that "the discussion of such questions" would damage the Party in "certain
parts of the Union." Rutledge clung to the Federalist Party to the end; but he also
recognized that the people of his state would never accept a party that attacked slavery,
their special interest.
10
Through the years it was hardly in the interests of southern slaveholders,
immigrants, and migrants who settled the South and Southwest to profit from slavery, or
even for westerners in general to support the Federalist Party. Thus, long before the War
of 1812, Federalists were all but defunct in the South and practically nonexistent in the
West. It was only because they had become the only spokesmen for Massachusetts'
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financial independence after 1805, that some Massachusetts Federalists imagined that
there was hope of a national resurgence. Following the election of 1808. however,
knowledgeable Federalists recognized that the party was confined to New England, with
ever shrinking minority support in other parts of the nation.
During the war, propagandists such as Mathew Cary, a Philadelphia bookseller and
widely read polemist, began to attack all of New England. He published An Examination
of the Pretenses ofNew England to Commercial Pre-Eminence in 1814. in order to
defend the South against the Federalists" charges of sectional bias in their commercial
policies. Examination upbraids New England for its "arrogant and unfounded
pretensions" and specifically targets Massachusetts, which "since the close of the reign of
Federalism,'" according to Carey, has been "the seat of discontent, complaint, and
turbulence." Carey also vented his venom on New Englanders for opposing slavery after
they had profited from the slave trade, and added that the region produced nothing but
below average politicians and cheating merchants who harassed the federal government
"more than all the rest of the union together." For all of its protests since 1800, it would
be "justice" for Massachusetts to be expelled from the Union. 11
Along with the effective smear campaigns of Democratic-Republicans and
southern sympathizers as Federalism began to expire, internal divisions played a role in
the party's collapse. After 1815, Federalists who aspired to public office on the state and
especially on the national level had no reason to tolerate backbiting from members of a
dying political party. Complaints and criticisms over their support of the compensation
" Mathew Carey, Examination of the Pretensions ofNew England to Commercial Pre-Eminence
(Philadelphia: Printed for M. Carey, 1814), B, vii, 2, 3, 45,61, 63, 66, Special Collections Boston
Athenaeum: Livermore, Twilight of Federalism, 34, 61.
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bill of 1816, which raised congressmen's salaries, forced some Federalists out of the
party. Many of these former Federalists ran as Democratic-Republicans, much as
Orchard Cook had more than decade earlier. Others in the party, such as Harrison Gray
Otis, attempted to curry favor with the newly elected President James Monroe; but as had
been the case since Jefferson, Democratic-Republican patronage remained an internal
affair.
12
When the controversy surrounding slavery in Missouri began in 1818, Federalists
resumed their opposition to the expansion of slavery. In previous debates, southerners
underscored the fact that the southwest territories already contained slavery and migrants
to the area were already slaveholders, but Missouri infringed on the Northwest
Territories, which had prohibited slavery in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Daniel
Webster and Josiah Quincy argued in an 1819 memorial to Congress, that migrants to the
northern territories were not slaveholders and the free states could not view the extension
of slavery in those territories "as being politically just." Federalists also re-raised the
balance of power issue and noted that the slave states already had more members in the
House of Representatives than they would have without the three-fifths clause, and the
three-fifths rule should have only been applied to the original thirteen states. 13
In February 1819 James Tallmadge, a Democratic-Republican from New York
originally instigated the contentious proceedings by introducing an amendment to bar
slavery from Missouri as a condition for statehood. The Tallmadge Amendment passed
12
Morison, Harrison Gray Otis Urbane Federalist, 403-406; Livermore, Twilight of Federalism, 36-41, 52,
53.
11 [Daniel Webster, et. al.]. A Memorial to the Congress of the United States on the Subject ofRestraining
the Increase ofSlave)? in New States to be Admitted into the Union (Boston: Sewell Phelps, Printer,
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the House several times but the Senate rejected it time and again. The stalemate reached
a boiling point after Maine applied for statehood. For a while, Southerners tried to
connect the admission of Maine as a free state to offset the entry of Missouri as a slave
state. Finally, Jesse B. Thomas, a representative from Dlinois, proposed what became the
Missouri Compromise of 1820, by suggesting that Missouri be admitted as a slave state,
but thereafter slavery be prohibited in those parts of the Louisiana Purchase territories
north of 36° 30'. With Maine entering as a state, the number of slave and free states
would be equal, which meant an equal number of slave and free states would be
represented in the U.S. Senate.
14
Harrison Gray Otis initially voted with the South until a rousing speech by Rufus
King pointed out that the slave states already had twenty representatives and electoral
votes because of the three-fifths clause. Otis then joined other northerners, but when
southerners threatened disunion, several northerners backed down and accepted the
compromise. Tallmadge left Congress for good in the spring of 1819; and when the final
vote came, fourteen northerners voted with the south for slavery in Missouri, after which
the flamboyant John Randolph of Virginia sniped, "they were scared at their own dough
faces - yes, they were scared at their own dough faces! - we had them, and if we wanted
three more, we could have them. ..the men, whose conscience, and morality, and
religion, extend to 'thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude. "' Josiah
Quincy had a name for northern politicians who sided with the South against their own
14
Glover Moore. The Missouri Controversy. 1 81 9- 182 J (Gloucester: P. Smith. 1967). 33-47: Livermore,
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15 Quoted in Leonard Richards. Slave Power, 85, 88 (Italics theirs).
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interests. He called them, "six-dollar-a-day patriots" because they were willing to "baiter
away our birth rights on the floor of Congress, for offices, contracts, appointments, and
every mess of pottage corrupt men can proffer." Until northerners realized they needed
to consolidate their efforts, they would remain powerless. 16 Whether they were
doughfaces or six-dollar-a-day patriots, there were always so many politicians of this sort
in Congress, neither Federalists nor antislavery Republicans would be able to block the
spread of slavery.
Meanwhile, divisions and disagreements continued to chip away at the Federalist
Party in Massachusetts. Josiah Quincy, now a member of the General Court, was
unhappy when Harrison Gray Otis and other Federalists supported Maine's separation
and statehood. They thought eliminating the strongly Republican Maine votes would
solidify the Federalist base in Massachusetts proper. But Quincy believed that promoting
separation was unfair to Maine's Federalists, and twice, in 1816 and again in 1819, he
cast the lone dissenting vote in the state Senate, which earned him even more criticism
from other Federalists. 17
In other parts of the country, Federalists were increasingly unable to elect
candidates to public offices, and some began to float the idea of disbanding the party. 18
The last Federalist Governor of Massachusetts was John Brooks, who held the office
froml816 to 1823. In the gubernatorial election of 1824, Harrison Gray Otis ran with the
16
Josiah Quincy. Oration Delivered Before the Washington Benevolent Society' ofMassachusetts, on the
Thirtieth Day of April, 1813, Being the Anniversary of the First Inauguration of President Washington
(Boston: Wiiliam S. and Henry Spear, 1813). 19. 29.
17
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support of Daniel Webster and a young, optimistic, William Lloyd Garrison; but
Federalists were not solidly behind Otis, and the Democratic-Republican candidate
William Eustis won the election. Following Otis' defeat in 1824, no Federalist candidate
ever again ran for governor in Massachusetts.
19
For ambitious politicians, the burdens of Federalism - disunionism, antiwar
activism, and constitutional reform - were too heavy to bear. Like the conciliatory
Harrison Gray Otis, many Federalists distanced themselves from the party and attempted
an amalgamation of sorts, with Democratic Republicans. This was not entirely successful
because Republicans, north and south, were cautious and highly suspicious, even of
former Federalists. Nonetheless, such defections from the party were a signal that
traditional party lines had begun to disintegrate. Party lines broke down, and state
elections became chaotic. In the state elections of 1826, for example, over 800 men
received votes to represent the city in the General Court. Thus, after 1824, the Federalist
Party was dead in Massachusetts. 20
Yet, the fear of Federalism continued long after the party's demise. Former
Federalist John Quincy Adams, who became Secretary of State in the Monroe
Administration and was instrumental in drafting the Monroe Doctrine, decided to run for
president in 1824. Except for Timothy Pickering and a few Federalists who were still
peeved over his defection during the Embargo, Massachusetts along with the rest of New
England threw their support behind Adams. Although he ran as a Democratic-
19
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20
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Republican, there were some Republicans who did not trust Adams because had been a
staunch Federalist, was not sympathetic with the South during the Missouri crisis, and
maintained friendships with Federalists. One of the Republicans' major concerns was
that he might end their proscription of Federalists by returning them to federal offices.
But when Adams accepted the nomination of the Massachusetts Legislature, he kept his
Federalist supporters at arm's distance.
21
Adams ran against the popular war hero Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, and
Republicans William H. Crawford of South Carolina and Henry Clay of Kentucky.
Adams received all of the New England votes and a majority of New York's votes; but
when votes when tallied, neither of the candidates had a commanding majority. Jackson
had 99 to Adams' 84 votes, while Crawford had 41, and Clay 37 electoral votes. In the
vice presidential race, South Carolinian John C. Calhoun was the clear winner with 182
votes; but the House of Representatives had to decide the presidential contest by casting
one vote for each state. Henry Clay threw his support behind Adams, and the House cast
13 of its 24 votes for Adams, 7 for Jackson, and only 4 for Crawford. As a result, Adams
became the sixth president. 22
Unfortunately, Adams' presidency was as contentious as his election. He
appointed Henry Clay Secretary of State in 1825, but kept Monroe's Attorney General,
Postmaster General, and Secretary of the Navy."" His unwillingness to follow Jefferson's
lead, or even learn from his father's mistakes and exercise his Executive prerogatives to
21
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dismiss his predecessor's appointees, was one of many serious mistakes. Along with a
lack of loyal supporters in government offices and his cabinet, Adams" conciliatory
treatment of Federalists gave Jackson enough evidence to use the president's former party
affiliation to garner popularity among Democratic-Republicans, including many in
Adams" cabinet."4
Jackson easily defeated John Quincy Adams in 1828, winning by 178 to 83 votes,
but without New England's help. Again, the New England states overwhelmingly
supported Adams. But New York, which had given Adams 26 out of 36 votes in 1824,
gave Jackson 20 and Adams only 16 in 1828. It is also important to note that the
electoral votes were distributed among four candidates in 1824, but were divided just
between Jackson and Adams in 1828. As with Federalist candidates since 1796, Adams
received no support at all from the Deep South or western states. 23 Thus, the sectional
alignment that had contributed to the Democratic-Republican ascendancy in 1800 had not
really changed.
Following their retreat from Federalism, many former Federalists matriculated
into the National Republican Party, which began, with Adams' help, in 1828.
Nevertheless, the National Republican presidential candidate Henry Clay lost in 1832 to
Andrew Jackson. It was during Jackson's second term that National Republicans, along
with anti-Jackson Democrats, formed the Whig Party.
The Whigs had a national coalition and were able to elect two candidates to the
presidency, but controversies involving Federalists followed former party members
"4
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wherever they went. In 1840, Charles G. Greene published an expose linking
Massachusetts Whigs to radical Federalists. In an attempt to defeat the Whig candidate
William Henry Harrison, Greene regurgitated every Republican complaint, from the Jay
Treaty to the Hartford Convention, to embarrass former Federalists where were still
serving as U.S. congressmen, senators, judges, magistrates, and in other public capacities.
Greene argued that these devious men were in yet another conspiracy to return
Federalism to the White House, and he connected Sedgwick, Ames, Pickering, Lowell,
Webster, Otis, and the sons of former Federalists to the Whig Party to show that they
were using Harrison to advance Federalist and abolitionist plans. 26
In an odd way, Greene's harangue gives us an idea of the Federalists' impact on
nineteenth century politics. Early on, resistance to the spread of slavery in Massachusetts
was not confined exclusively to the Federalist Party, as can be seen in the fact that Joseph
Varnum and others supported the Ely Amendment and protested the spread of slavery.
But between 1800 and 1820, fear of a Federalist resurgence forced many northern
Democratic-Republicans to compromise over issues that proved detrimental to their
state's interests. Even before the Missouri crisis, many deplored the "slave votes" but
most still went along with their commercial policies or refused to cast dissenting votes.
In 1808, a sense of regional alienation occurred amongst Republicans, who as Orchard
Cook expressed in a letter to John Quincy Adams, were "hurt" that New England was
26
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being degraded and oppressed by "that pan of the country. . .kept by Negro votes (as he
called them)."27
Regardless of how Democratic-Republicans portrayed Federalists, they took the
lead and forced New Englanders to confront the realization that they were losing ground
in national politics, both geographically and ideologically. The idea of a "Universal
Yankee Nation,'" which surfaced in 1822 among Adams supporters, spoke to the need to
cultivate regional ideals among New England migrants to other areas of the nation. 28
Massachusetts Federalists broached the topic of New England nationalism long before
the Missouri crisis compelled moderates and northern Republicans to resist the spread of
slavery. Unlike Democratic-Republicans, by 1805 they had little to lose by alienating the
southern wing of their party.
Most of the old-line agitators from the Jefferson era survived long enough to see
many New Englanders come to understand the costs of allowing their regional interests to
recede into the background. Timothy Pickering, one of the most prominent disunionist
Federalists, is either famous or infamous, depending on your point of view. His career
exemplifies the highest and lowest points of Federalism in national politics. Pickering's
family disinherited him for adopting the Patriot cause during the Revolution; and
although his inheritance was later restored, Pickering remained a man of unflappable
convictions. He faithfully served the Continental Army during the Revolution, and
endured funding deficiencies that made his stint as Quartermaster General unnecessarily
taxing and often unrewarding. In addition, few men could boast, as could Pickering, that
27
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their public service included terms as Postmaster General, Secretary of War, and
Secretary of State under two presidents, or that they represented their state in the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives. 29 Yet, by the time Eliza glimpsed his stately form
and youthful demeanor, the fates of the "old Roman" and his party were sealed.
Timothy Pickering is perhaps the most controversial Federalist. He was at the
forefront of the Federalists' calls for a northern confederation, even after his disunion
scheme of 1804 failed for lack of interest. Although his most extreme plans were
consistently blocked by moderate Federalists Pickering contributed the bulk of the
Hartford Convention demands and left public office after serving as a Massachusetts
representative from 1813 until the Fourteenth Congress adjourned in 1817. He remained
convinced that slavery would tear the Union apart. "But other causes may break the bond
of Union. The slave population. . .has had vast influences on the past and may affect the
future destinies of America,"' Pickering wrote Chief Justice John Marshall in 1826. 30
Like his friend Alexander Hamilton, far too often, Pickering let personal feelings
interfere with his political judgment, and with the same results. For instance, because of
his hatred for both John and John Quincy Adams, Pickering supported Crawford in 1824
and Jackson in 1828. Pickering also embarked on an unwise crusade to tarnish the legend
of George Washington, but to no avail. Finally, in January 1829, after a long illness,
Pickering, whose intellectual energy had still not diminished, succumbed to physical
mortality. On his deathbed, Pickering's final words to a friend were, from a favorite
29 Gerard H. Clarfield. Timothy Pickering and the American Republic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. 1980), 67-74; William Bentley. The Diary of William Bentley. D.D.: Pastor of the East Church
Salem, Massachusetts (Salem: Essex Institute, 1905), 1: 380.
30
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poem "truths would you teach, or save a sinking land / All fear, none aid you, and few
understand.** After uttering these words, the wily Pickering expired at age 83.
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Throughout his public life, he made rash decisions and did not always display the
discipline and reason that should have governed the actions of a man of his stature. Yet,
Pickering's enemies knew who they were; and so did his friend. His uncompromising
regionalism, disdain for the three-fifths clause, and willingness to take extreme measures,
challenged the irresolute and disingenuous. For most of his life. Pickering eagerly and
often imprudently, acted on his convictions.
After the War of 1812, there were no Federalists with the stature of Fisher Ames
or John Adams to act as conduits of encouragement and advice to aspiring Federalists.
Ames, whose zeal for politics was no match for his respiratory ailment, had passed from
the scene too soon. After his forced retirement, Ames continued to write essays dealing
with his political philosophies and contemporary political issues. Between 1806 and
1807, he also helped to end the Federalists' quiescence during the nonimportation debates
in letters to rouse Timothy Pickering and Josiah Quincy to action. Along with
Jeffersonian truculence, I might add, Ames had a hand in putting the radical Federalists in
Congress on course.
On 4 July 1800 Ames died, and despite his extraordinary oratory skills, brilliance,
and wit, he remains the subject of historical debate. Ames' biographer, Winfred E.A.
Bernhard, was criticized by David Hackett Fischer for not using "tools of psychology and
psychiatry" to confirm his own analysis that "Ames showed clear and abundant
symptoms of serious mental disturbance.'* He and others conclude that anxiety brought
31 Quoted in Clarfield, Timothy Pickering, 264-269.
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on Ames' physical ailments, and Fisher has diagnosed Ames with "a manic-Depressive
psychosis. " Sadly, it appeai-s that none of the historians making these assertions even
considered the possibility that what appears to be erratic behavior in Ames, can also be
attributed to physical illness, especially if he suffered from a clinging and debilitating
respiratory ailment such as asthma. This would be a valid argument especially since,
when compared with his contemporaries, Ames' died fairly young. Clearly, there will be
much more said and debated about his health, but ultimately, when examining Ames, it is
more constructive to contextualize his life and actions and examine his political views
against the philosophical and political convulsions that occurred during his lifetime. 33
Historians have been much kinder to moderate Federalists and especially to those
who rejected the party's extremism during Jefferson's presidency. For instance, the
moderate Harrison Gray Otis. Otis served several years in the U.S. House of
Representatives and then entered the U.S. Senate in 1817. Through most of his career,
Otis was less concerned with the spread of slavery than his Federalist colleagues. Samuel
Eliot Morison recounts the occasions that Otis could have voted against the spread of
slavery, but did not.
34
Otis' apathetic response and unwillingness to side with Federalists,
?: David H. Fisher, "Review: Fisher Ames: Federalist and Statesman. 1758-1808 by Winfred E.A.
Bernhard," Journal ofAmerican History 53 (Dec., 1966): 589. and American Conservatism, 21; also see,
Elisha P. Douglass. "Fisher Ames. Spokesman for New England Federalism." Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 103 (Oct.. 15. 1849): 695.
33 Bernhard does an excellent job of reconstructing Ames' personal life, and provides a meticulous
description of state and national politics to establish the currents that informed Ames' political
philosophy and his response to the U.S. Constitution, sectionalism in Congress, and Jeffersonian policies
after 1800. Compare. John W. Malsberger. "The Political Thought of Fisher Ames" Journal of the Early
Republic 2 (Spring, 1982): 1-20.
' 4
Morison. Harrison Cray Otis, 425-426.
324
even when they said little about the actual abolition of slavery, may have had something
to do with his racial prejudices.
When the petitions asking the Sixth Congress to stop the extradition of legally
manumitted slaves from Pennsylvania back to North Carolina came before the House,
Otis objected to taking up the issue, and said that the former slaves were "incapable of
writing their names, or of reading the petition, and. a. fortiori, of digesting the principles
of it." Whether or not the slaves were entitled to their freedom was inconsequential. To
Otis, the real issue was those persons who actually wrote the petition because they were
teaching black people "the art of assembling together, debating, and the like,'" which if
encouraged by Congress and allowed to continue, would "extend from one part of the
Union to the other." 35 Thus, Otis voted with southerners on that bill and many others
dealing with slavery for reasons more complex than property rights or apathy.
After his last term in Congress, Otis became mayor of Boston (1829-1831), and
never returned to national politics. Before his death on 28 October 1848 at age eighty-
three, Otis commented publicly on Whig defectors to the Free Soil Party. He published a
letter entitled, "To the People of Massachusetts" which warned of the dangers that
abolitionists and Free Soilers posed to the Union. Like many of his contemporaries. Otis'
mind remained sharp and alert until his slipped into a coma and died 26 days later. 36
The lives and careers of John Quincy Adams and Josiah Quincy took different
turns that ended in the same place. After serving one term as president (1825-1829),
Adams was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1831. Upon returning to
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Congress, he became an uncompromising opponent of slavery expansion. He introduced
antislavery petitions and campaigned for the abolition of slavery on an almost daily basis.
From 1836 to 1848, Adams defeated the nefarious gag rule on antislavery petitions and
denounced the annexation of Texas (1845) and the Mexican War (1846-1848) as
conspiracies to expand slavery.
By 1837, Adams confessed that slavery "is absorbing all my faculties."
Nonetheless, he became a popular champion of abolition, and even African-Americans
like John Davies, came to him with advice on how to rescue his stepson from slavery. In
1841, before the U.S. Supreme Court, Adams defended and won the freedom of a group
of Africans taken from the schooner Amistad in what is considered the most important
slavery case before Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856-1857). During his two-day argument,
Adams criticized the South for participating in the illegal slave trade and President
Martin Van Buren for his complicity. 37 Adams was asked but never joined an abolition
society. But abolitionists read his speeches at meetings, and celebrated he unrelenting
fight against slavery in Congress. In 1848, Adams suffered a cerebral stroke in Congress,
and died in the capital building a few days later. 38
Similar to Adams, Josiah Quincy became involved in the struggle to arrest the
spread of slavery, but never reentered national politics. Quincy became the mayor of
Boston and president of Harvard College after retiring from politics, and he edited John
37 Adams, Diary, 417, 545: See, Argument ofJohn Quincy Adams Before the Supreme Court of the United
States in The Case of the United States, Appellants, vs. Cinque, and Others, Africans Captured in the
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Quincy Adams* memoirs and soon recognized that Adams had adopted his own views on
the futility of attempting compromise with the slave states' "unbroken phalanx."' Quincy
became a prolific writer, conducted agricultural experiments on his farm, and became
Boston's largest landowner, which brought wealth and supported his family long after his
death. Quincy never lost touch with the sectional struggle and publicly praised John
Quincy Adams* fight to keep slavery out of new states. In 1850, Quincy began his
Federalist crusade anew and joined protests over the Compromise of 1850 and the
Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854). He also harshly criticized "Cotton Whigs," men of the
northern states who supported these legislative acts.
Quincy lived long enough to see his sons Edmund and Josiah Jr. become
abolitionists and his grandson, Samuel Miller Quincy, fight with the Second
Massachusetts Infantry and receive wounds at Cedar Mountain and Chancellorsville.
Samuel then served as a staff officer with the 73 rd United States Colored Infantry for the
remainder of the war. In the end, Quincy, who was never ashamed of his Federalist Party
history, lived a full and rewarding life. When slavery finally tore the Union apart,
Quincy supported the effort and asserted, "I have anticipated such an event for more than
sixty years. I am only disappointed and regret that it has not come before. 39
It is because of their unyielding convictions that Federalists continue to raise
controversy and the criticism of historians. Federalists attempted to check the spread of
slavery but were thwarted by moderates and northern Democratic-Republicans who
preferred compromise to problem solving. In the end, history bore out that certain issues,
such as the extension of slavery, could not be solved through compromise. Had more
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northerners in Congress aligned themselves with Federalists in their fight to check the
spread of slavery, had they supported the Thacher. Ely, or Tallmadge amendments,
perhaps the casualties that extended from Bleeding Kansas through the civil rights
movement would have been avoided. Of course, this did not happen; and for the most
part, nineteenth century politicians, not unlike their counterparts today, often chose
political office over principle even when vital issues are at stake. Thus, while they were
far from perfect, the Federalists' long and passionate defense of the Constitution, their
willingness to champion unpopular causes, and their fight for economic independence
continue to inspire historical inquiry.
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